injured were women and children. According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), as many as 53 persons have been killed and 132 have been injured in military operations in Dera Bugti from last week of December 2005 till 8 January 2006. Eighteen people including 12 suspected members of the Balochi armed opposition groups and six security personnel have been reportedly killed from 11-13 January 2006. There were also reports of extra-judicial killings of the detainees by the law enforcement agencies.

The root causes of the conflict in Balochistan are not hard to find. On 29 September 2004, a Parliamentary Committee comprising 29 members and headed by Pakistan Muslim League, President Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain was formed "to examine the current situation in Balochistan and make recommendations thereon." The committee was subsequently divided into two sub-committees. One of the Sub-Committees headed by Wasim Sajjad was mandated to address the question of provincial autonomy, while the other Sub-Committee headed by Mushahid Hussein Sayed was mandated to address the immediate crisis in the province.

I. The lack of provincial autonomy

The denial of autonomy has been a major cause of the ongoing conflict. The 1973 Constitution provided that the concurrent list determining the quantum of provincial autonomy would be revised after every 10 years. This has never been done. When General Pervez Musharaff assumed power in October 1999, among other things, he promised to work towards “strengthening the federation, removing inter-provincial disharmony and restoring national cohesion”. Six years later, President Musharaff failed to keep his promises. Instead, he has been sending thousands of regular troops and paramilitary forces in parts of Balochistan and South and North Waziristan, adjacent to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, supposedly for “strengthening the federation”.

In March 2005, the Parliamentary Sub-Committee on Balochistan headed by Wasim Sajjad recommended complete revision of the concurrent list, announcement of the National Finance Commission award before budget, biannual meetings of the Council of Common Interests and distribution of federal resources on the basis of poverty, backwardness, unemployment and development level of provinces instead of the existing criterion of population. These recommendations too have not been implemented, thereby creating impression that the federal government is not serious about politically accommodating the Balochis.

II. Problem of underdevelopment

Balochistan faces the twin problems of high illiteracy and high poverty incidences. The average literacy rate of the population aged 10 years and above is only 36 percent.

Some of the Balochi political leaders allegedly play narrow local or regional issues in order to sustain their leadership where tribalism in politics is deeply entrenched, not to mention about interferences by Islamabad. Its drought-stricken pastoral economy cannot even provide food for its small population. This state of affairs has been continuing since independence and the neglect has now strengthened the ranks of the nationalists and increased their clout.

Balochistan reportedly produces about 36 percent of natural gas of Pakistan. However, the Balochis have not reportedly been benefiting from these huge reserves of mineral resources.

In its report in March 2005, the Parliamentary Sub-Committe Committee on Balochistan headed by senator Mushahid Hussain, recommended increase in gas royalty and surcharge; maximum representation to the province on the boards of the oil and gas companies operating in the province; implementation of the job quota of the Baloch; shifting of the Gwadar Port Authority head office to Balochistan; seven per cent of the gross port revenue to go to the province; training of local youth for jobs; probing of allotment of lands by a judicial body; construction of highways; announcement of National Finance Commission; taking of Confidence Building Measures such as keeping the visibility of the armed forces low; not disbanding the levy forces; holding in abeyance the construction of cantonments at Gwadar, Dera Bugti and Kohlu; harnessing water resources; maintaining Baloch-Pakhtoon parity in every respect - in terms of population and the regions.

Earlier, in February 2005, Pakistan goevrnment announced two mega projects i.e. the construction of a deep seaport at Gwadar and the Saindak copper mining project. The Balochis claim that 75% of their lands at Gwadar have been acquired by serving military officers at throwaway prices. Most jobs at Gwadar and Saindak have been given to non-Balochistanis. The mega projects further alienated the Balochis who fear a possible Punjabi speaking Chief Minister in the near future because of the migration of outsiders. Though President Pervez Musharraf had reportedly accepted 27 out of 31 recommendations made by Mushahid Hussain Committee, it failed address the root causes of Balochistan.

Not surprisingly, the military cantonments being set up at Gwadar, Dera Bugti and Kohlu (the capital of the Marri tribal lands) have been viewed as outposts of repression and control. Baloch tribal leaders have reacted angrily and in January 2005 clashes broke out between the armed opposition groups and security forces.

The ongoing heavy military operations in Balochistan is well-kown and the recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee have been thrown out of the window. In the post September 11th period, Pakistan government has been able to club the Balochi rebellion as another basket case of Islamic fundamentalism and take draconian measures. Yet, there is no military solution to the crisis and the military regime of General Musharaff is unlikely to opt for a solution through dialogue. The Balochistan crisis is a clear example of the fact that tribalism is stronger than religious fundamentalism. It is the identity of the Balochis which is at stake.