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At
home with the Burmese Generals
With
the sacking of Burmese Prime Minister, General Khin Nyunt, which
the State Peace and Democratic Council (SPDC) euphemistically termed
as “permitted
to retire”, India finds itself in a piquant situation. The
top honcho of the SPDC, General Than Shwe is scheduled to undertake
five-day visit to India from 24 October 2004. New Delhi is all set
to accord red carpet welcome with a gun salute, reserved for the
Head of the State. If such a red carpet were accorded to General
Than Shwe, it would be a clear rebuff to the European Union which
imposed further sanctions on 11 October 2004 for the failure to
release Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and would also tantamount to recognising
the SPDC's hardline policy towards pro-democracy movement. As the
international community takes stock of the fallout of the sacking
of General Khin Nyunt, New Delhi might as well take the opportunity
to cement relations with the hardliners in the SPDC in order to
combat its insurgents in the North East, especially given the fact
that General Khin Nyunt is considered close to Beijing.
The sacking of General Khin Nyunt is the most serious challenge faced
by the military since it took over after a violent crackdown on
the pro-democracy activists in 1988. General Khin Nyunt has reportedly
been put under house arrest along with his son, Ye
Naing Win. Scores of other military intelligence
officials too have been arrested. Considered the most educated
and adroit of all the ruling generals, General Khin Nyunt, as the
powerful head of the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), eliminated
his rivals including Lt General Tun Kyi by exposing corruption and
venality within the ruling circle. He has now been ousted on the
same corruption allegations.
“Yet, corruption is not the key issue for
his ouster” - says Soe Myint, Director of Mizzima News based in
New Delhi. “Every one in the Burmese military is corrupt – deep
down, it is control over army, resources and road map to democratic
Burma that caused Khin Nyunt's sacking.”
The
power struggle between General Maung Aye, No. 2 and Commander of
the Army and General Khin Nyunt, No. 3 and head of the MIS has been
continuing for quite sometime. With General Than Shwe, No. 1 in
the SPDC hierarchy and Head of the State being a known hardliner
himself, General Khin Nyunt has been virtually living on the edges
with rumours of his looming ouster. On 25 August 2003, General Khin
Nyunt was made Prime Minister, a perceived demotion, in a major
shake up following the alleged coup attempt by the relatives of
late General Ne Win. In a clear indication of changes to come, General
Soe Win, who replaced Khin Nyunt as the Prime Minister, was appointed
Secretary One of the SPDC in August 2004. On 18 September 2004,
Khin Nyunt’s loyalists, Foreign Minister Win Aung and his deputy,
Khin Maung Win were “permitted to retire”. Following the orders
from General Maung Aye, the regular army conducted raids on intelligence
officials in Muse town along China-Myanmar border in September 2004
and arrested scores of intelligence officers. When General Khin
Nyunt and his staff reportedly flew to Mandalay on 18 October 2004
to see the arrested intelligence officials awaiting interrogation,
they were reportedly taken into custody on the order of General
Maung Aye. In Rangoon, an army unit seized the office of General
Khin Nyunt's MIS. According to Thai intelligence sources, Khin Nyunt
was reportedly taken to see Than Shwe in a military compound and
informed of the decision to eject him from the junta’s inner circle.
Prime
Minister Khin Nyunt’s ouster has put questions on the road map to
democracy in Burma and national reconciliation with the ethnic nationlity
groups. In an attempt to counter the call of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
for "early
lifting of restrictions placed on Aung San Suu Kyi" in its Phnom Penh summit on 16
June 2003 and Thailand’s roadmap of17 July 2003, Prime Minister Khin Nyunt
announced seven point roadmap of Burma on 30 August 2003 including
reconvening the National Convention, drafting
a new constitution and holding free and fair elections, without
any time frame. Prime Minister Khin Nyunt frequently told ASEAN leaders and the
United Secretary generals' Special Envoy, Razali Ismail that he
supported involving Aung San Suu Kyi in the national reconciliation
process and engaging in a dialogue with the international community.
General Khin Nyunt found at odd with the hardliners. The hardliners
prevailed and consequently Aung San Suu Kyi was barred from attending
the National Convention held from 17 May to 19 July 2004. In protest,
the National League for Democracy boycotted the National Convention
and international community raised legitimate questions. The hardliners
in the SPDC who appearantly believe that the junta has obtained
legitimacy from its neighbours after participation in the recent
EU-ASEAN Summit in Hanoi in October 2004, decided to dispense with
Khin Nyunt.
The
purge of Khin Nyunt is likely to have serious implications on the
cease-fire agreements with ethnic nationality groups. Khin Nyunt
was instrumental to neutralise infamous Khun Sa. He was also the
architect of signing cease-fire agreements with as many as 17 ethnic
armed groups including the Myanmar National Democracy Alliance Army
(Kokang), United Wa State Army (Myanmar National Solidarity Party),
National Democratic Alliance Army (Shan/Akha Armed National Groups),
Shan State Army (Shan State Progress Party), New Democratic Army
(Kachin), Kachin Defence Army (KIO 4th Brigade), Pa-O National Organisation,
Palaung State Liberation Army, Kayan National Guard (breakaway group
from KNLP), Kachin Independence Organization, Karenni State Nationalities
Peoples' Liberation Front, Kayan New Land Party, Shan State Nationalities
Peoples' Liberation Organization and New Mon State Party. Sixteen
members of the powerful Karen National Union who left for Yangoon
on 18 October 2004 for talks with the SPDC have been reportedly ordered to remain at the house where they are
staying. Many
ethnic leaders have developed trust on Khin Nyunt and have little
faith on Than Shwe or Maung Aye. Many ethnic group leaders who signed
the cease-fire agreements have been attending the National Convention.
With Khin Nyunt's ouster, their participation is far from guaranteed.
With
the appointment of Lt General Soe Win, a Than Shwe loyalist who
supported the Union Solidarity Development Association in their
brutal attack on Suu Kyi and her supporters on 30 May 2003 as Prime
Minister, the hardliners have consolidated their position. It is unlikely that General Khin Nyunt would
be able to come back. This is despite the fact that General Khin
Nyunt, compared to reclusive Than Shwe and General Maung Aye, has
been the face of the hardline regime overseas. Many governments
put their eggs in the “Khin Nyunt basket”, which basically meant
having faith in his ability to secure from the hardliners whatever
arrangements were made. Thailand’s Prime Minister Thaksin Shinwatra
stuck his neck out for Khin Nyunt at the ASEAN Summit in Bali in
October 2003, calling on the international community to give Rangoon
breathing space to push through its so-called “road map” for democracy
and national reconciliation. United Nations’ special envoy Razali
Ismail relied on Khin Nyunt as his point of entry into the SPDC's
inner circle. Even China had pinned its hopes on Khin Nyunt of being
able to introduce economic reforms in Burma.
All the neighbouring countries are likely to
follow Thailand, which has already termed the sacking of Khin Nyunt
as an “internal matter of Burma”. Given the possible negative fallout
from the neighbouring countries as well as within the military,
the SPDC is unlikely to prosecute Khin Nyunt on corruption charges.
It is precisely for these reasons he was "permitted to retire
on health grounds". For General Than Shwe and other
hardliners, there is no other alternative but to follow the initiatives
undertaken by Khin Nyunt with regard to national reconciliation
with the ethnic nationality groups and road map to democracy. Yet
the hardliners, too afraid of losing their control, are likely to
overturn the initiatives of General Khin Nyunt.
The
SPDC survives the stringent economic sanctions primarily because
of the support of the neighbouring countries. This was lucidly articulated
by Kyaw Win, Burma’s ambassador to Britain in an interview
to the BBC on 5 June 2002 while commenting on the new bill to increase
sanctions and tighten the visa ban on Burmese military officials
introduced in the US Congress: "There is no evidence we
are worried about sanctions. Not that we want them, but we are not
afraid of them either because we have lived for 26 years on our
own before, and we have very good neighbors around us and we can
simply trade and exchange relations with our close, good neighbors.
We have the two largest countries of the world (India and China)
on either side who are happily trading and exchanging all kinds
of technical, transportation, security measures [with Burma] and
we are living in harmony with all of them."
The sacking of General Khin Nyunt should not
be considered as an "internal matter of Burma". Rather
it provides an opportunity to the neighbouring countries to put
pressure on the SPDC for restoration of democracy in Burma. General
Than Shwe and other hardliners must be impressed upon, in the words
of United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, "to remain
committed to its promised "road map" to democracy".
Thailand should immediately convene the meeting of the "Forum
on International Support for National Reconciliation in Myanmar"
to develop a cogent regional approach to deal with the crisis in
Burma.
With General Than Shwe scheduled to undertake
his visit to India from 24 October 2004, the pressure on the SPDC
hardliners to commit themselves to promised roadmap to demcoracy
should ideally start from the self-proclaimed largest democracy
in the world. However, New Delhi having already blinked under the
SPDC's pressure as reflected from the use of its sovereign power
to deny visas to many international participants to the 2nd
International Conference for the Restoration of Democracy in Burma
held in New Delhi from 15-17 October 2004 is unlikely to adopt such
a policy. It is a shame for democracy but when did India or other neighbouring countries stood for democracy
in Burma? Ask those Burmese pro-democracy activists, who having
been promised assistance by Indian embassy in Yangoon in 1988, crossed
the international border only to be arrested and detained or handed
over to the Burmese military by the Indian security forces.
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