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"Change"
has been the campaign mantra of Indonesia’s first democratically
and directly elected President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, popularly
known as SBY. With nearly 61 percent of the 116 million voters casting
their votes in favour of President Yudhoyono, the mandate for reformasi
could not have been clearer. In only six years since the fall of
Soeharto, Indonesia has a quantum leap from authoritarianism to
a real democracy but dissatisfaction with previous governments and
expectations from President Yudhoyono remain high.
If
President Yudhoyono were not to face the fate of impeached President
Abdur Rahman Wahid, he must tackle corruption, bring financial stability
and uphold the rule of law. His Democratic Party and its allies
have slightly over 60 seats out of 550 in the House. The opposition
Nationhood Coalition consisting of outgoing President Megawati's
Democratic Party of Struggle, Golkar Party and a number of smaller
parties, controls more than 300 seats in the House. Any honeymoon
period for President is likely to be short lived. The opposition
has the capacity to shoot down virtually all proposals and initiatives
introduced by President Yudhoyono's administration.
Separation
of military from politics:
The
first test would be President Yudhoyono's attempt to review the
controversial Indonesian Military (TNI) bill adopted by the House
of Representatives on the last day of its five-year term on 30 September
2004 to replace Law No. 2/1988 on the Indonesian Armed Forces. It
comes into effect within one month after the House’s approval, with
or without, the President’s signature.
President
Yudhoyono promised to scrutinise the bill to determine whether it
contradicted the constitution or military doctrines. He has so far
failed to make any specific comment on any particular articles or
issues pertaining to the Bill. The Bill, despite the flaws, still
serves to reduce the military's power. But the bill is silent about
the future of the military's existing territorial command structure
after the law comes into effect, saying only that the physical presence
of troops on the ground can be maintained in areas prone to conflict
or incursions by foreign powers. Former President Soeharto used
territorial command structure to coerce the people into supporting
his government for more than three decades. Consequently, there
is strong reservation from the people about the territorial command
structure. It remains to be seen what action is taken by President
Yudhoyono who served as Chief of Territorial
Affairs of the TNI.
Exit
strategy for Aceh:
Sixteen
months have elapsed since the declaration of martial law in Aceh
in May 2003 but there appears to be no exit strategy. The TNI has
contained the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) but the basic structure of
GAM largely remains intact. The cost of war has been quite high.
According to the TNI, there were 1,164 victims of violence but only
662 civilian casualties. The TNI figure however does not include
the deaths of 2,879 people, the detention of 1,798, or the surrender
of 1,954 people, whom the TNI claims are members of GAM, or its
sympathizers. In addition, there are at least 159 casualties on
the TNI side.
President
Yudhoyono needs to implement what he called resolution of the Aceh
problem "in a fair manner and as peacefully as possible”. The
military interventions cannot resolve the Aceh crisis. As a confidence
building measure, the government should scale down the TNI presence
in Aceh and involve a mutually acceptable third party such as Japan
to facilitate the peace process. President Yudhoyono would have
to release at least the jailed GAM negotiators to allow real talks
to begin again.
Addressing
Papua question:
Jakarta
also needs to address the West Papuan crisis. The recent declassification
of documents by the United States National Security Archive states
that 1969 UN referendum on Papua unfolded like a Greek tragedy in
which the conclusion was already preordained - Indonesia "cannot
and will not permit any resolution other than the continued inclusion
of West Irian in Indonesia."
Jakarta
has been wishy-washy on the Papuan question. In an attempt to counter
Papua's call for freedom, then President BJ Habibi adopted Law No.
45/1999 to divide the province into three - West Irian Jaya, Central
Irian Jaya and Irian Jaya. In a departure from Habibi, succeeding
President Wahid introduced Papua Special Autonomy Law 21/2001. Unfortunately,
legislators involved in deliberations on Law No. 21/2001 failed
to include an article stipulating that Law No. 45/1999 was not legally
binding. However, President Megwati Sukarnoputri in a complete U-turn
introduced Instruction (Inpres) No.1 of 2003 calling for the speedy
implementation of Law No. 45.
On
28 July 2004, experts told the Constitutional Court of Indonesia
that Law No. 45/1999 on the formation of West Irian Jaya and Central
Irian Jaya provinces was no longer valid following the enactment
of Law No. 21/2001 on special autonomy for Papua. The division of
Papua also failed to follow Law No. 22/1999 on regional autonomy,
which says the formation of a new province requires the approval
of the people of the mother province. The Law No. 45/1999 ran counter
to Article 18(b) of the Constitution, which stipulates that the
state should respect special regions regulated by law.
The Papua Legislative Council has sought a judicial review
of Law No. 45/1999 and Presidential Instruction No. 21/2003 arguing
that they are contrary to the Constitution and Law No. 21/2001.
While
the verdict of the Constitutional Court is awaited, President Yudhoyono
must listen to what Papua's Governor J.P. Salossa told the Constitutional
Court on 28 July October 2004 - the division of Papua would lead
to rebellion. The implementation of the Papuan Special Autonomy
Law is crucial if the Acehnese were to be encouraged to accept solutions
within the framework of Indoensian nation state.
In
addition, there have been increasing human rights violations in
Papua. On 2 September 2004, the Chairman of the National Commission
on Human Rights (Komnas Ham) of Indonesia, Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara,
stated that it had found initial evidence suggesting that security
personnel had committed crimes against humanity in two separate
incidents in Papua a few years ago. The conclusion was based on
an investigation conducted by the Komnas Ham between 17 December
2003 and 31 July 2004. In
raids on Wamena villagers between April and June 2003 by Army troops,
at least seven people were killed, 48 tortured and some 7,000 others
were forced to flee. The sweeps were launched after suspected Free
Papua Movement (OPM) members stole 29 rifles from the military armory
in Wamena on 4 April 2003. In
Wasior, at least three people were killed, 16 others tortured and
dozens of houses were set ablaze when police raided a village following
the killings of six police Mobile Brigade (Brimob) officers by alleged
rebels on 13 June 2001.
Accountability
for the crimes against humanity in Timor Leste:
Impunity
is all pervading in Indonesia. The United Nations finalise its study
on the judgement of the Indonesian court of July 29 acquitting four
military and police officers -- Major General Adam Damiri, Colonel.
Noer Muis, Lt. Colonel Sujarwo and Senior Commander Hulman Gultom
-- who were convicted of perpetrating atrocities in East Timor.
All had been found guilty by the Ad hoc Human Rights Court established
by Jakarta in 2002 to scuttle the establishment of international
criminal court. As a result of the latest court decision, only two
of 18 defendants have been convicted - former East Timor governor
Abilio Soares and pro-Jakarta militia leader Eurico Guterres, both
of whom are civilians and ethnic Timorese. While both Indonesia
and Timor Leste rejected the idea of an UN tribunal, unless Indonesia
in cooperation with East Timor could find a way to establish accountability
for crimes against humanity, international community will continue
to have legitimate questions.
The
reformasi should start now. The
initiation of legal reforms for an accountable government; increasing
independence, powers and resources of the KOMNAS Ham; ratification
of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court
and other international human rights instruments; increasing involvement
for creation of regional human rights mechanisms in the ASEAN region;
and helping the process for
restoration of democracy in Myanmar must be included in the agenda
for reformasi.
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