Letters to the editor 

Editorial I

Managing Tsunami Aid Deluge
Suhas Chakma

While the Paris Club of 19 creditor nations decided to freeze the debts, a total of US$ 270 billions, owed by tsunami-affected countries on January 12, 2005, Indonesia tightened the screws over the involvement of foreign aid workers in trouble torn Aceh. At the meeting in Geneva on January 11, donor countries promised $ 717 million, equivalent to 73 per cent of the $ 977 million requested by United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan to help the survivors over the next six months.

One of the major concerns is to ensure that, in contrast with previous catastrophes, all the money promised is actually paid this time and reaches the people who need it. Providing of food aid and other assistances in the first few months will be relatively easier. However, as the satellite televisions shift the spotlights on other areas, reconstruction and rebuilding the lives of the millions affected by tsunami can be seriously hampered by the governments’ attempt to seize their chances to pound on the armed opposition groups in Indonesia and Sri Lanka.

Both the Sri Lankan and Indonesian military establishments expressed their wishes that nature in the form of the tsunami, would help to resolve decades-old political problems. While the Sri Lankan military stated that LTTE Supremo, Velupillai Prabhakaran had become a victim of the tsunami, Indonesian Army chief Endriartono Sutarto stated that majority members of the Free Aceh Movement — Gerakan Aceh Merdeka — (GAM) have become victims of the tsunami. There are no signs that the tsunami is helping to resolve political problems.

On January 11, 2005, the Indonesian Government restricted the movement of aid workers in Aceh under the guise of protecting them and accusing the GAM members of stealing aid. There were no confirmed reports to substantiate the allegations against the GAM. However, aid workers must now register to travel outside the towns of Banda Aceh and Meulaboh. The restriction will increase bureaucratic interference on the grounds, enhance the power of the local Army commanders and will seriously slow down relief efforts in the areas where it is needed most. While the foreign troops helping the tsunami survivors in Aceh province must leave by the end of March 2005, other remaining foreigners will have to register at a foreign affairs desk in Banda Aceh and provide details of their current and planned activities, as well as any travel plans outside Banda Aceh and Meulaboh.

Prior to December 26, 2004, the Indonesian military had little control over the areas outside of Banda Aceh and Meulaboh. The Indonesian Army did not reciprocate the unilateral cease-fire offered by GAM on December 26, 2004 and continued military operations in the North and East Aceh. The military also reportedly denied permission to the local NGOs to participate in the distribution of aid. Therefore, the latest directive of the Indonesian Army appears to be a part of its attempt to re-establish control over Aceh, where it has been battling separatist rebels. Since the collapse of the peace talks in May 2003, Aceh had been under emergency rule and was closed both to aid agencies and the international media.

Unlike in Aceh where the victims are uniformly Acehnese, in Sri Lanka victims include Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese, and the tsunami did not discriminate along ethnic lines. However, if the President Chandrika Kumaratunga government discriminates along ethnic lines, it could deepen the existing grievances. The discrimination by the Sinhalese against the minority Tamils cannot be swept aside under the abuses perpetrated by the LTTE.

The LTTE has accused the Central Government in Colombo of withholding aid from Tamil areas of the country and using the disaster as a pretext for sending government troops into LTTE-held areas. The Tamil survivors of the tsunami also complained that the government could have sent helicopters to help air-lift out of flooded areas as they did in the south. The quantity of aid coming from the Central Government is reportedly less.

Ordinary people from all over the world have donated hundreds of millions of dollars as raw display of generosity to assist the tsunami survivors and not to support the political agenda of the governments or the armed opposition groups. The last thing expected at the moment is the outburst of clashes between the security forces and the armed opposition groups which will only increase the despair of the victims of one of the greatest tragedies ordained by nature. While the outpouring of aid is welcome, the United Nations and the donors must realize that effective delivery of aid for the survivors would hinge on peace on the ground in Aceh and Northern and Eastern parts of Sri Lanka. Ignoring the survivors from these regions will further deepen the resentment against Jakarta and Colombo. While pledging aid, donors must also stress on maintaining peace.

The cease-fire between the LTTE and Sri Lankan Government is helpful for aid delivery. The donors must ensure a similar cease-fire agreement between the Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian Government so that aid agencies could distribute supplies and start reconstruction without any intimidation or interference. In addition, the donors must also urge to stop all forms of military operations and demilitarize the areas affected by the tsunami; remove the national military personnel from the delivery of aid after development of the infrastructure for the delivery of aid; prohibit the entry of the military personnel and other non-State armed personnel into the relief camps; establish a system of accountability for the use of aid to ensure that governments do not use the aid money for military purposes or other events and programmes; set conditions that project activities are supervised by independent agencies or the consultants or companies of the donors and the activities are implemented within a set time; undertake emergency measures to establish the local communities so that they could leave the relief camps as soon as possible to start their normal life in the community with others; develop mechanisms for co-ordination and information sharing amongst the donors to avoid duplication as well as to increase efficiency. The involvement of the local communities, community organizations and NGOs in the implementation of all the programmes and projects with special focus on the most vulnerable groups remains fundamental in this regard.

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