

**BANGLADESH:
SENDING DEATH SQUADS TO
KEEP THE UN'S PEACE**



ASIAN CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

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Bangladesh: Sending Death Squads to Keep the UN's Peace

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACHR	Asian Centre for Human Rights
AFD	Armed Forces Division
ARV	Armoured Recovery Vehicles
ASP	Assistant Superintendent of Police
BDR	Bangladesh Rifles
BGB	Border Guard Bangladesh
BIPSOT	Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operations
BMA	Bangladesh Military Academy
BNP	Bangladesh Nationalist Party
CHTs	Chittagong Hill Tracts
CoAS	Chief of Army Staff
Col.	Colonel
DB	Detective Branch
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
FIR	First Information Report
FPU	Formed Police Units
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IAPTC	International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres
IPOs	Individual police officers
Lt.	Lieutenant
JOPSOC	Junior Officers Peace Support Operation Course
MBML	Manual of Bangladesh Military Law
MBT	Main Battle Tanks
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NHRC	National Human Rights Commission of Bangladesh
OHCHR	Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

OIOS	UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services
PCJSS	Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti
PDT	Pre Deployment Training
PKOTC	Peacekeeping Operation Training Centre
PTC	Police Training Center
RAB	Rapid Action Battalion
RDO	Rural Departmental Officers
SAAT	Selection and Assistance and Assessment Team
SKS	Sena Kalyan Sangstha
SPATs	Special Police Assessment Teams
UN	United Nations
UNO	Upazilla Nirbahi Officer
UNCCC	UN Contingent Commanders Course
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNCMC	UN Contingent Member Course
UNGA	UN General Assembly
UNIKOM	UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
UNLOC	UN Logistic Officers Course
UNMIS	UN Mission in Sudan
UNMOC	UN Military Observer Course
UNPOL	UN Police Division
UNSAS	United Nations Standby Arrangement System
UNSMC	UN Senior Mission leaders Course
UNSOC	UN Staff Officers Course
UPDF	United People's Democratic Front
VDP	Village Defence Party

Introduction: Sending Death Squads to Keep the UN's Peace?

Despite a return to democracy in December 1990, the Bangladesh Army remains “the power behind the throne”¹ in Dhaka. Its control over the security forces is absolute. A large number of senior positions in the Bangladesh Navy and Bangladesh Air Force are served by Army officers as per Section 2A of the Army Act of Bangladesh.² The Bangladesh Army also commands other paramilitary forces³ and at the time of the Pikhana mutiny on 25 February 2009, out of the 446 officer positions in the Bangladesh Rifles (BDRs), 386 positions were occupied by deputed Army Officers.⁴ This situation remains unchanged - the Bangladesh Army officers continue to command the BDRs, now renamed as Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB). In fact, the Bangladesh Army has been engaged in civil policing since 26 March 2004 following the establishment of the RAB, a hybrid force drawn from the Bangladesh Police, Bangladesh Army, Bangladesh Navy, Bangladesh Air Force, Border Guard Bangladesh and Bangladesh Ansar.⁵ As of 27 August 2013, out of the 208 officers in the RAB, 114 were police officers, followed by 83 Army officers and 11 Air Force officers.⁶

The United Nations (UN) peacekeeping work is a source of considerable national pride for Bangladesh. It is the second largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs) at present. About seven percent of the Bangladesh Army has been consistently deployed on UN peacekeeping missions since 2005.⁷ There is no transparency in the selection of peacekeepers from any of the forces in Bangladesh. To ACHR's knowledge, the Bangladesh government has not developed vetting policies, despite the introduction of “*Human Rights Screening of United Nations Personnel*” by the United Nations on 12 December 2012. This policy was recently communicated to troop and police contributing countries with a request that they put in place the necessary systems to uphold the new policy. There is an urgent need for Bangladesh as one of the largest troop contributing countries to develop such policy and make it publicly available.

Serving in a UN peacekeeping operation is a significant financial opportunity and indeed a life changing opportunity for those selected. At the UN standard rate, Bangladesh Army personnel earn upwards of US \$2,200 a month for an officer and US \$1,100 for a soldier, in addition to other

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1. See International Crisis Group interview, London, November 2011, as cited in International Crisis Group (ICG), *Bangladesh: Back to the Future*, 13 December 2012, Asia Report N°226, available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/226-bangladesh-back-to-the-future.pdf>, last accessed on 8 October 2013.
 2. “The Government may by order in writing direct that any person referred to in clause (a), clause (b) or clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 2 shall, under such conditions as may be laid down by regulations, be seconded for service with the Bangladesh Navy or the Bangladesh Air Force.” See Army Act, 1950, Section 2A, available at: http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=248, last accessed on 26 August 2013.
 3. Other than the RAB, “paramilitary forces include the Bangladesh Rifles ...the Bangladesh Ansars...Village Defence Parties...and a National Cadet Corps. All answer to the home ministry, although the Bangladesh Rifles is commanded by seconded army officers and all paramilitary units operate in support of the army during national crisis or war.” See ICG, *Bangladesh Today*, 23 October 2006, Report N°121, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4565e5054.html>, last accessed on 9 October 2013.
 4. See Human Rights Watch, *Revolt at the BDR Headquarters situated at Peelkhana: Report of the Investigating Committee created for Investigation of the Heinous Massacre*, 21 May 2009, available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Investigation%20Report%20-%20Government%20Inquiry_0.pdf, last accessed on 1 September 2013.
 5. See Rapid Action Battalion, *Short History*, available at: http://www.rab.gov.bd/about_us.php?page=2, last accessed on 1 September 2013.
 6. See Rapid Action Battalion, *Telephone Directory*, available at: <http://www.rab.gov.bd/telephonedir.php>, last accessed on 21 October 2013. The details of RAB officers have been provided in Annex 1.
 7. The Army, UN Peacekeeping Mission and Democracy in Bangladesh, Nurul Islam, Economic and Political Weekly, 17 July 2010, Vol. XLV, No 29.

allowances and perks.⁸ In comparison the average monthly pay for a soldier is Taka 7,717 (about US \$100)⁹ and Taka 15,000 (about US \$200) for an officer.¹⁰

Not surprisingly, the Bangladesh Army has monopolised deployment in UNPKOs. The internal decision making for peacekeeping is at the hands of the Bangladesh Army. About 93 percent of all UN peacekeepers from Bangladesh¹¹ are from the Bangladesh Army with Congo and Sudan being less with the percentage of army at 88 percent while Navy and Air forces had six percent representation.¹² The remaining seven percent is being made up by the police.¹³

In fact, the denial of opportunities to serve with the UN missions was one of the reasons for the revolt at the BDR Headquarters at Palkhona, Dhaka on 25 February 2009 in which a total of 74 persons including 57 Army Officers deputed to the BDR from the army were massacred. The 10-member Investigation Committee¹⁴ formed by the Government of Bangladesh in its conclusion stated that the aims of the revolt by the BDR were, among others, “*proving Bangladesh to be unfit for working in UN missions*” and “*reducing Bangladesh’s foreign currency earning by reducing its presence in UN missions*”. The Investigation Committee, instead of resolving the grudge of the BDR personnel, appears to have misled the country by stating that the “*United Nations has objected to the proposal of BDR members being taken to foreign missions. Bangladesh Government has no jurisdiction in this matter*”.¹⁵

This is a blatant lie as neighbouring India has been sending its paramilitary forces including the Border Security Forces on UN missions.¹⁶ The issue still remains unresolved as the Director General of the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB, the new BDR) Major General Aziz Ahmed told *The New Age* on 25 February 2013 that “a decision on sending BGB soldiers to UN peacekeeping missions was under process”.¹⁷

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8. See Omair Ahmad, *Indian Army: UN Report, Rotting Olives*, Outlook India.com, 2 June 2008, available at: <http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?237577>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.
 9. See Nicolas Haque, *Bangladesh troops lead global peacekeeping*, Aljazeera, 29 May 2012, available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/05/201252982553900996.html>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.
 10. See Join Bangladesh Army, *Benefits*, available at: <http://www.joinbangladesharmy.mil.bd/benefits/money>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.
 11. See Dr. Rashed Uz Zaman and Niloy Ranjan Biswas, *Contributor Profile: Bangladesh*, University of Dhaka, available at: http://www.academia.edu/2939007/Contributor_Profile_Bangladesh, last accessed on 1 September 2013.
 12. See Jafar Iqbal Russell, *Bangladesh UN Peacekeeping Force, strategic plans and HR initiatives*, 24 November 2010, available at: <http://www.articlesbase.com/management-articles/bangladesh-un-peacekeeping-force-strategic-plans-and-hr-initiatives-3721710.html>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.
 13. See Dr. Rashed Uz Zaman and Niloy Ranjan Biswas, *Contributor Profile: Bangladesh*, University of Dhaka, available at: http://www.academia.edu/2939007/Contributor_Profile_Bangladesh, last accessed on 1 September 2013.
 14. The members of Investigating Committee were former Secretary Mr. Anis-Uz-Zaman Khan as its Chairman and the additional Secretary of Home Ministry as a Member Secretary and other members of the Investigation Committee were Secretary, Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs Ministry; Director General, Bangladesh Rifles; Representative of the Prime Minister’s Office, Representative of the Cabinet; 3 Representatives of the Armed Force; Additional Police Inspector (Administration) and Judge Advocate General, Military Headquarters. “Revolt at the BDR Headquarters situated at Palkhona: Report of the Investigating Committee created for Investigation of the Heinous Massacre, 21st May 2009 available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Investigation%20Report%20-%20Government%20Inquiry_0.pdf
 15. Revolt at the BDR Headquarters situated at Palkhona: Report of the Investigating Committee created for Investigation of the Heinous Massacre, 21 May 2009 available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Investigation%20Report%20-%20Government%20Inquiry_0.pdf
 16. Please visit <http://crpf.nic.in/un.HTM> which shows that India’s Central Reserve Police Force personnel have been deployed on UN Missions in Haiti, Kosovo and Liberia.
 17. 4 YEARS AFTER BDR MUTINY, Families of victims, accused still await justice, *The New Age*, 25 February 2013 available at <http://newagebd.com/detail.php?date=2013-02-25&nid=41095>

Participation in the UN peacekeeping missions also plays a role in national politics and economic development in Bangladesh. During the political instability in Bangladesh in December 2006 and January 2007, the UN reportedly warned Bangladesh Army that any extra constitutional action or involvement in one-sided parliamentary polls could jeopardise its participation in UN peacekeeping missions. The US Embassy's cable from Dhaka released by Wikileaks stated that, "[t]he UN representative (protect) told the Ambassador that COAS Moeen had complained to her of the horrendous pressure he was under to step in, either under a State of Emergency or otherwise, and solicited a letter from the UN threatening loss of UNPKO duties should the military act extra-constitutionally. Moeen claimed that he could not "stick his neck out" and approach the President/Chief Adviser to beg off from any political role for the military without such benefit of proof of the dire consequences for the army."¹⁸ The Bangladesh Army finally intervened and rule the country for about two years with a technocratic government.

Participation in UNPKOs has become the official *raison d'être* for increasing the military expenditure of the country. Bangladesh indeed increased its defence budget by over 11% for the Financial Year 2011-12 as it had decided, among others, to purchase 44 new Main Battle Tanks (MBTs), three Armoured Recovery Vehicles (ARVs) and two brand new helicopters for the army to ensure necessary logistical support for UN peacekeeping activities.¹⁹

Armed Forces personnel serving with UNPKOs are obligated to contribute to the *Sena Kalyan Sangstha* (SKS), a welfare fund of the Army. The fund runs a very large commercial arm for the armed forces. The military's influence over governance and the administration gives the armed forces a competitive advantage over civilian commerce. It can therefore be argued that UN peacekeeping funds have contributed directly to the increasing militarization of the civilian commercial sector.

Sending death squads to keep the UN's Peace

Bangladesh is very public about its commitment to the good conduct of its troops while on UNPKOs. Addressing the Plenary of the Sixth Committee of the 67th UNGA on "Criminal accountability of United Nations officials and experts on mission", Dr. A K Abdul a UN meeting on criminal accountability of UN officials and experts on mission" on 15 October 2012, Dr. A K Abdul Momen, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the UN stated that "*Bangladesh is committed to take all appropriate measures to ensure that crimes by United Nations officials and experts on mission do not go unpunished and that the perpetrators of such crimes are brought to justice, without prejudice to the privileges and immunities of such persons and the United Nations under international law, and in accordance with international human rights standards, including due process*".²⁰

These assertions are belied by the facts. This report documents cases where Bangladeshi servicemen, serving on UN mission in Sudan have committed acts of sexual abuse of children. These servicemen were repatriated. But there is little evidence of the kind of action promised by Bangladesh. This is unsurprising. Bangladesh may have paid lip service to zero tolerance but its national laws, including the Constitution, Criminal Procedure Code, Army Act, Air Force Act, Navy Ordinance, Armed Police Battalion Ordinance, in addition to others, contain provisions to shield State actors from

18. <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/01/07DHAKA56.html>

19. Army to get 44 tanks, 2 helicopters also on purchase list, *The Daily Star*, 27 June 2011, available at <http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=191737>

20. See Dr. A K Abdul Momen, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the UN at the Plenary of the Sixth Committee of the 67th UNGA on "Criminal accountability of United Nations officials and experts on mission", 15 October 2012, available at: <http://goo.gl/F9O8W1>, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

prosecution and punishment.²¹

Further at national level, the Bangladeshi security forces remain responsible for gross human rights violations. In clear violation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHTs) Peace Accord of 2 December 1997, the Government of Bangladesh failed to withdraw about 470 army camps until today.²² Instead, the Army had launched ‘*Operation Uttaron*’ (Operation Upliftment) and ‘*Operation Dabanol*’ (Operation Wildfire) in 2001.²³ Between 2004 and 2011, the Bangladesh Army working in support of illegal plain settlers was allegedly responsible for 15 cases of extrajudicial killings, 464 cases of arbitrary arrest, 374 cases of torture and 285 cases of forcible evictions in addition to burning down of 1,070 houses of indigenous Jumma peoples. Further, the Government of Bangladesh has forcibly acquired significant area of land for the expansion of cantonment, camps, Artillery Training Centers and Air Force Training Centers.²⁴ The CHTs remains under *de facto* military rule and occupation.

In response to the mutiny at the BDR Headquarters at Pilkhana, Dhaka in February 2009, it is publicly known that the Government of Bangladesh allowed the Bangladesh Army to vent their angers on the captured/surrendered rebel BDR personnel for the killing of the Army officers during the mutiny. In less than three months after the mutiny, on 21 May 2009, the Government of Bangladesh was forced to order an inquiry into the deaths of 21 BDR personnel who were held in custody after the mutiny.²⁵ This inquiry report has not been made public but Odhikar stated that by September 2009 at least 47 BDR personnel had died while in the custody of the RAB and Bangladesh Army.²⁶ The *Economist* in its issue on 9 November 2013 stated, “at least 70 suspects died while in custody—almost certainly murdered”.²⁷

Further, the RAB has been described as death squads for committing numerous extrajudicial executions. According to a leading Bangladeshi human rights organization, Odhikar, a total of 776

21. See The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Article 46, available at: http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/pdf_part.php?id=367, last accessed on 8 October 2013. “When any person who is a Judge within the meaning of section 19 of the Penal Code, or when any Magistrate, or when any public servant who is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government, is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction of the Government.” See also *Criminal Procedure Code, Section 197(1)*, available at: http://bdlaws.gov.bd/pdf_part.php?act_name=&vol=&id=75, last accessed on 14 October 2013. Only if a serviceman has committed murder, culpable homicide not amounting to murder and rape while not on active duty may a serviceman be tried by a civilian court rather than a court martial. See also Army Act, 1952, available at: http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=248, last accessed on 8 October 2013. “No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall be against any member of the Force for anything which is done or intended to be done in good faith under this Ordinance.” See also Armed Police Battalions, 1979, Section 13, available at: http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/pdf/593____.pdf, last accessed 8 October 2013 as cited in Human Rights Watch, *Ignoring Executions and Torture: Impunity for Bangladesh’s Security Forces*, 18 May 2009, 1-56432-483-4, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a110ecf2.html>, last accessed on 10 October 2013.
22. See Join Bangladesh Army, *Cantonment Locations*, available at: <http://www.joinbangladesharmy.mil.bd/about-army/cantonment-locations>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.
23. See Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti, *Report on the Implementation of the CHT Accord*, CHT Commission, January 2013, available at: <http://www.chtcommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Report-on-Impln-of-CHT-Accord-January-2013-Final.pdf>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.
24. Annex 7 shows the land illegally acquired by the Government of Bangladesh in the name of military purpose in Bandarban Hill district alone. See also Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti, *Report on the Implementation of the CHT Accord*, CHT Commission, January 2013, available at: <http://www.chtcommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Report-on-Impln-of-CHT-Accord-January-2013-Final.pdf>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.
25. See BBC, *Bangladesh mutiny deaths probed*, 21 May 2009, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8060954.stm>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.
26. See Odhikar, *9 Month Human Rights Monitoring Report, 01 January – 30 September 2009*, available at: <http://odhikar.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/human-rights-monitoring-report-Jan-Sep-2009-eng.pdf>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.
27. Bangladesh: Mutiny and revenge, *The Economist*, 9 November 2013 available at <http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21589496-mass-conviction-mutineers-comes-politically-delicate-moment-mutiny-and-revenge>

persons were killed in what the RAB described as “crossfire” between January 2004 and June 2013, of which majority were extrajudicial executions.²⁸ The RAB has been “*ineligible to receive training or assistance’ under laws which prohibit American funding or training for overseas military units which abuse human rights with impunity.*”²⁹ In fact, continuing gross violations of human rights by the RAB led to the unusual public statement in September 2011 by former Prime Minister and now leader of the opposition Ms. Khaleda Zia, who indeed established the RAB, calling for all RAB personnel to be banned from UN Peacekeeping duties.³⁰

Given the lack of political capacity to control the Army, a compliant and corrupt justice system and effective legal immunity provided to the Army and other law enforcement personnel, the members of death squad of Bangladesh have essentially been enjoying impunity.

The United Nations must not ignore the call made by Ms Khaleda Zia. It is unacceptable that the Government of Bangladesh should forward members of its death squad for UN peacekeeping. It is equally unacceptable that the UN should accept the RAB personnel into UN peacekeeping missions.

Suhas Chakma
Director

28. See Annex 10, Crossfire/Gunfight 2001-2013. These included 706 killings by RAB, 59 by RAB-Police and 11 by RAB-Coast Guard. See Odhikar, *Crossfire/Gunfight Statistics from 2001-2013*, available at: http://odhikar.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Statistics_Crossfire_Gunfight_2001-2013.pdf, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

29. See Fariha Karim and Ian Cobain, *WikiLeaks cables: Bangladeshi ‘death squad’ trained by U.K. government, Rapid Action Battalion accused of hundreds of extra-judicial killings, received training from U.K. officers, cables reveal*, The Guardian, 26 January 2011, available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/21/wikileaks-cables-british-police-bangladesh-death-squad>, last accessed on 6 September 2013. Under U.S. law (the Leahy Vetting Process), when credible information is uncovered that demonstrates that an individual or unit has committed gross human rights violations, U.S. assistance must be withheld. See also Human Rights.Gov, *An Overview of the Leahy Vetting Process*, 9 July 2013, available at: <http://www.humanrights.gov/2013/07/09/an-overview-of-the-leahy-vetting-process/>, last accessed on 16 September 2013.

30. See Bdnews24.com, *Reject RAB, police as UN peacekeepers*, 28 September 2011, available at: <http://ns.bdnews24.com/details.php?id=207286&cid=3>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

Chapter 1 - OVERVIEW OF THE BANGLADESH ARMY AND UN PEACEKEEPING

i. Bangladesh Army and its involvement in politics

The Bangladesh Army was formed following independence in 1971. As of 2011, the Bangladesh Armed Forces had approximately 220,950 serving personnel including 150,000 Army personnel, serving as Non-Commissioned Officers, Warrant Officers and Commissioned Officers.³¹ The Bangladesh Army began recruiting women for its officers' corps since 2001.³²

The Bangladesh Army has had significant influence over civilian governance and politics. In addition to a period of military rule, there have been three coups and multiple mutinies. There has been a long history of military involvement in politics,³³ and “[t]he public perceives the army to be an instrument of change, either directly or as the power behind the throne.”³⁴

Despite a return of democracy in December 1990, the military continues to exert significant influence over the government and administration irrespective of whichever political party comes to power.

The Army's most visible influence can be seen through its control of most of the commanding positions across Bangladesh's security forces. A large number of senior positions in the Bangladesh Navy and Bangladesh Air Force are served by Army officers. This control is enshrined in Section 2A of the Army Act of Bangladesh.³⁵

The Bangladesh Army also commands other paramilitary forces.³⁶ In 2009, at the time of Palkhana mutiny, the Bangladesh Rifles, a paramilitary force under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA), had around 44,000 personnel. Of 446 officer positions, 386 positions were occupied by deputed

31. See World Bank, *Armed forces personnel, total*, available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1>, last accessed on 29 September 2013. See also Join Bangladesh Army, *Personnel*, available at: <http://www.joinbangladesharmymil.bd/about-army/personnel>, last accessed on 29 September 2013.

32. See Bangladesh Army, *History*, available at: <http://www.army.mil.bd/node/146>, last accessed on 29 September 2013.

33. For example, the first Prime Minister, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and many of his family members were assassinated by army officers in 1975. Commander General Ziaur Rahman (also known as General Zia) emerged as a military ruler and founded the BNP as his civilian front. When “General Zia” was murdered by army officers, General Hussain Mohammed Ershad seized power. From the death of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975 until the democracy movement of 1990, Bangladesh saw a succession of military governments dominated by General Zia and then General H.M. Ershad. From 2007 to 2008, there was also a military-backed caretaker government. See International Crisis Group, *Bangladesh Today*, October 2006, Asia Report N°121-23, available at: http://www.ssrnetwork.net/uploaded_files/5041.pdf, last accessed on 29 September 2013. See International Crisis Group, *Bangladesh: Back to the Future*, 13 June 2012, Asia Report N°226, available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/226-bangladesh-back-to-the-future.pdf>, last accessed on 29 September 2013.

34. See Crisis Group interview, London, November 2011, as cited in International Crisis Group (ICG), *Bangladesh: Back to the Future*, 13 December 2012, Asia Report N°226, available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/226-bangladesh-back-to-the-future.pdf>, last accessed on 8 October 2013.

35. “The Government may by order in writing direct that any person referred to in clause (a), clause (b) or clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 2 shall, under such conditions as may be laid down by regulations, be seconded for service with the Bangladesh Navy or the Bangladesh Air Force.” See Army Act, 1950, Section 2A, available at: http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=248, last accessed on 26 August 2013.

36. Other than the RAB, “paramilitary forces include the Bangladesh Rifles ...the Bangladesh Ansars...Village Defence Parties...and a National Cadet Corps. All answer to the home ministry, although the Bangladesh Rifles is commanded by seconded army officers and all paramilitary units operate in support of the army during national crisis or war.” See International Crisis Group (ICG), *Bangladesh Today*, 23 October 2006, Report N°121, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4565e5054.html>, last accessed on 9 October 2013.

army officers.³⁷ Even after the mutiny, there has not been any change - Bangladesh Army officers continue to command the Bangladesh Rifles, now renamed the Border Guard Bangladesh.

On 26 March 2004, the Government of Bangladesh formed the RAB, a hybrid force drawn from the Bangladesh Police, Bangladesh Army, Bangladesh Navy, Bangladesh Air Force, Border Guard Bangladesh and Bangladesh Ansar.³⁸ As of 27 August 2013 out of the 208 officers in the RAB, 114 were police officers, followed by 83 Army officers and 11 Air Force officers.³⁹ It can be argued that the RAB is a front for illegitimate Army deployment in civilian policing.

Another measure of the military's power is the extraordinary dominance of the Army among those selected to serve on prestigious UN peacekeeping missions. The Army make up 93 percent of the UN peacekeepers from Bangladesh.⁴⁰ It was only in Congo and Sudan where the percentage of army was 88 percent while Navy and Air forces had six percent each.⁴¹ The remaining is represented by the police.⁴²

ii. Bangladesh Army's monopoly in United Nations Peacekeeping

Approximately 94,768 of Bangladesh Army personnel have been deployed to UN Peacekeeping missions since 1988. Around seven percent of the Army has been constantly deployed in UN peacekeeping operations since 2005.⁴³

Bangladesh joined UN peacekeeping operations in 1988 contributing officers to UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group.⁴⁴ In 1989, another observer group was sent to Namibia. A battalion was sent to the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) in 1993.⁴⁵ Since then, Bangladesh has been consistently ranked among the top contributing countries to UNPKOs⁴⁶ and currently Bangladesh is the second highest contributor. One hundred and thirteen Bangladeshi personnel have died while serving in UNPKOs.⁴⁷

37. See Human Rights Watch, *Revolt at the BDR Headquarters situated at Peelkhana: Report of the Investigating Committee created for Investigation of the Heinous Massacre*, 21 May 2009, available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Investigation%20Report%20-%20Government%20Inquiry_0.pdf, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

38. See Rapid Action Battalion, *Short History*, available at: http://www.rab.gov.bd/about_us.php?page=2, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

39. See Rapid Action Battalion, *Telephone Directory*, available at: <http://www.rab.gov.bd/telephonedir.php>, last accessed on 21 October 2013. The details of RAB officers have been provided in Annex 1

40. See Dr. Rashed Uzzaman and Niloy Ranjan Biswas, *Contributor Profile: Bangladesh*, University of Dhaka, available at: http://www.academia.edu/2939007/Contributor_Profile_Bangladesh, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

41. See Jafar Iqbal Russell, *Bangladesh UN Peacekeeping Force, strategic plans and HR initiatives*, 24 November 2010, available at: <http://www.articlesbase.com/management-articles/bangladesh-un-peacekeeping-force-strategic-plans-and-hr-initiatives-3721710.html>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

42. See Dr. Rashed Uz Zaman and Niloy Ranjan Biswas, *Contributor Profile: Bangladesh*, University of Dhaka, available at: http://www.academia.edu/2939007/Contributor_Profile_Bangladesh, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

43. The Army, UN Peacekeeping Mission and Democracy in Bangladesh, Nurul Islam, Economic and Political Weekly, July 17, 2010 Vol. XLV No 29

44. See UN Peacekeepers, *Iran-Iraq – UNILMOG, Facts and Figures*, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/uniimogfacts.html>, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

45. See Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operation Training, *Background*, available at: <http://www.bipsot.net/docs.php?sid>About%20BIPSOT&pid=Background>, last accessed on 1 September 2013. See also UN Peacekeepers, *Iraq/Kuwait – UNIKOM – Facts and Figures*, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unikom/facts.html>, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

46. For a complete list of Bangladesh's contribution to UN peacekeeping missions since 1988 see Annex 2, 3 and 4

47. Out of 3,149 peacekeepers killed during missions, Bangladesh has lost a total of 113, while India has lost 154, followed by Nigeria with 140, Pakistan with 133, Ghana with 131, Canada with 121. See UN Peacekeeping, *Fatalities, Nationality and Mission up to 30 September 2013*, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/fatalities/documents/stats_2.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

Lucrative deployment

Serving with the UNPKOs is rewarding and indeed life changing opportunity for all ranks. At the UN standard rate, Bangladesh Army personnel deployed with UNPKOs earn upwards of US \$2,200 a month for an officer and US \$1,100 for a soldier, in addition to other allowances and perks.⁴⁸ In comparison the average monthly pay for a soldier is Taka 7,717 (about US \$100)⁴⁹ and Taka 15,000 (about US \$200) for an officer.⁵⁰ In case of death, US \$70,000 is paid to the next of kin. Disability compensation is determined by the nature of the injury.⁵¹

Bangladesh as the Chair of the UN Peace-Building Commission pressed for increase of salaries for the UN peacekeepers and in May 2013, the salaries were raised by 6.75 percent while those working in 'most dangerous' places would get further 10 percent in additional risk payment.⁵²

Troops deployed on UNPKOs are required to contribute to the *Sena Kalyan Sangstha* (SKS) or Army Welfare Organization dedicated for the welfare of ex-Armed Forces personnel and their beneficiaries which has been created "to serve the entire community of the retired armed forces personnel by generating maximum profit through commercial ventures utilizing its resources efficiently and distributing the profit by a wide range of welfare activities, while focusing on future growth in a sustainable manner for broader range of welfare". As with other countries, the size of the fund combined with military influence in governance and administration has allowed a significant military expansion into civilian commerce.⁵³

Pilkhana Massacre: Continued misleading of the Border Guard Bangladesh

The denial of opportunities for peacekeeping to the paramilitary forces has been one of the reasons for the revolt at the BDR Headquarters at Pilkhana, Dhaka on 25 February 2009. In the revolt, a total of 74 persons including 57 Army Officers deputed to BDR, 1 retired Army Officer, 2 wives of Army Officers, 9 BDR members, 3 innocent pedestrians, 1 Army Soldier and 1 Police Constable were killed. Among the Army Officers killed by the BDR rebels, included 1 Major General, 1 Brigadier General, 16 Colonels, 10 Lieutenant Colonels, 23 Majors, 2 Captains and 4 Army Medical Corps (AMC) Officers. Among the survivors, there were 3 Lieutenant Colonels, 14 Majors, 15 AMC

48. See Omair Ahmad, *Indian Army: UN Report, Rotting Olives*, Outlook India.com, 2 June 2008, available at: <http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?237577>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

49. See Nicolas Haque, *Bangladesh troops lead global peacekeeping*, Aljazeera, 29 May 2012, available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/05/201252982553900996.html>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

50. See Join Bangladesh Army, *Benefits*, available at: <http://www.joinbangladesharmy.mil.bd/benefits/money>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

51. See Lok Sabha, *Starred Question No. 528 Answered by Mr. A. K. Antony, Defence Minister, Government of India*, 14 May 2012, available at: http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/psearch/qsearch15.aspx_last accessed on 1 September 2013.

52. See Bdnews24.com, *UN increases Bangladeshi peacekeepers*, 11 May 2013, available at: <http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2013/05/11/un-increases-bangladeshi-peacekeepers>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

53. The Board of Trustees of SKS is headed by Chief of Army Staff (CoAS) of Bangladesh Army or his nominee not below the rank of Major General. The SKS is involved from selling bread to cement. It is engaged in cement product, food productions including ice cream, distributing electric bulbs under the brand name SAINIK, Sena Filling and CNG Station at Chittagong, in real estate under the Sena Kalyan Construction and Developments which is currently building 28 plots under SKCD projects including 3x14 Storied Building for Shaheed Paribar and owns Mongla Cement Factory, Bagerhat; Fauji Flour Mills, Chittagong; Diamond Food Industries, Chittagong; Chittagong Flour Mills, Chittagong; SK Electric Industries, Chittagong; Savoy Ice Cream Factory, Dhaka; Eastern Hosiery Mills, Tongi; SK Fabrics, Tongi; Enesel Textile Mills, Chittagong. The SKS is also involved in tourism industry and owns the Radisson Water Garden Hotel, the first five star hotel in Dhaka, as well as the Nilgiri Resort in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. See Sena Kalyan Sangstha, available at: <http://www.senakalyan.org/>, last accessed on 1 September 2013. See also IWGIA, *Militarization in the Chittagong Hill Tracts*, Bangladesh, ORGANISING COMMITTEE CHT CAMPAIGN and SHIMIN GAIKOU CENTRE, 2012, available at http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_publications_files/0577_Igia_report_14_optimized.pdf, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

Officers, 1 newly appointed Officer, 5 Majors working on ‘*Operation Dal Bhat*’, 1 Officer Major arriving for the parade, 5 Majors who had reached the camp to distribute invitation letters, 7 Majors who had come to accept awards, 8 Rural Departmental Officers (RDO), and 14 Civil Officers.⁵⁴

The Government of Bangladesh formed a 10-member Investigation Committee on 2 March 2009. The Investigation Committee in its report stated that the BDR rebels had among others demanded “*withdrawal of all Army Officers from BDR and appointment of BDR’s own Officers from BDR cadre in their place*” and “*opportunity to take part in foreign (UN) missions*”.⁵⁵

The Investigation Committee in its conclusion stated that the aims of the revolt by the BDR were, among others, “*proving Bangladesh to be unfit for working in UN missions*” and “*reducing Bangladesh’s foreign currency earning by reducing its presence in UN missions*”.⁵⁶ The Investigation Committee, with half of its members from the Armed Forces i.e. Bangladesh Army but none from the BDR, as expected, made no recommendations with respect to deployment of the BDR personnel for UNPKOs. Rather, the Investigation Committee stated that that “*United Nations has objected to the proposal of BDR members being taken to foreign missions. Bangladesh Government has no jurisdiction in this matter*”. This does not appear to be true as India has been sending its paramilitary forces such as the Border Security Force personnel for the UN missions.⁵⁷ The issue still remains unresolved as the Director General of the BGB Major General Aziz Ahmed told *The New Age* on 25 February 2013 that “a decision on sending BGB soldiers to UN peacekeeping missions was under process”.⁵⁸

iii. Is UN peacekeeping increasing defence budget of Bangladesh?

Foreign currency from UNPKOs indirectly increased military expenditure. The Government of Bangladesh reportedly earned \$1.28 billion from the UN as compensation for troop contributions, contingent-owned equipment, and other forms of compensation from 2001 to 2010.⁵⁹ While as per the statement of the Bangladesh’s Permanent Representative to the UN Dr. AKM Abdul Momen on 25 April 2012 Bangladesh earned about US \$919 million equivalent to Taka 7,500 crore over three years from UNPKOs,⁶⁰ the defence budget of Bangladesh for the Financial Year in 2008-2009 was

54. The members of Investigating Committee were former Secretary Mr. Anis-Uz-Zaman Khan as its Chairman and the additional Secretary of Home Ministry as a Member Secretary and other members of the Investigation Committee were Secretary, Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs Ministry; Director General, Bangladesh Rifles; Representative of the Prime Minister’s Office, Representative of the Cabinet; 3 Representatives of the Armed Force; Additional Police Inspector (Administration) and Judge Advocate General, Military Headquarters. “Revolt at the BDR Headquarters situated at Peelkhana: Report of the Investigating Committee created for Investigation of the Heinous Massacre, 21st May 2009 available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Investigation%20Report%20-%20Government%20Inquiry_0.pdf

55. Revolt at the BDR Headquarters situated at Peelkhana: Report of the Investigating Committee created for Investigation of the Heinous Massacre, 21st May 2009, available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Investigation%20Report%20-%20Government%20Inquiry_0.pdf

56. Ibid.

57. Please visit <http://crpf.nic.in/un.HTM> which shows that India’s Central Reserve Police Force personnel have been deployed for the UN Missions in Haiti, Kosovo and Liberia.

58. 4 YEARS AFTER BDR MUTINY, Families of victims, accused still await justice, *The New Age*, 25 February 2013 available at <http://newagebd.com/detail.php?date=2013-02-25&cnid=41095>

59. See K. Krishnasamy, *Bangladesh and UN Peacekeeping: The Participation of a ‘Small’ State*, *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 41:1 (2003): 4-47.

60. Bangladesh earns US\$ 919 million from UN peace missions in 3 Years, *Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha* (National News Agency of Bangladesh), 26 April 2012, <http://www1.bssnews.net/newsDetails.php?cat=0&id=244656&date=2012-04-26&dateCurrent=2012-05-01>

Taka 6306 crore (US\$ 935 million).⁶¹ It is clear that Bangladesh earns the equivalent of one third of its defence budget from UNPKOs.

The Government of Bangladesh has been increasing its defence budget based on the need for UNPKOs. The government of Bangladesh hiked its defence budget by over 11% for the Financial Year 2011-12 (July 2011-June 2012) with a total budgetary allocation of 121.34 billion Taka for the 2011-12 fiscal. It was necessitated as in June 2011, the Government of Bangladesh decided to purchase 44 new MBTs and three ARVs for the army from China. The government also decided to buy two brand new helicopters for the army to ensure necessary logistical support for UN peacekeeping activities.⁶²

Justifying the increase, Bangladeshi Finance Minister Mr AMA Muhith told the parliament:

*We cannot but admit that by occupying the top position in the list of the countries, which send soldiers to the UN peacekeeping mission, our armed forces have not only glorified the image of Bangladesh but also made significant contribution to the economy. We believe that they will continue to leave their mark in the international arena in the similar fashion as they are doing now.*⁶³

iv. Bangladesh Army's Selection, Recruitment and Promotion Policies and Procedures at national level

The formal recruitment process for the Army should be placed within Bangladesh's highly patronage and politically polarised culture.⁶⁴

There is little debate about the fact that recruitment for all government jobs, civilian and military is highly politicised in Bangladesh. Each administration attempts to ensure party loyalists are recruited at all levels. Research by the International Crisis Group (ICG) suggests that this process is intensifying. Loyal party supporters are installed into key positions. Those linked, or suspected of having links with the prior regimes are forcibly retired or stalled in their careers.⁶⁵

The military's influence in government can be seen from its obvious dominance of the selection of

61. Bangladesh defence budget 2008-09: An analysis by Air Cdre Isfaq Ilahi, *ndc, psc (ret'd)*, *The Daily Star*, 5 July 2008 available at <http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=44241>

62. Army to get 44 tanks, 2 helicopters also on purchase list, *The Daily Star*, 27 June 2011. available at: <http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=191737>

63. See Xinhuanet.com, *Bangladesh plans over 11% defense budget hike*, 9 June 2011, available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-06/09/c_13920692.htm, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

64. "Serving and retired military officers occupy key positions in the administration and some will remain even under a new government... One prominent writer asked, 'Why would the military want to run the country, in the traditional sense – through martial law – when it has officers in almost every branch of the government, running private businesses and heading up civil society organisations?' See Crisis Group interview, serving army general, Dhaka, 2 November 2008 and "Bangladesh: Military must not dominate civil administration", Asian Human Rights Commission, 29 August 2008, available at: www.ahrchk.net/statements/mainfile.php/2008statements/1671/as_cited_by_International_Crisis_Group,_Bangladesh:_Elections_and_Beyond 11 December 2008, Asia Briefing N°84, available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/b84_bangladesh_elections_and_beyond.pdf, last accessed on 29 September 2013.

65. "Mujibur Rahman promoted those who had fought in the Liberation War, then Zia promoted those he thought were deprived under Mujib, Ershad promoted officers who were in West Pakistan during the War, and then when the BNP took over it became a clear case of whether you belonged to the Awami League or not," said a retired lieutenant-general concerning when the politicization started. See International Crisis Group, *Bangladesh: Back to the Future*, 13 June 2012, Asia Report N°226, available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/226-bangladesh-back-to-the-future.pdf>, last accessed on 29 September 2013. See Dalem Barman, Golam Rahman, Tasneem Siddiqui, *Democracy Report for Bangladesh*, available at: <http://www.idea.int/publications/sod/upload/Bangladesh.pdf>, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

UN peacekeepers. The Bangladesh Army leadership further developed a patronage system where children of serving soldiers are given preference at the time of recruitment at national level “*if they fulfill laid down standard*”.⁶⁶

There are four broad categories for service in the Bangladesh Army: Soldiers (Sainiks), Non-Commissioned Officers, Junior Commissioned Officers (including Warrant Officers) and Commissioned Officers.⁶⁷

The Army has established education and physical qualifications and standards for recruits.⁶⁸ Every male Bangladeshi citizen is eligible for Army recruitment, “irrespective of caste, class or religion” provided that he meets the criteria.⁶⁹ Typically the Headquarters Recruitment Unit, Branch Recruitment Unit or Area Recruitment Team and Training Centers carry out recruitment for soldiers on a quarterly basis.⁷⁰ Officer candidates can be recruited through: commission through the Bangladesh Military Academy (BMA) Long Course, BMA Special Course and Direct Short Service Commission.⁷¹

v. Selection Criteria and Deployment for United Nations Peacekeepers

According to the UN, as of 31 July 2013, Bangladesh was the second largest contributor of military and police personnel for UNPKOs with 7,936 military and police personnel.⁷² Out of these 1,819 were police officers, 67 Military Experts on Mission and 7,936 were Contingent Troops serving in UNPKOs.⁷³ Included in these numbers are 7,728 men and 208 women on missions.⁷⁴ Members of the armed forces and police were serving in nine out of the current 15 UNPKOs.⁷⁵

It can be inferred from the Army’s process for recruitment and selections that the process for recruitment and selection for UN peacekeepers is also highly politicised and officers are unlikely to be selected unless they are close to the ruling party.⁷⁶

66. See Join Bangladesh Army, *Become a Soldier*, available at: <http://www.joinbangladesharmy.mil.bd/career-jobs/become-soldier>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

67. See Join Bangladesh Army, *Service Options*, available at: <http://www.joinbangladesharmy.mil.bd/about-army/service-options>, last accessed on 29 September 2013. See also Join Bangladesh Army, *Personnel*, available at: <http://www.joinbangladesharmy.mil.bd/about-army/personnel>, last accessed on 29 September 2013.

68. For example, a person wanting to become an officer must be between the ages of 17 and 21, a Bangladeshi citizen, single, passed SSC and HSC with a minimum GPA of 4, in addition to meeting particular height and weight measurements. See Join Bangladesh Army, *Become an Officer*, available at: <http://www.joinbangladesharmy.mil.bd/career-jobs/become-officer>, last accessed on 29 September 2013. The specific requirements for enlisting as a soldier can be found at: Join Bangladesh Army, *Become a Soldier*, available at: <http://www.joinbangladesharmy.mil.bd/career-jobs/become-soldier>, last accessed on 29 September 2013.

69. See Bangladesh Army, *Soldiers*, available at: <http://www.army.mil.bd/node/124>, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

70. *Ibid.*

71. The BMA Long Course is a direct commission (recruitment) into the Army. When opportunities for the BMA Long Course arise, the Army posts the dates and times of when applications are accepted, the selection procedure and when the training/commission will occur. The BMA Special Course is available to the officers of the Army Education Corps and the Direct Short Service Commission is available to officers of the Army Medical Corps, Army Dental Corps, Remount Veterinary & Farm Corps and Army Education Corps (Jag Dept/Psychologist). See Bangladesh Army, *Officers*, available at: <http://www.army.mil.bd/node/123>, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

72. See UN Peacekeeping, *UN Mission’s Contributions by Country*, 31 July 2013, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2013/jul13_1.pdf, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

73. *Ibid.*

74. *Ibid.*

75. The nine missions are as follows: MINURSO, MINUSMA, MINUSTAH, MONUSCO, UNAMID, UNIFIL, UNMIL, UNMISS and UNOCI. See UN Peacekeeping, *UN Mission’s Summary detailed by Country*, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2013/jul13_3.pdf, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

76. Chapters 2 and 3 will discuss the selection and recruitment policies for the Bangladesh Police and RAB and how those forces also have no formal procedures, but operate within Bangladesh’s highly politically polarized culture.

Bangladeshi troops and police personnel are deployed for UN peacekeeping missions based on a generic Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Government of Bangladesh and the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations.⁷⁷ In December 2007, the UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) came into force to provide for conditional pledges by Member States to contribute specific resources within agreed response time and restrictions in UNPKOs.⁷⁸

Neither the Government of Bangladesh nor the Bangladesh Armed Forces have any specific policy guidelines regarding contributions to UNPKOs. The Bangladesh Army has tended to monopolise decisions about Bangladesh's participation in UN peacekeeping missions and the civilian authorities have not challenged this prerogative as described below:⁷⁹

The decision-making process usually starts when Bangladesh receives a request for peacekeepers from the UN Secretariat. Dhaka's Permanent Mission at the UN receives this request on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoEA) and examines it in light of Bangladesh's broader foreign policy priorities and existing international commitments. The Defense Attaché in the Permanent Mission in New York deals with the bureaucratic procedures and subsequently forwards the requests to the relevant agencies in Bangladesh. Requests relating to troops are directed to the Armed Forces Division (AFD), which is the coordinating headquarters of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Overseas Operations Directorate deals with peacekeeping operations in the Army Headquarters in Dhaka. Requests for naval and air force components are transferred to the respective Navy and Air Force Headquarters in Dhaka, which then issue necessary directives for the upcoming operations. For troops, the Overseas Operations Directorate issues the necessary instructions to all other concerned branches of the armed forces for the requisite preparations. This involves the selection of personnel and the provision of equipment and training. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) receives requests related to the deployment of the police personnel for the UN missions. After the initial notification, the MoHA transfers the order to Police Headquarters in Dhaka to take decisions on the selection of personnel.⁸⁰

The Government of Bangladesh has so far not included paramilitary forces like the Bangladesh Ansar and the Border Guard Bangladesh for the UN peacekeeping missions as the Bangladesh Army maintains its monopoly.⁸¹

Pre-Deployment Training

The training of Bangladesh peacekeepers is conducted by the Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operations (BIPSOT) located at Rajendrapur Cantonment, Gazipur. BIPSOT was established by

77. See Dr. Rashed Uzzaman and Niloy Ranjan Biswas, *Contributor Profile: Bangladesh*, University of Dhaka, available at: http://www.academia.edu/2939007/Contributor_Profile_Bangladesh, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

78. See Dr. Rashed Uzzaman and Niloy Ranjan Biswas, *Contributor Profile: Bangladesh*, University of Dhaka, available at: http://www.academia.edu/2939007/Contributor_Profile_Bangladesh, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

79. *Ibid.*

80. *Ibid.*

81. See Jafar Iqbal Russell, *Bangladesh UN Peacekeeping Force, strategic plans and HR initiatives*, 24 November 2010, available at: <http://www.articlesbase.com/management-articles/bangladesh-un-peacekeeping-force-strategic-plans-and-hr-initiatives-3721710.html>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

the Government of Bangladesh in response to the UN General Assembly Resolution 49/37, which called on member states to train their peacekeepers for deployment in conflict zones.⁸²

The Peacekeeping Operation Training Centre (PKOTC) was set up on 24 June 1999 and was subsequently renamed the Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operations (BIPSOT) in 2002.⁸³ Since then, BIPSOT has provided specialised training to more than 6,300 personnel including 1,251 from 26 other countries.⁸⁴

Training conducted at BIPSOT includes Pre Deployment Training (PDT), UN Contingent Commanders Course (UNCCC), UN Military Observer Course (UNMOC), UN Staff Officers Course (UNSOC), UN Logistic Officers Course (UNLOC), Junior Officers Peace Support Operation Course (JOPSOC), UN Contingent Member Course (UNCMC), UN Senior Mission Leaders Course (UNSMC), and Special Training.⁸⁵

From 28 to 31 October 2013, BIPSOT hosted the 19th Annual Conference of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC)⁸⁶ on the theme “Coping with Change: Leveraging Regional Education and Training Capabilities for Effective Multidimensional Peace Operations”.⁸⁷

vi. Human Rights violations by the Bangladesh Army

Accurate reporting of human rights violations by the Bangladesh Army is difficult at best, mainly due to the control the Army can exert over the areas in which it operates, i.e. the CHTs. The human rights violations committed by the Army personnel while deployed with the RAB are also difficult to disaggregate.

82. See BIPSOT/DPKO Training of Trainers Course, *Speech by Neal Walker, UN Resident Coordinator*, available at: [http://www.un-bd.org/rc/Speeches/2012/BIPSOT-DPKO%20TOT%20Course%20\(17%20Jun%202012\).pdf](http://www.un-bd.org/rc/Speeches/2012/BIPSOT-DPKO%20TOT%20Course%20(17%20Jun%202012).pdf), last accessed on 1 September 2013.

83. See Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operation Training, *Background*, available at: <http://www.bipsot.net/docs.php?sid=About%20BIPSOT&pid=Background>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

84. According to one retired senior general, “[the army] has been literally running the country and unable to train its soldiers. It will be very difficult to take officers out of the government and to put them back into the field.” See *Elections and Beyond* 11 December 2008, Asia Briefing N°84, available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/b84_bangladesh__elections_and_beyond.pdf, last accessed on 29 September 2013. “[Until] 2006, BIPSOT training curriculum consisted of Pre Deployment Training, Potential Observers and Staff Officers Course, Warrant Officers and Non Commissioned Officers Peace Support Operations Course and Contingent Members Course. Recently, these courses have been reviewed in the backdrop of Standardized Training Module-2 (STM - 2) and Standardized Training Module-3 (STM - 3) of UNDPKO and a new training curriculum has been developed containing a number of professional courses for the Bangladeshi potential peacekeepers and also for the personals of Armed Forces of UN member states.” See BIPSOT/DPKO Training of Trainers Course, *Speech by Neal Walker, UN Resident Coordinator*, available at: [http://www.un-bd.org/rc/Speeches/2012/BIPSOT-DPKO%20TOT%20Course%20\(17%20Jun%202012\).pdf](http://www.un-bd.org/rc/Speeches/2012/BIPSOT-DPKO%20TOT%20Course%20(17%20Jun%202012).pdf), last accessed on 1 September 2013.

85. See Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operation Training, *Courses at BIPSOT*, available at: <http://www.bipsot.net/docs.php?sid=Training%20Information&pid=Courses%20at%20BIPSOT>, last accessed on 1 September 2013. From 28 November to 2 December 2010, BIPSOT held the 16th IAPTC Conference on the topic “Training for peacekeeping missions with complex mandates.” See 16th IAPTC Conference Report, *Training for peacekeeping mission with complex mandates*, available at: http://www.aapc.asia/images/frontImages/16TH_IAPTC_CONF_REPORT-BIPSOT.pdf, last accessed on 8 October 2013.

86. The IAPTC is an “association of centres, institutions, and programs dealing peace operations research, education, and training... It is intended to broaden contacts between various international organizations, peacekeeping training centres and institutions, universities, and other interested groups leading to more effective peace operations.” See IAPTC, *About IAPTC*, available at: <http://www.iaptc.org/about-iaptc/>, last accessed on 8 October 2013. See also BIPSOT, available at: <http://www.bipsot.net>, last accessed on 8 October 2013. See also IAPTC 2013, available at: <http://www.iaptc2013.net>, last accessed on 8 October 2013.

87. See also IAPTC 2013, available at: <http://www.iaptc2013.net>, last accessed on 8 October 2013.

Human rights violations in the Chittagong Hill Tracts

In southeastern Bangladesh, the Chittagong Hill Tracts is home to 11 indigenous groups, commonly known as Jummas, “who differ markedly from the Bengali majority in language, culture, physical appearance, religion, dress, eating habits, architecture and farming methods.”⁸⁸ From 1976 until the signing of the CHTs Accord on 2 December 1997, the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) and its armed wing, Shanti Bahini led an armed insurgency against the Government of Bangladesh.⁸⁹ The insurgency was in response to the loss of the Jummas’ autonomy, “the denial of constitutional recognition and their political, economic and social marginalization”.⁹⁰ In response, the Government of Bangladesh deployed large numbers of troops in the region.⁹¹

Additionally, the Government of Bangladesh carried out a “transmigration programme” under which approximately 400,000 Bengali speaking people belonging to the mainstream Muslim majority (herein after referred to as “illegal plain settlers”⁹²) were settled to the CHTs.⁹³ This resettlement program changed the demographics in the area and reduced the indigenous peoples into a minority in their own lands.⁹⁴

The Bangladesh Army personnel and the illegal settlers belonging to Muslim majority have perpetrated frequent human rights violations and attacked indigenous peoples in order to grab their lands. There is well-documented evidence that the security forces have participated and led these attacks. The Bangladesh Army personnel, paramilitary forces, the police and the plain settlers jointly

88. The indigenous communities such as Chakmas, Marmas, Tripuras, Khiyangs, Lushais, Khumis, Chaks, Murungs, Bowsms and Pankooos of the Chittagong Hill Tracts are collectively known as Jumma, a pejorative term used by the Chittagonian Bangalees, for their shifting or Jum cultivation. See Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, *Chittagong Hill Tracts*, available at: <http://www.unpo.org/members/7867>, last accessed on 1 September 2013. See also Intercontinental Cry, *Jumma*, available at: <http://intercontinentalcry.org/peoples/jumma/>, last accessed on 1 September 2013. See UN Economic and Social Council, *Study on the status of implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord of 1997*, available at: <http://www.chtcommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/CHT-Accord-Study-Final.pdf>, last accessed on 1 September 2013. See also IWGIA, *Militarization of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, The Slow Demise of the Region's Indigenous Peoples*, Report 14, May 2012, available at: http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_publications_files/0577_Igia_report_14_optimized.pdf, last accessed on 14 October 2013.
89. The Shanti Bahini was the armed wing of the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS), the indigenous peoples’ party. See UN Economic and Social Council, *Study on the status of implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord of 1997*, available at: <http://www.chtcommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/CHT-Accord-Study-Final.pdf>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.
90. See UN Economic and Social Council, *Study on the status of implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord of 1997*, available at: <http://www.chtcommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/CHT-Accord-Study-Final.pdf>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.
91. See IWGIA, *Militarization of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, The Slow Demise of the Region's Indigenous Peoples*, Report 14, May 2012, available at: http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_publications_files/0577_Igia_report_14_optimized.pdf, last accessed on 14 October 2013.
92. The Bengali speaking plain settlers who are transplanted into the CHTs are termed as “illegal” as they were brought in clear violation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts 1900 Regulation which restricts the entry of non-hill people into the CHTs. Moreover, article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits such population transfer.
93. See Norwegian Refugee Council/Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, *Bangladesh: Indigenous people and religious minorities still affected by displacement*, 16 July 2009, available at: [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/\(httpInfoFiles\)/5E9692B6E4E0A918C12575F5004F95C3/\\$file/Bangladesh_Overview_Jul09.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/5E9692B6E4E0A918C12575F5004F95C3/$file/Bangladesh_Overview_Jul09.pdf), last accessed on 14 October 2013. See also IWGIA, *Militarization of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, The Slow Demise of the Region's Indigenous Peoples*, Report 14, May 2012, available at: http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_publications_files/0577_Igia_report_14_optimized.pdf, last accessed on 14 October 2013.
94. See Asian Centre for Human Rights, *Who finds the acts of racism and racial discrimination in the Chittagong Hill Tracts?*, 15 June 2005, available at: <http://www.achrweb.org/reports/bangla/BD-BP-0105.pdf>, last accessed on 1 September 2013. See also Norwegian Refugee Council/Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, *Bangladesh: Indigenous people and religious minorities still affected by displacement*, 16 July 2009, available at: [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/\(httpInfoFiles\)/5E9692B6E4E0A918C12575F5004F95C3/\\$file/Bangladesh_Overview_Jul09.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/5E9692B6E4E0A918C12575F5004F95C3/$file/Bangladesh_Overview_Jul09.pdf), last accessed on 14 October 2013. See also IWGIA, *Militarization of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, The Slow Demise of the Region's Indigenous Peoples*, Report 14, May 2012, available at: http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_publications_files/0577_Igia_report_14_optimized.pdf, last accessed on 14 October 2013.

perpetrated 15 major massacres of indigenous Jumma peoples between 1979 and 1997.⁹⁵ Over 70,000 indigenous peoples were forced to seek refuge in India between 1986 and 1989.⁹⁶ The CHTs Peace Accord signed on 2 December 1997 by the Government of Bangladesh and the PCJSS failed to establish any accountability for these grave violations.

Even after signing of the CHTs Peace Accord, the military continue to occupy the CHTs in violation of the Accord. Clause 17(a) of the CHTs Peace Accord provides:

After the signing and execution of the Accord between the Government and the Jana Sambhati Samiti and immediately after return of the members of Jana Sambhati Samiti to normal life, all the temporary camps of the army, the Ansars and the Village Defence Party (VDP), excepting the Border Security Force (BDR) and permanent army establishment (being those three at the three district headquarters and those at Alikadam, Ruma and Dighinala), shall be taken back by phases from Chittagong Hill Tracts to permanent cantonments and the time-limit shall be fixed for its purpose. (emphasis ours) In case of deterioration of the law and order situation, in time of normal calamities and for similar other purposes, Army Forces may be deployed under the authority of the civil administration in adherence to Law and Rules as are applicable to all the other parts of the country. In this respect, the Regional Council may, in order to get the required or timely help make requests to the appropriate authority.

The time limit for withdrawal of the Army camps has not been fixed until today. In July 2009 the Government of Bangladesh announced that 35 camps of the Bangladesh Army would be withdrawn.⁹⁷ However, the PCJSS in a report in January 2013 stated that at least five camps out of 35 camps withdrawn have been re-established and there are currently over 470 military camps in the CHTs,⁹⁸ in addition to the four cantonments.⁹⁹

After the signing of the Peace Accord, the Bangladesh Army personnel launched ‘Operation Uttaron’ (Operation Upliftment) and ‘Operation Dabanol’ (Operation Wildfire) in 2001 in order to justify their presence in the region.¹⁰⁰ These military operations continue until today.

The Bangladesh Army has been responsible for serious human rights violations.¹⁰¹ Between 2004 and 2011, the Bangladesh Army working in support of illegal plains settlers was allegedly responsible for 15 cases of extrajudicial killings, 464 cases of arbitrary arrest, 374 cases of torture and 285

95. See IWGIA, *Militarization in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh*, ORGANISING COMMITTEE CHT CAMPAIGN and SHIMIN GAIKOU CENTRE, 2012, available at: http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_publications_files/0577_Igia_report_14_optimized.pdf, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

96. See Reuters, *Bangladesh orders troops out of hill region*, 29 July 2009, available at: <http://in.reuters.com/article/2009/07/29/idINIndia-41403520090729>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

97. Bangladesh to pull out soldiers, BBC, 20 July 2009 available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8175768.stm>

98. See Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti, *Report on the Implementation of the CHT Accord*, CHT Commission, January 2013, available at: <http://www.chtcommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Report-on-Impln-of-CHT-Accord-January-2013-Final.pdf>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

99. See Joint Bangladesh Army, *Cantonment Locations*, available at: http://www.joinbangladesharmy.mil.bd/about-army/cantonment-locations_ last accessed on 1 September 2013.

100. See Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti, *Report on the Implementation of the CHT Accord*, CHT Commission, January 2013, available at: <http://www.chtcommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Report-on-Impln-of-CHT-Accord-January-2013-Final.pdf>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

101. A table detailing all of the human rights violations committed by the military in CHT from 2004-2011 has been provided in Annex 5. Additionally Annex 6 provides another table listing the major attacks by Bengali settlers backed by military personnel from 2001-2011. See also IWGIA, *Militarization in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh*, Organising Committee CHT Campaign Shimin Gaikou Centre, 2012, available at: http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_publications_files/0577_Igia_report_14_optimized.pdf, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

cases of forcible evictions in addition to burning down 1,070 houses of indigenous Jumma peoples. Further, the Government of Bangladesh has forcibly acquired significant amount of land for the expansion of cantonments, camps, Artillery Training Centers and Air Force Training Centers.¹⁰² However, documenting human rights violations in the CHTs is at best difficult. The CHTs remains under *de facto* military rule and occupation.

The abuses in the CHTs prompted the then Special Rapporteur of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in May 2011 to recommend that the UN Department of the Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) “develop a mechanism to strictly monitor and screen the human rights records of national army personnel prior to allowing them to participate in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations” and “prevent human rights violators and alleged human rights violators within the security forces of Bangladesh from participating in international peacekeeping activities under the auspices of the United Nations.”¹⁰³

Torture and extrajudicial executions of the Pilkhana mutiny accused

As mentioned previously, in the revolt at the BDR Headquarters at Pilkhana, Dhaka at 9 am on 25 February 2009, a total of 74 persons including 57 Army Officers deputed to BDR from the army, one retired Army Officer, two wives of Army Officers, nine BDR members, three innocent pedestrians, one Army Soldier and one Police Constable were killed.¹⁰⁴

In response to the mutiny, it is publicly known that the Government of Bangladesh allowed the Bangladesh Army to revenge on the captured/surrendered rebel BDR personnel for the killing of the Army officers in the Pilkhana mutiny. In less than three months after the mutiny, on 21 May 2009, the Government of Bangladesh was forced to order an inquiry into the deaths of 21 BDR personnel were held in custody after the mutiny on 25 February 2009.¹⁰⁵ This inquiry report has not been made public until today. In the meantime, Odhikar stated that by September 2009 at least 47 BDR personnel had died while in the custody of the RAB and Bangladesh Army¹⁰⁶ while *The Economist* in its issue on 9 November 2013 stated, “at least 70 suspects died while in custody—almost certainly murdered”.¹⁰⁷

A total of 5,926 BDR personnel have so far been sentenced to varying terms on charges of taking up arms. A total of 847 people, including 23 civilians were charged with various criminal offences including murder. Besides, the special courts led by military officers, the ‘commanding officer courts’

102. Annex 7 shows the land illegally acquired by the Government of Bangladesh in the name of military purpose in Bandarban Hill district alone. See also Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti, *Report on the Implementation of the CHT Accord*, CHT Commission, January 2013, available at: <http://www.chtcommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Report-on-Impln-of-CHT-Accord-January-2013-Final.pdf>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

103. See UN Economic and Social Council, *Study on the status of implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord of 1997*, available at: <http://www.chtcommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/CHT-Accord-Study-Final.pdf>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

104. See Human Rights Watch, *Revolt at the BDR Headquarters situated at Peelkhana: Report of the Investigating Committee created for Investigation of the Heinous Massacre*, 21 May 2009, available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Investigation%20Report%20-%20Government%20Inquiry_0.pdf, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

105. See BBC, *Bangladesh mutiny deaths probed*, 21 May 2009, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8060954.stm>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

106. See Odhikar, *9 Month Human Rights Monitoring Report, 01 January – 30 September 2009*, available at: <http://odhikar.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/human-rights-monitoring-report-Jan-Sep-2009-eng.pdf>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

107. Bangladesh: Mutiny and revenge, *The Economist*, 9 November 2013 available at <http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21589496-mass-conviction-mutineers-comes-politically-delicate-moment-mutiny-and-revenge>

had taken punitive action against 2,803 personnel.¹⁰⁸ The trials of these personnel did not meet international standards on fair trial.¹⁰⁹ On 5 November 2013, the special court set up to prosecute the Pilkhana mutiny accused further sentenced 152 people to death and 161 people to life imprisonment. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay in a public statement on sentencing of 152 persons to death stated “*The crimes committed during the mutiny were utterly reprehensible and heinous, and my sympathies are with the grieving families, but justice will not be achieved by conducting mass trials of hundreds of individuals, torturing suspects in custody and sentencing them to death after trials that failed to meet the most fundamental standards of due process. ... The perpetrators of the crimes must be held accountable in compliance with the laws of Bangladesh and the country’s international obligations, including those pertaining to fair trial standards, as laid down in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Bangladesh ratified in 2000. The trial of these 847 suspects has been rife with procedural irregularities, including the lack of adequate and timely access to lawyers.*”¹¹⁰

It is suspected that many of those responsible for the torture and custodial death of the BDR personnel have since been serving on UNPKOs.

vii. Deployment of Alleged Human Rights Violators on United Nations Peacekeeping Missions

As discussed in detail below, there have been documented cases of Bangladesh Army officers involved in human rights violations both prior to their deployment and upon return from their deployment in UNPKOs.

Lieutenant Colonel Md. Sazid Imtiaz, Training Officer (ITS/DPET, DPKO)

“If anything happens to the Bengalis in the future, I will kill all of you. There is no need for you to live in this country.”- Lieutenant Colonel Md Sazid Imtiaz¹¹¹

Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col.) Mohammed (Md.) Sazid Imtiaz is currently serving as the Training Officer (ITS/DPET, DPKO).¹¹²

Prior to the deployment, Lt. Col. Mohammed (Md.) Sazid Imtiaz was allegedly responsible for grave violations of human rights as given below.

On 20 April 2008, illegal plains settlers with the support of the Bangladesh Army attacked seven indigenous Jumma villages in the Rangamati district in the CHTs.¹¹³ According to witness statements,

108. See Muktadir Rashid, 4 Years After BDR Mutiny, Families of victims, accused still await justice, *The New Age*, 25 February 2013, available at: <http://newagebd.com/detail.php?date=2013-02-25&nid=41095>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

109. See Human Rights Watch, *The Fear Never Leaves Me: Torture, Custodial Deaths, and Unfair Trials after the 2009 Mutiny of the Bangladesh Rifles*, 4 July 2012, available at: <http://hrw.org/reports/2012/07/05/fear-never-leaves-me-0>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

110. Pillay alarmed at sentencing of 152 paramilitary personnel to death in Bangladesh, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 6 November 2013 available at: <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Media.aspx?IsMediaPage=true&LangID=E>

111. See Sajek– Asian Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Network, *Sajek: Burnt to Ashes, Emblematic of Bangladesh’s policy toward indigenous Jumma peoples*, available at: www.aitpn.org/Reports/Bangladesh-Sajek.pdf, last accessed on 16 October 2013.

112. See Bangladesh Army, *Bangladeshi Military Officers in UNDPKO*, available at: <http://www.afd.gov.bd/?q=node/26>, last accessed on 16 October 2013.

113. The seven villages were Nursery Para, Baibachara, Purba Para, Nangal Mura, Retkaba, Simanapara and Gangarammukh under Sajek Union under Baghaichari Upazila (sub-district)) in Rangamati district in the CHTs. See Sajek – Asian Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Network, *Sajek: Burnt to Ashes, Emblematic of Bangladesh’s policy toward indigenous Jumma peoples*, available at: www.aitpn.org/Reports/Bangladesh-Sajek.pdf, last accessed on 16 October 2013.

the Jumma villagers had gathered due to rumors of an impending attack and the Army arrived to assure them of their safety.¹¹⁴ The Army is alleged to have distracted and kept the indigenous Jumma men occupied so that the illegal plains settlers could begin the attack.¹¹⁵

From 9:30 p.m. until 1:30 a.m., the settlers burnt down a church, two United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) run schools and an estimated 77 indigenous Jumma peoples' homes.¹¹⁶ Four indigenous villagers were wounded, and hundreds of Jummas were internally displaced.¹¹⁷ The attack was in response to mounting tension and resistance by the indigenous Jumma population to the resettlement of the illegal plain settlers onto lands owned by them.¹¹⁸

Further on 23 April 2008, Lt. Col. Sazid Imtiaz allegedly took a group of settlers at Bana Vihar area (lying between Dane Baibachara and Retkaba village) and ordered them to construct houses on land of the Jummas. On 24 April, Lt. Col. Sazid Imtiaz further held a meeting at his headquarters at Baghaihat in which representatives from both the indigenous peoples and the illegal settlers were invited. It was at this meeting that Lt. Col. Sazid Imtiaz issued his death threat warning to the Jummas, as quoted above.¹¹⁹

To date, no one has been held accountable for these grave human rights violations.¹²⁰ Following the burning of the villages, on 21 April 2008, Mr. Anu Chakma filed a First Information Report (FIR) with the Baghaichari police station.¹²¹ On the same day, a counter FIR was filed by a settler named Md. Nurul Alam.¹²² On 28 April 2008, the army personnel arrested four Jummas identified as Sushil Chakma (26), son of Asomi Chandra Chakma; Ratna Bikash Chakma (22), son of Gunodhar Chakma; Sangram Chakma (22), son of Ashok Kumar Chakma and Rabindra Chakma (23), son of Shashi Mohan Chakma from Simanachara village for alleged involvement in arson of their own villages. The arrested Jummas were sent to Rangamati jail. On 29 May 2008, Rangamati district judge court granted them bail.¹²³

Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Awal, Sierra Leone

After returning from UN peacekeeping duties in Sierra Leone, Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Awal was involved in the first massive communal attack after the CHTs peace accord.¹²⁴ As the Commander of

114. Prior to the 20 April 2008 attack, a dozen homes of indigenous Jumma peoples in Bhanga Karbari Para were destroyed by the settlers on 19 April 2008. See Sajek – Asian Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Network, *Sajek: Burnt to Ashes, Emblematic of Bangladesh's policy toward indigenous Jumma peoples*, available at: www.aitpn.org/Reports/Bangladesh-Sajek.pdf, last accessed on 16 October 2013.

115. See Sajek – Asian Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Network, *Sajek: Burnt to Ashes, Emblematic of Bangladesh's policy toward indigenous Jumma peoples*, available at: www.aitpn.org/Reports/Bangladesh-Sajek.pdf, last accessed on 16 October 2013.

116. *Ibid.*

117. *Ibid.*

118. *Ibid.*

119. See Asian Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Network, *Sajek: Burnt to Ashes*, June 2008, available at: <http://aitpn.org/Reports/Bangladesh-Sajek.pdf>, last accessed on 1 September 2013. See also IWGIA, *Militarization in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh*, Organising Committee CHT Campaign Shimin Gaikou Centre, 2012, available at: http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_publications_files/0577_Igia_report_14_optimized.pdf, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

120. See Asian Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Network, *Sajek: Burnt to Ashes*, June 2008, available at: <http://aitpn.org/Reports/Bangladesh-Sajek.pdf>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

121. See GR. No. 122/08. Case No. 03, date: 21/4/08, under section 143/144/323/427/436/34 of Bangladesh Penal Code.

122. See GR. No. 121/08. Case No. 02, date 21/4/08, under sections 143/144/323/324/427/436/34 of Bangladesh Penal Code.

123. See Asian Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Network, *Sajek: Burnt to Ashes*, June 2008, available at: <http://aitpn.org/Reports/Bangladesh-Sajek.pdf>, last accessed on 1 September 2013. See also Case No. GR 121, 2008.

124. See IWGIA, *Militarization in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh*, Organising Committee CHT Campaign Shimin Gai-

Mahalchari Zone, Khangrachari district, Lt. Col. Awal had a prominent role in the 27 August 2003 attacks on the indigenous Jumma peoples at Mahalchari.¹²⁵

On 24 August 2003, a Bengali Hindu man, Rupan Mahajan, was abducted from the Mahalchari sub-district. In response to the abduction, the Army conducted cordon and search operations of Jummas.¹²⁶

On the morning of 26 August, a group of plain settlers came to a store in Babupara and harassed the owner, asking why the store was open despite the boycott of the bazaar. They withdrew after the Jumma villagers protested but, following that, they came back with a group of army officers led by Mahalchari Zone Commander, Lt. Col. Abdul Awal, and beat up Binod Bihari Khisha, an indigenous person, at his store. Khisa's son was also beaten up when he tried to intervene. Binod Bihari Khisha tried to speak to the Commanding Officer but Major Moazzem allegedly refused to listen, handing him over to the settlers, who beat him to death with sticks and iron rods. Ronel Chakma, Mongsangyo Marma and others who had first protested against the settlers' attack were taken to Mahalchari camp and tortured.

Simultaneously, looting and arson of the villages began. The attackers were accompanied by the military so the villagers could do nothing but flee. Witness accounts say that some 400-500 Bengalis participated in the attack on Babupara village. The attacks spread from Babupara to Marma Para, Nua Para, Pahartuli, Durpujyanal, Herengyanal, Boidyo Adam, Basanta Para, Rameshu Para, Saw Mil Para and Lemuchari, etc.¹²⁷

During the attack on Herengyanal village, Kiriton Chakma, a nine-month-old infant, was murdered and his grandmother Kala Sona Chakma, who was with him, was raped. The two were attacked while escaping from their house, which had been set on fire. Further ten indigenous Jumma women were raped during this attack. It is unclear whether the perpetrators were settlers or soldiers. The rape victims included three or four teenage girls.¹²⁸

The army and settlers also targeted their attacks on Buddhist temples. Amrakanan Buddhist Temple, Shanti Niketon Bouddha Vihara and Arjyo Mitra Buddha Vihara were looted and ransacked. Buddha images were smashed, valuables were carried away and everything else was destroyed.¹²⁹

Lt. Col. Abdul Awal was responsible for torture to death of Binod Bihari Khisa as well as failure of command responsibility that led to gross human rights violations including rape. No action was taken or any investigation was conducted. The administrative officer, the Upazilla Nirbahi Officer (UNO), of Mahalchari sub-district was transferred immediately after he told the media that "the hill people are helpless and I am without any means to do anything".¹³⁰

kou Centre, 2012, available at: http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_publications_files/0577_Igia_report_14_optimized.pdf, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

125. *Ibid.*

126. *Ibid.*

127. *Ibid.*

128. *Ibid.*

129. *Ibid.*

130. *Ibid.*

viii. Accountability for Human Rights Violations by the Bangladeshi UN Peacekeepers

In 2007 a U.K. newspaper reported that four Bangladeshi peacekeepers deployed to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) had been repatriated following investigations into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse of children as a result of investigations by a UN team that began in February 2006.¹³¹ The news report also stated “the Sudanese government in Khartoum had video footage of Bangladeshi UN personnel having sex with three young girls.”¹³² The UN later confirmed that the four Bangladeshi peacekeepers had been repatriated over the allegations and that their cases would be pursued in Bangladesh.

The UN announced its intention to follow up with the Government of Bangladesh with regard to allegations.¹³³ On his second day as UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon issued a statement reiterating the UN’s “zero-tolerance” policy towards sexual abuse stating “zero tolerance, meaning zero complacency and zero impunity.”¹³⁴ The Government of Bangladesh has failed to indicate publicly as to whether any action has been taken against the accused.

Five years later in October 2012 at the Plenary of the Sixth Committee of the 67th UNGA on “Criminal accountability of United Nations officials and experts on mission”, Dr. A K Abdul Momen, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the United Nations stated:

Being one of the top troop contributors to UN Peacekeeping operations, the government of Bangladesh always maintains a ‘zero tolerance’ policy in addressing all cases of abuse and sexual exploitation committed by peacekeeping personnel. This is in line with her general commitment to ensure a better universe for the mankind. We firmly believe that all UN peacekeeping personnel should perform their duties in a manner that preserves the integrity, the image, the trust and credibility of the United Nations.

According to domestic law of Bangladesh, where Bangladesh Defence Force and Police personnel serve as United Nations officials or experts on mission, they are subject to a system of military or Police discipline, thereby ensuring accountability at all times. In fact, the members of defence force in Bangladesh are governed by two sets of law, one is ‘the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898’ and the other is, ‘Manual of Bangladesh Military Law (MBML)’. Apart from the above, all crimes under Bangladesh law committed by Bangladesh civil servants and Bangladesh Police Force in foreign countries are also punishable. Therefore, all military or civilian UN peacekeeping personnel involved in suspected sexual

131. See Wikileaks, *Cable No. 07KHAROU31_a*, 8 January 2007, available at: http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07KHARTOUM31_a.html, last accessed on 4 October 2013. See also UN News Centre, *Four peacekeepers accused of sex abuse already repatriated – UN mission in Sudan*, available at: <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=21160>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

132. See Wikileaks, *Cable No. 07KHAROU31_a*, 8 January 2007, available at: http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07KHARTOUM31_a.html, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

133. See UN News Centre, *Four peacekeepers accused of sex abuse already repatriated – UN mission in Sudan*, available at: <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=21160>, last accessed on 1 September 2013

134. See Secretary-General Office of the Spokesperson, *Statement Attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General on Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Personnel in Sudan*, 3 January 2007, available at: <http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=2388>, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

exploitation and abuse cases are to be reported to the competent authorities and investigated in accordance with Bangladesh law.

*Finally, Bangladesh is committed to take all appropriate measures to ensure that crimes by United Nations officials and experts on mission do not go unpunished and that the perpetrators of such crimes are brought to justice, without prejudice to the privileges and immunities of such persons and the United Nations under international law, and in accordance with international human rights standards, including due process.*¹³⁵

Despite the Government of Bangladesh's pledge to a "zero tolerance" policy towards human rights abuses concerning persons deployed on UN peacekeeping missions, there is currently no human rights screening process for deployment on UNPKOs.¹³⁶ As demonstrated above, the need for proper vetting is evident as the Army has been involved in widespread and systematic violations of human rights throughout its deployment in Bangladesh.

135. See Dr. A K Abdul Momen, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the UN at the Plenary of the Sixth Committee of the 67th UNGA on "Criminal accountability of United Nations officials and experts on mission", 15 October 2012, available at: <http://goo.gl/F9O8Wl>, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

136. National level recruitment in the Army requires persons to meet combat requirements. Every male citizen, irrespective of caste, class or religion is eligible for recruitment in the army provided he meets the laid down age educational, physical and medical requirement. Recruitment is carried out on quarterly basis by Headquarters Recruitment Unit/Branch Recruitment Unit/Area Recruitment Team and Training Centers. Soldiers are recruited at the age between 17 to 19 years and Secondary School Certificate (SSC) Examination/ Equivalents with minimum GPA-2/2nd Division is the minimum educational qualification in addition to physical requirements. Children of serving/retired Armed Forces personnel and serving civilian of Armed Forces are preferred "if they fulfill laid down standard". Initial screening includes checking of documents and preliminary medical test following which written examination of the candidates qualified in the initial screening is conducted. Candidates qualified in written examination will appear before final medical examination. Final selection will be made by the Recruiting Officer. The same procedure is followed with respect to the officers. See Join Bangladesh Army, *Become a Soldier*, available at: <http://www.joinbangladesharmy.mil.bd/career-jobs/become-soldier>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

Chapter 2: Overview of the Bangladesh Police and United Nations peacekeeping

History of the Bangladesh Police

*“Bangladesh’s police have a well-deserved reputation for brutality, corruption and incompetence.”*¹³⁷

Governments and politicians have used the Bangladesh Police to destroy political enemies.¹³⁸ Low police salaries and government control of police promotions and transfers contribute to a cycle of corruption and abuse.¹³⁹

The Police Act, 1861 governs the Bangladeshi Police.¹⁴⁰ This Act was passed by the British Parliament, and under the Act a police force was created in each province of British India.¹⁴¹ It was enacted expressly as a punitive response to the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 in India and was designed to establish a paramilitary force that could act without accountability.¹⁴²

There is little dispute that the police under the British perpetrated what would be described today as a pattern of systematic and widespread human rights violations. Since independence there has been little reform of the laws governing the police or the organization of the police.¹⁴³ Sporadic attempts to reform have been made, but were unsuccessful.¹⁴⁴ Unsurprisingly human rights violations remain systemic and are perpetrated with high levels of impunity.

The Bangladesh Police are a national organization and are under the supervision of the MoHA.

i. History of the Bangladesh Police’s Involvement in United Nations Peacekeeping

In 1989, Bangladesh began its involvement with the UN Police through its participation in the UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia.¹⁴⁵ Since that time, Bangladesh has continued to send its police to serve in UN peacekeeping missions and has participated in 20 missions.¹⁴⁶ Bangladesh

137. See International Crisis Group (ICG), *Bangladesh: Getting Police Reform on Track*, 11 December 2009, Asia Report N°182, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b22758b2.html>, last accessed on 8 October 2013.

138. *Ibid.*

139. *Ibid.*

140. See Bangladesh Police, *History*, available at: <http://www.police.gov.bd/history.php?id=51>, last accessed on 4 October 2013. See also Police Act, 1861, available at: http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=12, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

141. *Ibid.*

142. See Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, *Police Accountability in India*, available at: http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/aj/police/papers/gpj/police_accountability_in_india.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

143. Bangladesh has kept the following laws: the Police Act, 1861; the Evidence Act, 1872; the Criminal Procedure Code of Police, 1898; and the Police Regulation of Bengal, 1943. A draft bill, commonly referred to “Police Ordinance (2007)” was drafted under the last caretaker government, but has not been passed. See International Crisis Group (ICG), *Bangladesh: Getting Police Reform on Track*, 11 December 2009, Asia Report N°182, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b22758b2.html>, last accessed on 8 October 2013.

144. For example the Awami League-led government has failed to update and reform the Bangladeshi Police despite including police reform in its election manifesto. See International Crisis Group (ICG), *Bangladesh: Getting Police Reform on Track*, 11 December 2009, Asia Report N°182, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b22758b2.html>, last accessed on 8 October 2013.

145. See Bangladesh Police, *Bangladesh Police in UN Missions*, available at: <http://www.police.gov.bd/content.php?id=252>, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

146. The Bangladesh Police have participated in the following past missions: UNTAES, UNMIBH, UNMOP, UNAMA, UNMIK, UNTAC, UNTAET, ONUMOZ, UNAMIK, UNOMSIL, MONUA, UNMIS and UNTAG. Bangladesh Police are

Police has sent two all female Formed Police Units (FPUs) to United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).¹⁴⁷ As of August 2013, Bangladesh was the top Police Contributing Country with a total of 1,816 personnel serving in seven missions.¹⁴⁸

ii. Recruitment Policy and Promotion in the Bangladesh Police

Out of the 18 ranks in the Bangladesh Police, recruitment is conducted for only four of the ranks: Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP), Sub-Inspector, Sergeant and Constable.¹⁴⁹ For each of these positions, the Bangladesh Police sets forth specific qualifications for the position, including education, age and height requirements.¹⁵⁰

Despite having formal recruitment guidelines, some officers have been able to buy their way into the Bangladesh Police as “nepotism and political affiliations are common factors influencing recruitment in the police”.¹⁵¹ Moreover, bribery “is widely used to recruit, transfer and promote police officers”.¹⁵² Sources have suggested that entry into the National Police Academy can cost up to Taka (Tk) 2 million (\$28,985), while bribes to local politicians or recruiting officers for a constable position can range from Tk 80,000 to Tk 100,000 (\$1,160 to \$1,450).¹⁵³ According to a former Directorate General

currently serving in MINUSMA (FPUs), MINUSTAH (FPUs and IPOs), MONUSCO (FPUs), UNAMID (FPUs and IPOs), UNMIL (IPOs), UNMISS (IPOs) and UNOCI (FPUs). See Bangladesh Police, *Bangladesh Police in UN Missions*, available at: <http://www.police.gov.bd/content.php?id=252>, last accessed on 4 October 2013. See also UN Peacekeeping, *Contributors*, 31 August 2013, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2013/aug13_1.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013. See also UN Peacekeeping, *UN Mission's Summary detailed by Country*, 31 August 2013, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2013/aug13_3.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

147. See Bangladesh Police, UN Missions, available at: <http://www.police.gov.bd/content.php?id=252>, last accessed on 4 October 2013. See also Salim Mia, BBC News, Dhaka, 12 May 2010, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8678561.stm, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

148. Following Bangladesh, the second and third largest Police Contributing Countries are Jordan with 1,571 personnel and Senegal with 1,062 personnel. Bangladesh Police are currently serving in MINUSMA (FPUs), MINUSTAH (FPUs and IPOs), MONUSCO (FPUs), UNAMID (FPUs and IPOs), UNMIL (IPOs), UNMISS (IPOs) and UNOCI (FPUs). See UN Peacekeeping, *Contributors*, 31 August 2013, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2013/aug13_1.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013. See also UN Peacekeeping, *UN Mission's Summary detailed by Country*, 31 August 2013, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2013/aug13_3.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

149. See Bangladesh Police, *Recruitment*, available at: http://www.police.gov.bd/career_child.php?id=247, last accessed on 4 October 2013. See also International Crisis Group (ICG), *Bangladesh: Getting Police Reform on Track*, 11 December 2009, Asia Report N°182, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b22758b2.html>, last accessed on 8 October 2013.

150. For example, the primary entry-level position for recruitment is Constable, which is directly recruited by the Superintendent of Police of the concerned district. Persons seeking this position must have a SSC or equivalent degree. Both male and female recruits must be between the ages of 18-20 (although male freedom fighters may be between the ages of 18-32, and female freedom fighters may be between the ages of 19-32). The height requirement for males is 5'6", and the height requirement for females is 5'2". See Bangladesh Police, *Constable*, available at: <http://www.police.gov.bd/constable.php>, last accessed on 4 October 2013. The highest entry-level position recruited is that of the ASP. Two-thirds are directly recruited, while one-third of the posts are filled through promotion of Inspectors. Persons wishing to apply must have a four-year degree (or equivalent) or have previously graduated. Both males and females must be between the ages of 21-30 (unless they are freedom fighters than 21-32). Males must be 5'4" in height, whereas females must be 5' in height. The direct recruitment procedure for ASPs is conducted by the Bangladesh Public Service Commission. See Bangladesh Police, *Assistant Superintendent of Police*, available at: http://www.police.gov.bd/asp_child.php, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

151. “Observers note that ‘admission bribes’ for constables and SIs range between Tk 60,000 and 100,000 (\$870-\$1,450). Bribes...are often paid to the local recruiter who is usually a police superintendent of the local Member of Parliament (MP).” See Crisis Group interviews, Dhaka, March 2009, and Crisis Group interviews, former Directorate General of Forces Intelligence official, Dhaka, January 2009, as cited in, International Crisis Group (ICG), *Bangladesh: Getting Police Reform on Track*, 11 December 2009, Asia Report N°182, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b22758b2.html>, last accessed on 8 October 2013. See also Sofia Wickberg, *Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Bangladesh*, Transparency International, 7 November 2012, available at: <http://goo.gl/zWP3qj>, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

152. See Sofia Wickberg, *Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Bangladesh*, Transparency International, 7 November 2012, available at: <http://goo.gl/zWP3qj>, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

153. “Observers note that ‘admission bribes’ for constables and SIs range between Tk 60,000 and 100,000 (\$870-\$1,450).

of Forces Intelligence official, “[a]t the ASP level, entry into the force can cost anywhere between Tk 150,00 and Tk 400,000 (\$2,170-\$5,800) or higher but officers say that political connections at this level are more important than money”.¹⁵⁴

Typically each recruit goes through six months to one year of basic training in areas such as physical fitness and weapons.¹⁵⁵ Training for new recruits and officers is generally poor.¹⁵⁶ The curriculum used for constable training is inadequate. As a result, the junior ranks generally have a weak grasp of police procedures and the proper use of force when dealing with criminals or crowd.¹⁵⁷ According to interviews with Sardah trainers, the academy’s curriculum prioritises “physical toughness over mental toughness and ... it focuses too heavily on the study of law, with no attention given to subjects such as ... human rights...and investigations.”¹⁵⁸ Lastly, only 0.06 percent of the total police spending is spent on the training budget, which adds to the weaknesses in the system.¹⁵⁹

iii. United Nation’s Police Officers and Peacekeeper Selection Policy

Although there is little research into bribery and peacekeeping selection procedures in Bangladesh, it would appear highly unlikely that informal practices are not central to de facto selection processes for peacekeeping duties, not least given the significant financial rewards of peacekeeping work.¹⁶⁰ It can cost constables anywhere from Tk 200,000 to Tk300,000 (\$2,890 to \$4,350) in bribes to secure a position in a UN peacekeeping mission.¹⁶¹

Formed Police Units

A Formed Police Unit (FPU) is a team of police officers deployed as a “cohesive mobile unit,” who protect UN staff and property/facilities, ensure public order and support police operations that involve a higher risk.¹⁶² They are deployed on UN missions under a Memorandum of Understanding

Bribes...are often paid to the local recruiter who is usually a police superintendent of the local Member of Parliament (MP).” See Crisis Group interviews, Dhaka, March 2009, and Crisis Group interviews, former Directorate General of Forces Intelligence official, Dhaka, January 2009, *as cited in*, International Crisis Group (ICG), *Bangladesh: Getting Police Reform on Track*, 11 December 2009, Asia Report N°182, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b22758b2.html>, last accessed on 8 October 2013.

154. According to various interviews, the bribes are not only lucrative for the politicians but also for the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Home Affairs, which may at times have the final word on appointments, transfers and promotions. See Crisis Group interviews, Dhaka, March 2009, and Crisis Group interviews, former Directorate General of Forces Intelligence official, Dhaka, January 2009, *as cited in*, International Crisis Group (ICG), *Bangladesh: Getting Police Reform on Track*, 11 December 2009, Asia Report N°182, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b22758b2.html>, last accessed on 8 October 2013.

155. New recruits still train on horses and practice with bayonets. See International Crisis Group (ICG), *Bangladesh: Getting Police Reform on Track*, 11 December 2009, Asia Report N°182, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b22758b2.html>, last accessed on 8 October 2013.

156. See International Crisis Group (ICG), *Bangladesh: Getting Police Reform on Track*, 11 December 2009, Asia Report N°182, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b22758b2.html>, last accessed on 8 October 2013.

157. *Ibid.*

158. *Ibid.*

159. *Ibid.*

160. According to interviews conducted by ICG, the bribes are recouped quickly through money received from UN peacekeeping missions. The amount received “propels an officer instantly into the middle class.” See International Crisis Group (ICG), *Bangladesh: Getting Police Reform on Track*, 11 December 2009, Asia Report N°182, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b22758b2.html>, last accessed on 8 October 2013.

161. See Crisis Group interviews, Dhaka, February 2009, *as cited in*, International Crisis Group (ICG), *Bangladesh: Getting Police Reform on Track*, 11 December 2009, Asia Report N°182, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b22758b2.html>, last accessed on 8 October 2013.

162. See UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, Department of Field Support, Ref. 2009. 32, 1 March 2013, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/documents/formed_police_unit_policy_032010.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

between the UN and the Police Contributing Country, and the typical deployment ranges from six months to one year.¹⁶³

All FPU to be deployed to a UN peacekeeping operation must be assessed by Special Police Assessment Teams (SPATs)¹⁶⁴ on operational capacity and readiness, the professional background of the unit and specific training received. The composition and organization of FPUs vary depending on the mission-specific requirements.¹⁶⁵ However, each FPU has at minimum 120 police officers, and typically has operational, logistic and command strength of 140 personnel.¹⁶⁶

The Police Training Center (PTC), Tangail, and the PTC, Noakhali, provide the pre-deployment course for FPUs.¹⁶⁷ Additionally, PTC Tangail provides pre-Selection Assistance and Assessment Team (SAAT) training and PTC Noakhali provides pre-SAT training for officers of ASP rank.

Individual Police Officers

The majority of individual police officers (IPOs) are seconded to the DPKO for a term of six months to a year.¹⁶⁸ Another, more limited way is for the UN Police Division (UNPOL) Division to seek candidates for professional posts via the UN Careers portal, where individual police officers (IPOs) can apply directly.¹⁶⁹

163. Their deployment can be extended up to 24 months. See UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, Department of Field Support, Ref. 2009. 32, 1 March 2013, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/documents/formed_police_unit_policy_032010.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

164. The Special Police Assessment Teams (SPAT) evaluate FPU personnel. The SPAT assessment, which is a compulsory step prior to deployment, comprises language, firearms, crowd control and other special police function assessments. It also focuses on the verification of the professional background of FPU personnel and specific pre-deployment preparations, including training, received by the unit. According to the UN guidelines, the following is subject to SPAT review: 1) All commissioned ranks (command staff, including deputies) must have a minimum of five years of police service in their home countries prior to deployment. Non-commissioned ranks must have a minimum of two years of police service in their home countries prior to deployment; 2) Personnel must be between the ages of 25-62 years (preference given to those under 55 years); 3) Personnel must demonstrate a clear understanding and practical application of the graduated use of force principles; 4) Personnel will be tested on their public order management capacity in accordance with the current testing regime; 5) All drivers within the FPU will be tested on their driving skills; 6) All personnel will be tested and assessed on their individual weapons handling skills; and 7) Personnel will be tested on their language skills. See UN Police Magazine, July 2012 9th Edition, DPKO, available at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/unpolmag/unpolmag_09.pdf, last accessed on 22 May 2013. See also UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, Department of Field Support, Ref. 2009. 32, 1 March 2013, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/documents/formed_police_unit_policy_032010.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013. See also UN Police Division Minimum Recruitment Requirements, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/requirements.shtml>, last accessed on 4 October 2013. Public order managements “includes preventive activities, such as high-visibility patrolling and popular confidence-building, as well as crowd and riot control. In accordance with mandated tasks, this may include protection of public and private property”. See UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, Department of Field Support, Ref. 2009. 32, 1 March 2013, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/documents/formed_police_unit_policy_032010.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

165. See UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, Department of Field Support, Ref. 2009. 32, 1 March 2013, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/documents/formed_police_unit_policy_032010.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

166. *Ibid.*

167. See Bangladesh Police, *Training*, available at: <http://www.police.gov.bd/training.php?id=290>, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

168. Member States have been asked to extend the term from six months to a year at minimum in order for more stability within the deployed units. See UN Police Magazine, July 2012 9th Edition, DPKO, available at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/unpolmag/unpolmag_09.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

169. See UNPOL Recruitment, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/recruitment.shtml>, last accessed on 21 May 2013.

IPOs are deployed to meet the specific nature of the mandates of the UN only after they pass the UN Selection Assistance and Assessment Team Test.¹⁷⁰ All IPOs must also meet minimum requirements relating to age, medical fitness, professional experience, professional integrity, language skills, mission-specific skills, computer skills, driving skills, firearms handling and shooting skills (for armed missions).¹⁷¹ Medical fitness is certified before the deployment phase.¹⁷²

Professional and higher level police posts for UN missions and UN Headquarters are also filled through the UN global vacancies system from police/troop contributing countries. The recruitment of these officers is done through semi-annual recruitment campaigns. Member States are approached to nominate qualified and skilled police officers who meet the requirements outlined in the circulated job openings. As of October 2013, there were 81 contributing countries and a limited number of posts making the process highly competitive.¹⁷³

To apply for a UN position through its global vacancy system, candidates should have completed at least one UN mission duty and should not face any departmental action over the preceding year. The selection of IPOs for the UNPOL is carried out on the basis of examinations conducted as per the UN SAAT Guidelines.

The typical length of deployment for an IPO is one year; however the selection policy allows for a 45-day technical extension by the UN and a six-month to a year extension for officers in seniors posts.

Selection Criteria for United Nations' Peacekeepers

The Bangladesh Police have no published formal selection criteria for the selection for UN peacekeepers. As discussed in the previous section, it can be inferred from the Bangladesh Police's process for recruitment and selection into the force that the process for recruitment and selection for UN peacekeepers is also highly politicised, and officers are unlikely to be selected unless they have paid bribes and/or are close to the ruling party.¹⁷⁴

170. The UN SAAT is the name of the UN team that conducts the assessments in Member States. The UN SAAT uses the Standard Operating Procedure called the Assessment of IPO for Service in UN Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions (AMS). See UN Police Magazine, July 2012, 9th Edition, DPKO, available at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/unpolmag/unpolmag_09.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013. See also UN Police, *UN Police Division Minimum Recruitment Requirements*, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/requirements.shtml>, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

171. See UN Police Magazine, July 2012 9th Edition, DPKO, available at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/unpolmag/unpolmag_09.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

172. Assessment of Individual Police Officers for Service in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions Standard Operating Procedure available at: http://www.apf.gov.np/downloads/un/SAAT_SOP_2012.pdf, last accessed on 11 May 2013.

173. See UN Peacekeeping, *Monthly Summary of Contributions*, 31 August 2013, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2013/aug13_1.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013. See also UN Department of Peacekeeping, UN Mission's Summary detailed by Country, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2013/aug13_3.pdf, last accessed 4 October 2013.

174. As previously stated, according to interviews conducted by ICG, the bribes are recouped quickly through money received from UN peacekeeping missions. The amount received "propels an officer instantly into the middle class." See International Crisis Group (ICG), *Bangladesh: Getting Police Reform on Track*, 11 December 2009, Asia Report N°182, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b22758b2.html>, last accessed on 8 October 2013. Chapter 1 discussed the selection and recruitment policies for the Bangladesh Army and how that force also has no formal procedures, but operates within Bangladesh's highly politically polarized culture.

Pre-Deployment Training for Bangladesh Police

The Police Training Centers in Tangail, and Noakhali, are responsible for conducting FPU pre-deployment training.¹⁷⁵ In 2008, the British High Commission together with the Bangladesh Police held a four-week program aimed at improving the pre-deployment training of Bangladesh Police for UN missions.¹⁷⁶ The program intended to improve the training on a range of issues, including “UN policing standards, human rights, cultural issues, stress management, gender equality, sexual abuse and exploitation, VIP protection, driving and tactical skills.”¹⁷⁷

iv. Accountability for Human Rights Violations and Selection of Peacekeepers

There is documented evidence that widespread and systematic abuse in police custody, including torture, occurs regardless of the government in power.¹⁷⁸ Although the Constitution of Bangladesh guarantees that “no person shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment,” an additional Superintendent of Police at police headquarters “admitted that harsh beatings and torture were often used to gain information from a criminal suspect,” stating that “[n]ot all police have the materials or the knowledge to conduct proper investigations like forensic ones, so some resort to torture methods to find the murder weapon.”¹⁷⁹

Amnesty International reported that victims in Bangladesh were “subjected to various kinds of police torture including beating with rifle butts, iron rods, bamboo sticks, hanging by the hands from the ceiling, rape, ‘water treatment’ in which hose pipes are fixed into each nostril and taps turned on full for two minutes at a time, the use of pliers to crush fingers, and electric shocks.”¹⁸⁰

According to Odhikar, the Bangladesh Police, including police seconded to the RAB, were involved in a total of 1,077 extrajudicial killings from 2001 until June 2013.¹⁸¹ From 2001 until June 2013, the Bangladesh Police have allegedly been involved in a further 186 deaths due to torture in their custody.¹⁸²

175. See Bangladesh Police, *Bangladesh Police Academy*, available at: <http://www.police.gov.bd/training.php?id=290>, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

176. See The Daily Star, *Training of police for UN missions ends*, 30 September 2008, available at: <http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=57157>, last accessed 10 October 2013.

177. *Ibid.*

178. See International Crisis Group (ICG), *Bangladesh: Getting Police Reform on Track*, 11 December 2009, Asia Report N°182, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b22758b2.html>, last accessed on 8 October 2013.

179. *Ibid.*

180. See *Bangladesh: Endemic Torture Since Independence*, Amnesty International, 29 November 2000, as cited by, International Crisis Group (ICG), *Bangladesh: Getting Police Reform on Track*, 11 December 2009, Asia Report N°182, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b22758b2.html>, last accessed on 8 October 2013.

181. See Odhikar, *Crossfire/Gunfight from 2001-2013*, available at: http://odhikar.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Statistics_Crossfire_Gunfight_2001-2013.pdf, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

182. See Odhikar, *Torture to death by LEA*, available at: http://odhikar.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Statistics_Torture-to-Death_2001-2013.pdf, last accessed on 1 September 2013. See also Odhikar, *Total Extrajudicial Killings from 2001-2013*, available at: http://odhikar.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Statistics_EJK_2001-2013.pdf, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

Chapter 3- Overview of the Rapid Action Battalion and United Nations Peacekeeping

i. History of the RAB

The RAB was formed on 26 March 2004 by then ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) to “address [the] unstable law and order situation as one of the impediments to development” of Bangladesh and fight organised crime.¹⁸³ According to its website, the RAB’s current mission is to “prevent crime and apprehend criminals.”¹⁸⁴

The RAB is tasked with the following duties¹⁸⁵:

1. Internal security;
2. Recovery of unauthorised arms, ammunitions, explosives and other such articles;
3. Apprehension of armed gangs of criminals;
4. Assisting other law enforcement agencies in the maintenance of law and order;
5. Intelligence gathering;
6. Investigation of any offence concerning the government; and,
7. Any other such duties as the government requires from time to time.

The RAB is comprised of seconded members of the Bangladesh Army, Bangladesh Navy and Bangladesh Air Force, the Bangladesh Police, and members of Bangladesh’s other law enforcement groups such as Border Guard Bangladesh and Bangladesh Ansars.¹⁸⁶ The RAB is under the authority of the Ministry of Home Affairs and is commanded by a police officer not below the rank of Deputy Inspector General or someone of equivalent rank from the military.¹⁸⁷

Currently out of the 208 officers in the RAB, 114 were police officers, followed by 83 Army officers and 11 Air Force officers.¹⁸⁸

183. See Rapid Action Battalion, *Short History*, available at: http://www.rab.gov.bd/about_us.php?page=2, last accessed on 6 September 2013. See also Human Rights Watch, *Testimony of John Sifton, Asia Advocacy Director Human Rights Watch*, Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission House Committee on Foreign Affairs, available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/2012_Bangladesh_JohnSiftonTestimony_7-19-12.pdf, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

184. See Rapid Action Battalion, *Motto, Mission & Capabilities*, available at: http://www.rab.gov.bd/about_us.php?page=2, last accessed on 6 September 2013.

185. *Ibid.*

186. See Rapid Action Battalion, *Short History*, available at: http://www.rab.gov.bd/about_us.php?page=2, last accessed on 6 September 2013. See also Human Rights Watch, *Testimony of John Sifton, Asia Advocacy Director Human Rights Watch*, Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission House Committee on Foreign Affairs, available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/2012_Bangladesh_JohnSiftonTestimony_7-19-12.pdf, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

187. See Human Rights Watch, *Crossfire - Continued Human Rights Abuses by Bangladesh’s Rapid Action Battalion*, 10 May 2011, available at: <http://www.hrw.org/node/98591/section/2>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

188. See Rapid Action Battalion, *Telephone Directory*, available at: <http://www.rab.gov.bd/telephonedir.php>, last accessed on 1 September 2013. The details of RAB officers have been provided in Annex 1. In 2006, Human Rights Watch interviewed military officials concerning how many military personnel were currently in the RAB. They stated that 60 percent of the RAB personnel were seconded from the police, the remaining personnel came from the military and various civilian organizations. However there are widely different estimates as to the military’s contribution to the RAB. See Human Rights Watch, *Judge, Jury and Executioner: Torture and Extrajudicial Killings by Bangladesh’s Elite Security Force*, December 2006, available at: <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/bangladesh1206/3.htm>, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

The RAB has the following branches under its control:¹⁸⁹

1. Operation Wing,
2. Intelligence Wing,
3. Legal & Media Wing,
4. Communication & MIS Wing,
5. Investigation & Forensic Wing,
6. Air Wing,
7. Training & Orientation Wing, and,
8. Research and Development Cell.

The RAB currently has 12 battalions, with five of those posted in Dhaka.¹⁹⁰

ii. Training for the RAB

Prior to entry, RAB personnel undergo initial military or police training due to members being seconded from branches of the military, Navy, Air Force, the police and Bangladesh's various paramilitary forces.¹⁹¹

Upon entry to the RAB, members receive training at the RAB Forces Training School located in Gazipur, Bangladesh.¹⁹² The courses offered are as follows: RAB basic training course, RAB basic intelligence course, basic driving course and a basic computer course.¹⁹³ Additional courses and training are provided as necessary.

iii. Foreign Assistance for training of the RAB

Since late 2007, the RAB has received assistance in training in areas such as "investigative interviewing techniques" and "rules of engagement" from the U.K.¹⁹⁴ In response to diplomatic cables leaked through the website Wikileaks, the U.K. Foreign Office stated that "the U.K. government provides a range of human rights assistance."¹⁹⁵ However the RAB's head of training,

189. See Rapid Action Battalion, available at: <http://www.rab.gov.bd/index.php>, last accessed on 6 September 2013.

190. There is one each in Rajshahi, Khulna, Chittagong, Barisal, Sylhet, Narayanganj and Sirajganj. See Rapid Action Battalion, available at: <http://www.rab.gov.bd/index.php>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

191. See for example Join Bangladesh Army, *Training*, available at: <http://www.joinbangladesharmy.mil.bd/army-life/training>, last accessed on 16 September 2013.

192. See RAB Headquarters, *Training & Orientation Wing*, available at: http://www.rab.gov.bd/rab_wings.php?mid=12, last accessed on 16 September 2013.

193. *Ibid.*

194. "Small teams of British police from forces such as West Mercia and Humberside have travelled to Bangladesh under the auspices of the National Police Improvement Agency." See Fariha Karim and Ian Cobain, *Bangladesh interrogation centre where Britons were taken to be tortured*, The Guardian, 17 January 2011, available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/17/bangladesh-secret-interrogation-centre>, last accessed on 16 September 2013. See also Fariha Karim and Ian Cobain, *WikiLeaks cables: Bangladeshi 'death squad' trained by U.K. government, Rapid Action Battalion accused of hundreds of extra-judicial killings, received training from U.K. officers, cables reveal*, The Guardian, 21 December 2010, available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/21/wikileaks-cables-british-police-bangladesh-death-squad>, last accessed on 6 September 2013. See also Asian Center for Human Rights, *Rethinking International Security Sector Assistance: British Assistance to the Rapid Action Battalion in Bangladesh*, 25 February 2011, available at: <http://www.achrweb.org/briefingpapers/Bangladesh-BP-01-11.html>, last accessed on 16 September 2013.

195. Human Rights Watch's Asia Director, Brad Adams, said: "RAB is a Latin American-style death squad dressed up as an anti-crime force. The British government has let its desire for a functional counter-terrorism partner in Bangladesh blind it to the risks of working with RAB, and the legitimacy that it gives to RAB inside Bangladesh. Furthermore, it is not

Mejbah Uddin, was unaware of any human rights training.¹⁹⁶

Due to the scale of documented human rights abuses, the United States does not provide any training, other than human rights training, to the RAB.¹⁹⁷ In the same leaked cables, then US Ambassador, James Moriarty, said that the US was “constrained by RAB’s alleged human rights violations, which have rendered the administration (RAB) ineligible to receive training or assistance’ under laws which prohibit American funding or training for overseas military units which abuse human rights with impunity.”¹⁹⁸ The cables further stated that the “use of torture has been documented by the U.K. government as well as human rights groups. The British government does not face the same legal restraints as the US government.”¹⁹⁹

iv. RAB and Human Rights Violations

Among all the security forces in Bangladesh, the RAB has by far the highest public profile; a profile dominated by what can only be described as extraordinarily well-documented allegations of grave human rights violations including arbitrary detention, torture, other forms of ill treatment and abuse, and almost routine extrajudicial executions.²⁰⁰

clear that the British government has ever made it a priority at the highest levels to tell RAB that if it doesn’t change, it will not co-operate with it.” See Fariha Karim and Ian Cobain, *WikiLeaks cables: Bangladeshi ‘death squad’ trained by U.K. government, Rapid Action Battalion accused of hundreds of extra-judicial killings, received training from U.K. officers, cables reveal*, The Guardian, 21 December 2010, available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/21/wikileaks-cables-british-police-bangladesh-death-squad>, last accessed on 6 September 2013. See Fariha Karim and Ian Cobain, *Bangladesh interrogation centre where Britons were taken to be tortured*, The Guardian, 17 January 2011, available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/17/bangladesh-secret-interrogation-centre>, last accessed on 16 September 2013. See also Fariha Karim and Ian Cobain, *WikiLeaks cables: Bangladeshi ‘death squad’ trained by U.K. government, Rapid Action Battalion accused of hundreds of extra-judicial killings, received training from U.K. officers, cables reveal*, The Guardian, 21 December 2010, available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/21/wikileaks-cables-british-police-bangladesh-death-squad>, last accessed on 6 September 2013. See also Asian Center for Human Rights, *Rethinking International Security Sector Assistance: British Assistance to the Rapid Action Battalion in Bangladesh*, 25 February 2011, available at: <http://www.achrweb.org/briefingpapers/Bangladesh-BP-01-11.html>, last accessed on 16 September 2013.

196. See Fariha Karim and Ian Cobain, *Bangladesh interrogation centre where Britons were taken to be tortured*, The Guardian, 17 January 2011, available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/17/bangladesh-secret-interrogation-centre>, last accessed on 16 September 2013. See also Fariha Karim and Ian Cobain, *WikiLeaks cables: Bangladeshi ‘death squad’ trained by U.K. government, Rapid Action Battalion accused of hundreds of extra-judicial killings, received training from U.K. officers, cables reveal*, The Guardian, 21 December 2010, available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/21/wikileaks-cables-british-police-bangladesh-death-squad>, last accessed on 6 September 2013.

197. See Ian Cobain, *WikiLeaks cables: Bangladeshi ‘death squad’ trained by U.K. government resumes extrajudicial killing*, The Guardian, 26 January 2011, available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/26/bangladesh-death-squad-killings-britain>, last accessed on 6 September 2013. Under U.S. law (the Leahy Vetting Process), when credible information is uncovered that demonstrates that an individual or unit has committed gross human rights violations, U.S. assistance must be withheld. See also Human Rights.Gov, *An Overview of the Leahy Vetting Process*, 9 July 2013, available at: <http://www.humanrights.gov/2013/07/09/an-overview-of-the-leahy-vetting-process/>, last accessed on 16 September 2013.

198. See Fariha Karim and Ian Cobain, *WikiLeaks cables: Bangladeshi ‘death squad’ trained by U.K. government, Rapid Action Battalion accused of hundreds of extra-judicial killings, received training from U.K. officers, cables reveal*, The Guardian, 26 January 2011, available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/21/wikileaks-cables-british-police-bangladesh-death-squad>, last accessed on 6 September 2013. Under U.S. law (the Leahy Vetting Process), when credible information is uncovered that demonstrates that an individual or unit has committed gross human rights violations, U.S. assistance must be withheld. See also Human Rights.Gov, *An Overview of the Leahy Vetting Process*, 9 July 2013, available at: <http://www.humanrights.gov/2013/07/09/an-overview-of-the-leahy-vetting-process/>, last accessed on 16 September 2013.

199. See Ian Cobain, *WikiLeaks cables: Bangladeshi ‘death squad’ trained by U.K. government resumes extrajudicial killing*, The Guardian, 26 January 2011, available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/26/bangladesh-death-squad-killings-britain>, last accessed on 6 September 2013. Under U.S. law (the Leahy Vetting Process), when credible information is uncovered that demonstrates that an individual or unit has committed gross human rights violations, U.S. assistance must be withheld. See also Human Rights.Gov, *An Overview of the Leahy Vetting Process*, 9 July 2013, available at: <http://www.humanrights.gov/2013/07/09/an-overview-of-the-leahy-vetting-process/>, last accessed on 16 September 2013.

200. There are four main paramilitary/security forces in Bangladesh: the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), the Ansars and the Village Defence Party, all of which are organized under the control of the Ministry of Home Affairs. See Country of Origin Information Report (COIS) Bangladesh 30 September 2012 Section 8, available at: <http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/coi/bangladesh/report-0912.pdf?view=Binary> last

Based on evidence of routine extrajudicial executions, the RAB has been variedly described a “death squad”. The label is contentious in Bangladesh but is supported not just by documentation but unusual statements by members of successive governments. These give frank confirmation that the RAB extrajudicially executes on behalf of the government. For example, in 2009 the Awami League Shipping Minister, Shahjahan Khan, speaking in a discussion organised by the BBC, said: “The government will need to continue with extrajudicial killings, commonly called crossfire, until terrorist activities and extortion are uprooted.”²⁰¹ This is consistent with statements made by the opposition BNP officials who stated that extrajudicial killings were part of the RAB mandate.²⁰²

The current government promised in its manifesto that it would end all extrajudicial killings, but they have continued since its election two years ago. In fact, these killings have increased under the current administration.²⁰³

There is a large number of well-documented cases in which RAB forces have “identified individuals, illegally detained them and then later claimed or staged a shootout in which the detainee is killed, [while the RAB claims] self-defense. The RAB then issues a formulaic press statement explaining how victims died in ‘crossfire’.”²⁰⁴

In Bangladesh, “crossfire” is a widely accepted euphemism for extrajudicial killing. According to Odhikar, a total of 776 persons were killed in “crossfire” incidents by RAB forces from January 2004 to June 2013.²⁰⁵ On the other hand, as per the RAB, in the 10 years since its foundation, 18 RAB personnel died²⁰⁶ but not a single death has been the result of innumerable crossfire incidents, which supposedly involve armed exchanges with criminal gangs and terrorist groups.²⁰⁷ The 18 RAB personnel were killed in the Pikhana massacre, road accident etc.

As evidenced by public statements by government officials, the RAB enjoys wide support for its tactics. Former Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs Minister Moudud Ahmed, was quoted as saying, “*Although technically you may call it extrajudicial – I will not say killing – but extrajudicial deaths.*

accessed on 16 September 2013. See also Human Rights Watch, *Testimony of John Sifton, Asia Advocacy Director Human Rights Watch*, Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission House Committee on Foreign Affairs, available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/2012_Bangladesh_JohnSiftonTestimony_7-19-12.pdf, last accessed on 1 September 2013. See also Human Rights Watch, *The Fear Never Leaves Me*, 4 July 2012, available at: <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/07/04/fear-never-leaves-me>, last accessed on 16 September 2013.

201. See Ian Cobain, *WikiLeaks cables: Bangladeshi ‘death squad’ trained by U.K. government resumes extrajudicial killing*, The Guardian, 26 January 2011, available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/26/bangladesh-death-squad-killings-britain>, last accessed on 6 September 2013.

202. See Human Rights Watch, *Testimony of John Sifton, Asia Advocacy Director Human Rights Watch*, Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/2012_Bangladesh_JohnSiftonTestimony_7-19-12.pdf, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

203. See International Crisis Group (ICG), *Bangladesh: Getting Police Reform on Track*, 11 December 2009, Asia Report N°182, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b22758b2.html>, last accessed on 8 October 2013.

204. The term “crossfire” has become almost synonymous with the RAB, and in the region is used to describe summary executions (extrajudicial executions). See “Crossfire” See Human Rights Watch, *Testimony of John Sifton, Asia Advocacy Director Human Rights Watch*, Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission House Committee on Foreign Affairs, available at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/2012_Bangladesh_JohnSiftonTestimony_7-19-12.pdf, last accessed on 1 September 2013. See also See Country of Origin Information Report (COIS) Bangladesh 30 September 2012 Section 8, available at: <http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/coi/bangladesh/report-0912.pdf?view=Binary> last accessed on 16 September 2013. See also

205. See Annex 10, *Crossfire/Gunfight 2001-2013*. These included 706 killings by RAB, 59 by RAB-Police and 11 by RAB-Coast Guard. See Odhikar, *Crossfire/Gunfight Statistics from 2001-2013*, available at: http://odhikar.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Statistics_Crossfire_Gunfight_2001-2013.pdf, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

206. See RAB, *Heroes That We Lost*, available at: http://www.rab.gov.bd/oi_wwl.php, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

207. *Ibid.*

*But these are not killings. According to RAB, they say all those who have been killed so far have been killed or dead on encounter or whatever crossfire, whatever you call it – people are happy.*²⁰⁸

In September 2011, the gross violations of the right to life by the RAB also led to the unusual public statement by former Prime Minister and now leader of the opposition Ms. Khaleda Zia, who had actually established the RAB, calling for all RAB personnel to be banned from UN Peacekeeping duties.²⁰⁹

v. Selection of RAB for the United Nations Peacekeeping

As previously discussed, members of the RAB are seconded from the military, including the Bangladesh Army, the Air Force and Navy, and the Bangladesh Police. As a result, members of the RAB are selected for UN peacekeeping duty as part of a military contingent, part of a FPU or as an IPO. The UN peacekeeper selection procedures (or lack thereof) for either the Bangladesh Army or the Bangladesh Police also pertain to the members of the RAB.

Pre-deployment training for members of the RAB chosen for UN peacekeeping missions is dependent on which branch of the military or area of the police force the personnel are selected.

vi. Accountability for Human Rights Violations and Selection of Peacekeepers

Successive governments have promised to end the RAB's use of extrajudicial execution. Nevertheless, there is considerable tolerance for the killings, which many regard as necessary in a justice sector that fails to prosecute criminals. Bangladesh's National Human Rights Commission has recommended independent investigations into all alleged extrajudicial killings. In December 2009, Justice Amirul Kabir Chowdhury, then commission's Chairperson, recommended that:

*Each of the incidents should be investigated by an independent inquiry committee of minimum three members comprising a government official not below the rank of deputy secretary, a police officer not below the rank of superintendent of police and a civil society personality of the choice of the family of the victim*²¹⁰

In July 2010, the NHRC reported that it was dealing with a number of disappearances of people who had allegedly been picked up by RAB.²¹¹ However the effectiveness of the NHRC has been limited. Despite numerous recommendations for investigations into alleged extrajudicial killings, the Government has largely ignored the NHRC's pleas.²¹²

208. See Phillip Reeves, "Anti-Terror Force Stalks Bangladesh Capital," National Public Radio, November 21, 2006, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6520810> (accessed 30 November 2006), as cited in See Human Rights Watch, *Judge, Jury and Executioner: Torture and Extrajudicial Killings by Bangladesh's Elite Security Force*, December 2006, available at: <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/bangladesh1206/3.htm>, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

209. See Bdnews24.com, *Reject RAB, police as UN peacekeepers*, 28 September 2011, available at: <http://ms.bdnews24.com/details.php?id=207286&cid=3>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

210. See Human Rights Watch, *Crossfire Continued Human Rights Abuses by Bangladesh's Rapid Action Battalion*, May 2011, available at: <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bangladesh0511webwcover.pdf>, last accessed on 6 September 2013.

211. *Ibid.*

212. The NHRC chairman, Mizanur Rahman, wrote to the MoHA demanding immediate investigations stating, "I will go to the president if the Home Ministry does not form a probe committee and submit its report to the NHRC within the stipulated time. The Rapid Action Battalion has no authority to shoot a person even if that person guilty. The RAB personnel responsible for the incident have violated human rights and the law. The offenders must be detected and punished to stop such practice." See The Daily Star, *NHRC chief pushes for govt probe*, 9 April 2011, available at: <http://thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=181085>, as cited in Human Rights Watch, *Crossfire Continued Human Rights Abuses*

The judiciary has also expressed concern over the RAB but has been equally unable to hold perpetrators accountable. In November 2009, the Bangladesh High Court directed the government and the RAB to explain why action should not be taken against RAB personnel involved in the killing of the two victims, the Khalashi brothers.²¹³ The RAB enjoys the same legal immunities and de facto impunity as other branches of the security forces.

Case No. 1: Director General MD Abdul Aziz Sarkar and Additional Director General MD Mahbubul Alam Mollah, RAB HQ

Md. Abdul Aziz Sarkar as the Chief of the RAB and Additional Director General Md. Mahbubul Alam Mollah have command responsibility for all gross violations that their subordinates have committed. The director general had served in UN missions in Yugoslavia and Kosovo while his deputy served in the Iraq-Kuwait mission.²¹⁴

Case No. 2: Lieutenant Colonel Muhammed Badrul Absan, Commanding Officer of RAB-4

On 9 March 2006, Md. Masudur Rahman alias Iman Ali (37), son of the late Mr. Suruz Mondol, was killed by the RAB-4 at Savar in Dhaka. He was earlier arrested on 8 March 2006 at 11:00 am from the premises of the Session Judge's Court in Dhaka. The dead body of Md. Masudur Rahman was recovered from a field at Khagain village under Savar police station on 9 March 2006. The dead body reportedly had burn wounds, swelling around the right ear, a bruise on the right side of the face and a hole in the toe of the right foot. The family members of the deceased alleged that he was killed by the RAB in cold blood.²¹⁵ Lieutenant Colonel Muhammed Badrul Ahsan who had served in the UN mission to Sierra Leone was the commander of the RAB-4 at the time of extrajudicial execution of Md. Masudur Rahman, alias Iman Ali.

Case No. 3: Lieutenant Colonel Farhad Ahmed, Commanding Officer of RAB-3

The diplomatic cables of the US Embassy states that on 1 June 2006 local media reported that in Rampura, a suburb of Dhaka, the RAB killed Abul Kalam Azad Sumon, a Jubo League (the student wing of the Awami League) member. In a press release, RAB declared that the deceased was notorious criminal Goailya Sumon, and that he was killed in late night "crossfire" when his criminal colleagues opened fire as he tried to lead police to an arms cache. Goailya Sumon, they said, was wanted on charges of murder, rape and theft.²¹⁶

The media, however, quoting friends and family of the deceased, stated that he was in fact Abul Sumon, aged 22, and had no criminal record. They noted that, according to Abul's father, the Sumon family lives at 259 East Goran, while police listed Goailya Sumon's address as 435 South Goran. In addition, Sumon's rape charge occurred nine years ago, when Abul Sumon was 13. Abul Sumon's father said that plainclothes police picked up his son at his place of work on 30 May 2006. Awami League leader Saber Hussain Chowdhury claimed Abul Sumon was a minor Awami League

by Bangladesh's Rapid Action Battalion, May 2011, available at: <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bangladesh0511webwcover.pdf>, last accessed on 6 September 2013.

213. See Human Rights Watch, *Crossfire Continued Human Rights Abuses by Bangladesh's Rapid Action Battalion*, May 2011, available at: <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bangladesh0511webwcover.pdf>, last accessed on 6 September 2013.

214. See Asian Human Rights Commission, *BANGLADESH: Arbitrary arrest and extra-judicial killing by the Rapid Action Battalion in Dhaka*, 27 March 2006, available at: <http://www.humanrights.asia/news/urgent-appeals/UA-106-2006>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

215. *Ibid.*

216. See Wikileaks, *Cable No. 05DHIKA2491, RAB Kills Awami League Activists, Apparently in Error*, available at: <http://www.wikileaks.org>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

activist, had no criminal record, and that his duties consisted of distributing leaflets at a local mosque protesting the construction of a public works project. Local BNP politicians said that Abul Sumon was polite and his killing was “abominable.”²¹⁷

The US Embassy officials in the comment stated, “There appears to be no political or criminal motivation for Sumon’s textbook “crossfire” fate, which underscores one of the principal problems with extra-judicial killings as a matter of practice: when mistakes are made, they are impossible to rectify.”²¹⁸ The Commander of the RAB-3 who killed Sumon was *Colonel Farhad Ahmed*. The commander had served as a UN military observer in Iraq.²¹⁹

217. *Ibid.*

218. *Ibid.*

219. See The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), *Appendix IV, List of Alleged Perpetrators Names Submitted to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations*, August 2006, available at: <http://www.humanrights.asia/resources/journals-magazines/article2/0504/appendix-iv-list-of-alleged-perpetrators-names-submitted-to-the-un-department-of-peacekeeping-operations>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

Chapter 4: Conclusion and recommendations

It will not be an understatement to assert that the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations are indeed indirectly increasing the grip of the Bangladesh Army over the country to the detriment of democracy and the rule of law. Further, whether a poor country like Bangladesh requires such a large army whose modernization is taking place in the name of the UN peacekeeping operations is highly questionable.²²⁰ The UN ought to consider the consequences of disproportionate recruitment for the UN peacekeeping operations from Bangladesh with the seriousness it deserves.

The situation is further accentuated by absolute impunity enjoyed by the Bangladesh Army because of the legal immunity provided and the Bangladesh Army being the power behind the throne in Dhaka. Bangladesh's national laws, including its Constitution²²¹, Criminal Procedure Code, Army Act, Air Force Act, Navy Ordinance, Armed Police Battalion Ordinance, in addition to others, all contain provisions, which shield state actors from prosecution and punishment.²²²

Section 59(2) of the Army Act, 1952, states “[a] person subject to this Act or to the Air Force Act, 1953, or to the Navy Ordinance, 1961, or of culpable homicide not amounting to murder against such a person or of rape in relation to such a person, shall not be deemed to be guilty of an offence against this Act and shall not be dealt with under this Act unless he commits any of the said offences, - (a) while on active service, or (b) at any place outside Bangladesh, or (c) at a frontier post specified by the Government by notification in this behalf”²²³

In other words, crimes committed by the Bangladesh Army while on active service, or at any place outside Bangladesh i.e. peacekeeping missions, or at a frontier post specified by the Government by notification in this behalf fall outside the jurisdiction of the civilian courts. Consequently, almost all prosecutions must be done through military tribunals. This is in stark contrast with the opinions of the UN Human Rights Committee, which has held that “military tribunals should only have

220. Please see *Blood on the Streets: The Use of Excessive Force During Bangladesh Protests* (<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/08/01/blood-streets>), Human Rights Watch, AUGUST 1, 2013 which chronicles case after case in which police, the paramilitary Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), and the Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB) opened fire into crowds or beat protesters in a brutal and unlawful manner. In some cases, security forces carried out extrajudicial executions.

221. See the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Article 46, available at: http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/pdf_part.php?id=367, last accessed on 8 October 2013 which provides that “Parliament may by law make provision for indemnifying any person in the service of the Republic or any other person in respect of any act done by him in connection with the national liberation struggle or the maintenance or restoration of order in any area in Bangladesh or validate any sentence passed, punishment inflicted, forfeiture ordered, or other act done in any such area.

222. See The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Article 46, available at: http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/pdf_part.php?id=367, last accessed on 8 October 2013. “When any person who is a Judge within the meaning of section 19 of the Penal Code, or when any Magistrate, or when any public servant who is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government, is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction of the Government.” See also *Criminal Procedure Code, Section 197(1)*, available at: http://bdlaws.gov.bd/pdf_part.php?act_name=&vol=&cid=75, last accessed on 14 October 2013. Only if a serviceman has committed murder, culpable homicide not amounting to murder and rape while not on active duty may a serviceman be tried by a civilian court rather than a court martial. See also *Army Act, 1952*, available at: http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=248, last accessed on 8 October 2013. “No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall be against any member of the Force for anything which is done or intended to be done in good faith under this Ordinance.” See also *Armed Police Battalions, 1979, Section 13*, available at: http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/pdf/593__pdf, last accessed 8 October 2013 as cited in Human Rights Watch, *Ignoring Executions and Torture: Impunity for Bangladesh's Security Forces*, 18 May 2009, 1-56432-483-4, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a110c2f.html>, last accessed on 10 October 2013.

223. See *Army Act, 1952*, available at: http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=248, last accessed on 8 October 2013.

jurisdiction over offenses that are strictly military in nature and that gross human rights violations by members of the armed force cannot be considered military offenses".²²⁴

In this context, it is pertinent to mention that the NHRC of Bangladesh proposed that an independent inquiry committee comprising of a government official, police officer and a member of civil society investigate all allegations of torture and deaths in the custody of RAB.²²⁵ This has not been implemented. Therefore, the statement of Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the United Nations, Dr. A K Abdul Momen on Bangladesh's "zero tolerance policy" towards human rights abuses and peacekeepers is belied by facts on the ground.

Given the level of human rights violations in the CHTs and extrajudicial executions by the RAB, it is difficult to avoid a conclusion that there are Bangladesh Army personnel serving in UNPKOs who were responsible for grave violations of human rights including torture and other forms of ill-treatment and abuse, extrajudicial execution and other violations. However, in the absence of any vetting process, they escaped the scrutiny. It remains to be seen whether the introduction of a new UN policy for the human rights screening of UN peacekeeping personnel (adopted in December 2012) which was recently communicated to troop and police contributing countries has any impact.

Asian Centre for Human Rights recommends the following to:

1. The Government of Bangladesh:
 - Issue necessary guidelines/instructions to those being deployed for the UN Peacekeeping Operations to provide that no immunity shall be provided for any offences committed as part of the U.N. peacekeeping operations;
 - Put in place effective human rights screening policies for the selection and deployment of security forces personnel on peacekeeping duties, and make them publicly available;
 - Introduce national vetting procedures to comply with "ANNEX H: WE ARE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING PERSONNEL of the Memorandum of Understanding signed with the U.N.; and
 - Make public report of any action taken against the Bangladeshi peacekeepers involved in sexual exploitation and abuses in Sudan.
2. The United Nations, in particular, the Department of the Peacekeeping Operations:
 - Reduce the number of peacekeepers from Bangladesh considering its detrimental effect on democracy and the rule of law at national level;

224. See UN Human Rights Committee, "Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Chile," CCPR/C/CHL/CO/5, 18 May 2007, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/419/97/PDF/G0741997.pdf?OpenElement>, para. 5; "Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Guatemala," CCPR/CO/72/GTM, 27 August 2001, [http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/\(Symbol\)/CCPR.C.79.Add.78.En?Opendocument](http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CCPR.C.79.Add.78.En?Opendocument), para. 14, as cited in Human Rights Watch, *Ignoring Executions and Torture: Impunity for Bangladesh's Security Forces*, 18 May 2009, 1-56432-483-4, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a110ect2.html>, last accessed on 10 October 2013.

225. The government official may not be below the rank of a deputy secretary, the police officer not below the rank of superintendent of police and the member of civil society must be selected by the family of the victim.

- Ensure that Bangladesh security forces are not deployed for peacekeeping operations until the Army, Navy and Air Force personnel are removed from normal policing duties under the Rapid Action Battalion;
- Ensure that security personnel deployed with the Rapid Action Battalion and in the Chittagong Hill Tracts are not deployed for the UN peacekeeping operations without a transparent vetting system;
- Withhold the salaries of those suspected of involvement in serious human rights violations and establish criminal accountability;
- Name and shame the peacekeepers who are found responsible for sexual exploitation and abuse while in UN Peacekeeping missions; and
- Make all the reports of inquiry into sexual exploitation and abuses by the OIOS public.

Annex 1: Police, Army and Air Force Personnel Deployed with Rapid Action Battalion as on 31st August 2013

Available at: <http://www.rab.gov.bd/telephonedir.php>

I. Police:

1. A K M Habibur Rahman

Assistant Director
ASP, Investigation Wing & Forensic Lab

2. Abdullah Al Mamun

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 1 (Dhaka)

3. Abu Sayeed

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 12 (Sirajgonj)

4. Abu Taher Mohammad Abdullah

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 1 (Dhaka)

5. Aftab Uddin Ahmed

Additional Director General (Admin)
Deputy Inspector General, RAB HQ

6. Ahmed Mainul Hasan

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 12 (Sirajgonj)

7. Amirul Islam

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 7 (Chittagong)

8. Al Mahmud Hasan

Assistant Director
ASP

9. Andru Kenet Rozario

Assistant Director
ASP

10. ANM Sajedur Rahman

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 6 (Khulna)

11. Ashok Kumar Pal

Assistant Director

ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 12 (Sirajgonj)

12. Atia Husna

Assistant Director

Senior ASP, Admin & Finance Wing

13. Aziza Sultana

Assistant Director

Senior ASP, R&D Cell

14. Chao Lao Marma

Assistant Director

ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 9 (Sylhet)

15. Chitta Ranjan Paul

Assistant Director

ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 11 (Narayangonj)

16. Dewan Md Rezaul Karim

Assistant Director

ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 5 (Rajshahi)

17. Fatema Doha

Assistant Director

ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 4 (Dhaka)

18. GM Manzur Rahman

Assistant Director

ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 9 (Sylhet)

19. Habibullah Dalal

Assistant Director

ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 11 (Narayangonj)

20. Jalal Uddin Ahmed

Assistant Director

ASP

21. Jamil Ahmed

Director

Additional Deputy Inspector General

22. Kazi Akter Hossain

Assistant Director

ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 6 (Khulna)

23. Khaleda Begum

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 10 (Dhaka)

24. Khandakar Fazle Rabbi

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 10 (Dhaka)

25. Khandaker Fazle Rabbi

Assistant Director
Senior ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 10 (Dhaka)

26. Khandker Shamima Yeasmin

Senior Assistant Director
Additional Sp, Rapid Action Battalion 3 (Dhaka)

27. M K H Jahangir Hossain

Assistant Director
Senior ASP

28. M M Anisur Rahman, psc

Director
Additional Deputy Inspector General
Rapid Action Battalion 2 (Dhaka)

29. M Tanvir Ahmed

Assistant Director
ASP Operations Wing

30. Mahmuda Amatullah

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 4 (Dhaka)

31. Mahmudul Hasan

Assistant Director
ASP, Operations Wing

32. Mallik Fakhru'l Islam

Director
Additional Deputy Inspector General
Rapid Action Battalion 3 (Dhaka)

33. Maruf Ahmed

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 8 (Barisal)

34. Md Abul Kalam Shahid

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 12 (Sirajgonj)

35. Md Abdullah Al Yeasin

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 12 (Sirajgonj)

36. Md Al-Amin

Assistant Director
ASP, Legal & Media Wing

37. Md Aminur Rahman

Assistant Director
Senior ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 8 (Barisal)

38. Md Anisuzzaman

Senior Assistant Director
Additional Sp, Rapid Action Battalion 3 (Dhaka)

39. Md Anwar Sayeed

Assistant Director
ASP, Legal & Media Wing

40. Md Asaduzzaman

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 7 (Chittagong)

41. Md Ashrafuzzaman

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 3 (Dhaka)

42. Md Aslam Shahajada

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 2 (Dhaka)

43. Md Aslam Uddin

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 5 (Rajshahi)

44. Md Golam Morshed, psc

Deputy Director
Legal & Media Wing

45. Md Azad Rahman

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 5 (Rajshahi)

46. Md Bashir Ahmed

Assistant Director
Senior ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 2 (Dhaka)

47. Md Delwar Hossain

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 8 (Barisal)

48. Md Golam Ruhul Kuddus

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 9 (Sylhet)

49. Md Ibrahim Khalil

Senior Assistant Director
Additional Sp, Rapid Action Battalion 10 (Dhaka)
Mission

50. Md Iqbal Shafi

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 2 (Dhaka)

51. Md Jahangir Alam

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 7 (Chittagong)

52. Md Jakir Hossain

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 10 (Dhaka)

53. Md Jalal Uddin Ahmed

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 10 (Dhaka)

54. Md Jasim Uddin

Director
Additional Deputy Inspector General
Training & Orientation Wing

55. Md Jasim Uddin

Senior Assistant Director
Additional Sp, Rapid Action Battalion 7 (Chittagong)

56. Md Kamrul Hasan

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 4 (Dhaka)

57. Md Kamrul Islam

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 11 (Narayangonj)

58. Md Kudrat-e-Khuda

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 3 (Dhaka)

59. Md Masud Anwar

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 8 (Barisal)

60. Md Mezbah Uddin Khan

Assistant Director
ASP

61. Md Mokbul Hossain

Assistant Director
Senior ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 2 (Dhaka)

62. Md Mostafizur Rahman

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 7 (Chittagong)

63. Md Mostak Sarkar

Senior Assistant Director
Additional Sp, Rapid Action Battalion 1 (Dhaka)

64. Md Obayedul Islam Khan

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 11 (Narayangonj)

65. Md Rabiul Haque

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 11 (Narayangonj)

66. Md Rabiul Islam

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 12 (Sirajgonj)

67. Md Rafiqul Islam

Director
Additional Deputy Inspector General
Investigation Wing & Forensic Lab

68. Md Rezaul Karim

Senior Assistant Director
Additional Sp

69. Md Riazur Rahman, psc, EB

Director

Additional Deputy Inspector General, R&D Cell

70. Md Ruhul Amin

Assistant Director

ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 8 (Barisal)

71. Md Ruhul Amin

Assistant Director

ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 7 (Chittagong)

72. Md Shafikul Islam Sarkar

Assistant Director

ASP, Investigation Wing & Forensic Lab

73. Md Shariful Alam

Assistant Director

ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 12 (Sirajgonj)

74. Md Wares Mia

Assistant Director

ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 11 (Narayangonj)

75. Md Zafor Ullah

Assistant Director

ASP, Investigation Wing & Forensic Lab

76. Md Zahurul Haque

Assistant Director

ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 7 (Chittagong)

77. Md Zamirul Islam

Assistant Director

ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 8 (Barisal)

78. Md Ziaur Rahman

Assistant Director

ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 1 (Dhaka)

79. Md. Mukhlesur Rahman, BPM

Director General

Additional Inspector General, RAB Headquarter

80. Md. Abul Kalam Azad

Assistant Director

ASP

81. Md.Golam Rabbani Shak

Assistant Director
ASP

82. Md.Zahurul Haque

Assistant Director
ASP

83. Mehedi Shahriar

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 5 (Rajshahi)

84. Mir Modasser Hossain

Senior Assistant Director
Additional Sp, Rapid Action Battalion 6 (Khulna)

85. MM Sakiluzzaman

Senior Assistant Director
Additional Sp

86. Mofizul Islam

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 7 (Chittagong)

87. Mohammad Badrul Alam Molla

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 4 (Dhaka)

88. Mohammad Harun Or Rashid

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 6 (Khulna)

89. Mohammad Kamruzzaman

Assistant Director
Senior ASP, Admin & Finance Wing

90. Mohammad Liakat Ali Khan

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 3 (Dhaka)

91. Mohammad Mobarak Hossain

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 11 (Narayangonj)

92. Mohammad Monjur Morshed

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 1 (Dhaka)

93. Mohammad Mozammel Haque

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 6 (Khulna)

94. Mohammad Rezaul Kabir

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 1 (Dhaka)

95. Moksud Rosul

Assistant Director
Additional Sp, Rapid Action Battalion 3 (Dhaka)

96. Mrs Hamida Parvin

Senior Assistant Director
Additional Sp, Investigation Wing & Forensic Lab

97. Muhammad Lokman Hakim

Director
Additional Deputy Inspector General
Rapid Action Battalion 6 (Khulna)

98. Nilufa Yeasmin

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 1 (Dhaka)

99. Raihan Uddin Khan

Assistant Director
Senior ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 2 (Dhaka)

100. Razib Kumar Dev

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 9 (Sylhet)

101. Rownok Alam

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 4 (Dhaka)

102. S M Tarek Rahman

Assistant Director
ASP

103. Sajedur Rahman

Assistant Director
ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 7 (Chittagong)

104. Sana Shaminur Rahman

Assistant Director
Senior ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 9 (Sylhet)s

105. Shah Mohammad Azad

Assistant Director

ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 8 (Barisal)

106. Shakhwat Hossain

Assistant Director

ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 7 (Chittagong)

107. Shamim Ara Begum, ppm

Assistant Director

ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 2 (Dhaka)

108. Sharmin Akter

Assistant Director

ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 10 (Dhaka)

109. Shek Zahidul Islam

Senior Assistant Director

Additional Sp

110. SM Naimur Rahman

Assistant Director

ASP, Training & Orientation Wing

111. Suggan Chakma

Senior Assistant Director

Additional Sp

112. Sumon Dev

Assistant Director

ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 8 (Barisal)

113. Syed Mohammad Farhad

Assistant Director

ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 11 (Narayangonj)

114. Tanvir Ahmed

Assistant Director

ASP, Rapid Action Battalion 4 (Dhaka)

II. Army

1. Abdul Malek

Assistant Director

Captain, Operations Wing

2. Abdullah Al Mehedee (x) BN

Senior Assistant Director

LT, Rapid Action Battalion 12 (Sirajgonj)

3. ABM Zahidul Karim, AC

Deputy Director
Major, Rapid Action Battalion 6 (Khulna)

4. Abu Naser Md Tanzirul Hasan

Assistant Director
Captain, Operations Wing

5. Abul Bashar

Senior Assistant Director
Captain, Rapid Action Battalion 8 (Barisal)

6. Ahmed Hossain Mohiuddin

Deputy Director
Major, Rapid Action Battalion 3 (Dhaka)

7. AKM Zahirul Hossain

Deputy Director
Major, Admin & Finance Wing

8. Arif Mohammad, EB

Director
Lt Col, RAB Air Wing

9. Beig Sabbir Ahmed

Deputy Director
Major, Admin & Finance Wing

10. Avishek Ahmed

Senior Assistant Director
Captain, Rapid Action Battalion 2 (Dhaka)

11. Emarat Hossain

Deputy Director
Major, Rapid Action Battalion 3 (Dhaka)

12. Hasibul Haque

Assistant Director
Captain, Rapid Action Battalion 4 (Dhaka)

13. Himadri Shekhor Roy

Senior Assistant Director
Captain, Rapid Action Battalion 2 (Dhaka)

14. K M Tanvir Anwar, (L) BN

Deputy Director
Lt Commander, Rapid Action Battalion 4 (Dhaka)

15. Kismat Hayat

Director
Lt Col, Rapid Action Battalion 1 (Dhaka)

16. KM Ariful Islam

Deputy Director
Major, Rapid Action Battalion 4 (Dhaka)

- 17. M Ashraf Ali ,ppm**
Senior Assistant Director
Captain, Rapid Action Battalion 6 (Khulna)
- 18. M Daloer Hossain**
Assistant Director
LT, Communications & MIS Wing
- 19. M Faiz Al Karim, (x), PPM, BN**
Deputy Director
Lt Commander
- 20. M Rashed Sattar (N), psc, BN**
Director
Commander, Rapid Action Battalion 9 (Sylhet)
- 21. Mahbubur Rahman Khan, EME**
Deputy Director
Major, RAB Air Wing
- 22. Maksudul Alam**
Senior Assistant Director
Captain, Legal & Media Wing
- 23. Md Abu Sayeed Khan**
Deputy Director
Major, Training & Orientation Wing
- 24. Md Ahsanul Kabir, PPM**
Deputy Director
Major, Rapid Action Battalion 1 (Dhaka)
- 25. Md Ali Ahsan**
Deputy Director
Major, Rapid Action Battalion 3 (Dhaka)
- 26. Md Anwar Latif Khan**
Director
Lt Col, Rapid Action Battalion 5 (Rajshahi)
- 27. Md Anwarul Kabir**
Deputy Director
Major, Admin & Finance Wing
- 28. Md Arif Hossain**
Deputy Director
Major
- 29. Md Faridul Alam, psc**
Director
Lt Col, Rapid Action Battalion 8 (Barisal)
- 30. Md Jahangir Alam, psc**
Director
Lt Col, Rapid Action Battalion 11 (Narayangonj)

31. Md Kajemur Rashid

Senior Assistant Director
Captain, Rapid Action Battalion 1 (Dhaka)

32. Md Khademul Islam

Senior Assistant Director
Captain, Rapid Action Battalion 2 (Dhaka)

33. Md Mahfizur Rahman

Senior Assistant Director
Captain, Rapid Action Battalion 10 (Dhaka)

34. Md Majibur Rahman,psc

Additional Director General (Ops)
Colonel, ADG Ops, RAB HQ

35. Md Mashqurur Rahman Rawnak,Art

Senior Assistant Director
Captain, Rapid Action Battalion 2 (Dhaka)

36. Md Masudur Rahman

Senior Assistant Director
Captain, Rapid Action Battalion 12 (Sirajgonj)

37. Md Miftah Uddin

Deputy Director
Major, Rapid Action Battalion 10 (Dhaka)

38. Md Mostafizur Rahman

Assistant Director
Captain

39. Md Mustafizur Rahman

Deputy Director
Major, Rapid Action Battalion 12 (Sirajgonj)

40. Md Nuruzzaman (X BN)

Deputy Director
Lt Commander, Rapid Action Battalion 7 (Chittagong)

41. Md Rakibul Amin

Deputy Director
Major, Rapid Action Battalion 7 (Chittagong)

42. Md Riadul Islam

Assistant Director
Captain

43. Md Riazur Rahman, psc

Director
Lt Col, Operations Wing

44. Md Sabbir Rahman Osmany

Deputy Director
Major, Rapid Action Battalion 8 (Barisal)

45. Md Saiful Karim, BIR

Director
Lt Col, Rapid Action Battalion 7 (Chittagong)

46. Md Salman Arefin Siddiqi

Assistant Director
Captain, Admin & Finance Wing

47. Md Sarwar e Alam

Deputy Director
Major, Rapid Action Battalion 7 (Chittagong)

48. Md Shafiqul Islam

Deputy Director
Major, Rapid Action Battalion 2 (Dhaka)

49. Md Shahed Hasan Razib

Deputy Director
Major, Rapid Action Battalion 5 (Rajshahi)

50. Md Tareque Jubayer

Assistant Director
Captain, Rapid Action Battalion 6 (Khulna)

51. Md Towfiqul Bari

Deputy Director
Major, Rapid Action Battalion 10 (Dhaka)

52. Md Zahid Hasan Khan

Deputy Director
Major, Operations Wing

53. Md. Mansurun Mahdin, (x)

Deputy Director
Lt Commander, Rapid Action Battalion 5 (Rajshahi)

54. Mohammad Abdur Rahman

Deputy Director
Major, Operations Wing

55. Mohammad Enamul Haque, AMC

Senior Assistant Director
Captain, Rapid Action Battalion 3 (Dhaka)

56. Mohammad Imran Ibn A Rouf

Director
Lt Col, Rapid Action Battalion 10 (Dhaka)

57. Mohammad Jahangir Alam

Deputy Director
Major, Rapid Action Battalion 10 (Dhaka)

58. Mohammad Kamrul Hasan

Director
Lt Col, Rapid Action Battalion 4 (Dhaka)

59. Mohammad Khurshid Alam, psc,g,Arti.

Deputy Director
Major, Rapid Action Battalion 5 (Rajshahi)

60. Mohammad Shahid Sarwar

Deputy Director
Major, RAB Air Wing

61. Monjur Morshed Mannan

Deputy Director
Major, Admin & Finance Wing

62. Mosaddek Ibn Mujib

Senior Assistant Director
Captain, Rapid Action Battalion 12 (Sirajgonj)

63. Mst. Sadira Khatun

Senior Assistant Director
LT, Rapid Action Battalion 11 (Narayangonj)

64. Muhammad Abu Bakar Mayeen, G+

Deputy Director
Major, Rapid Action Battalion 12 (Sirajgonj)

65. Muhammad Mostaq Ahmed

Deputy Director
Major, Rapid Action Battalion 1 (Dhaka)

66. Muhammad Sadiqur Rahman

Deputy Director
Major

67. Nadira Jannat

Senior Assistant Director
Captain, Operations Wing

68. Rashedul Hasan Prince

Assistant Director
Captain, Rapid Action Battalion 7 (Chittagong)

69. Rehnuma Sabur Tuhin

Deputy Director
Major, Operations Wing

70. Riadul Islam

Senior Assistant Director
Captain, Rapid Action Battalion 1 (Dhaka)

71. Riyadul Islam

Assistant Director
Captain, Rapid Action Battalion 1 (Dhaka)

72. Sabbir Ahmed Siddique

Deputy Director
Major

73. Sarker Asif Mahmud

Senior Assistant Director
Captain, Rapid Action Battalion 9 (Sylhet)

74. Sazzad Raihan, X (BN)

Assistant Director
LT, Rapid Action Battalion 2 (Dhaka)

75. Sharif Ahammad Raihanul Karim, psc

Deputy Director
Major, RAB Air Wing

76. Sharif Md Farhad Hossain

Senior Assistant Director
Captain, Rapid Action Battalion 10 (Dhaka)

77. Sheikh Mohammad Badruddoza

Deputy Director
Major, Rapid Action Battalion 9 (Sylhet)

78. Shibli Mohammad Sadek

Deputy Director
Major, Rapid Action Battalion 9 (Sylhet)

79. Shishir Mahmud Talukder

Senior Assistant Director
Captain, Rapid Action Battalion 8 (Barisal)

80. Syed Mohammad Sarfaraj Obaid (X) BN

Senior Assistant Director
Captain, Rapid Action Battalion 8 (Barisal)

81. Tahsin Shalehin Rana

Assistant Director
Captain

82. Tanvir Ahmed Sadi

Assistant Director
Captain, Rapid Action Battalion 5 (Rajshahi)

83. Ziaul Ahsan, BPM, BIR

Director
Lt Col, Intelligence Wing

III. Air Force

1. Abdullah Al Mamun

Deputy Director
Squadron Leader, Rapid Action Battalion 10 (Dhaka)

2. ATM Habibur Rahman, psc GD(P)

Director
Wing Commander, RAB HQ, L&M Wing

3. Md Atik Hasan

Assistant Director
Flt LT

4. Md Fozle Shahin Haque

Deputy Director
Squadron Leader

5. Md Mofazzal Hossain (Admin)

Director
Wing Commander, Admin & Finance Wing

6. Md. Hamidul Haque, GD (P)

Deputy Director
Squadron Leader, Rapid Action Battalion 6 (Khulna)

7. Mohammad Miran Hossain

Deputy Director
Squadron Leader, Rapid Action Battalion 4 (Dhaka)

8. Mohammad Nazmul Haque GD (P)

Deputy Director
Squadron Leader, Rapid Action Battalion 7 (Chittagong)

9. Mst Arzuman Banu (Engg)

Deputy Director
Squadron Leader

10. Shahed Ahmed Khan

Deputy Director
Squadron Leader, Rapid Action Battalion 11 (Narayangonj)

11. SM Enamul Haque

Deputy Director
Squadron Leader, Admin & Finance Wing

Annex 2: Bangladesh's Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Missions since 1998²²⁶

Country	Name of the Mission	Army	Navy	Air	Total
Afghanistan	UNAMA	3	4	1	8
Afghanistan – Pakistan	UNSM/UNGOMAP	2	0	0	2
Angola	UNAVEM	0	0	9	9
	UNAVEM III	470	9	0	479
Burundi	BINUB	1	5	0	6
Cambodia	UNAMIC/UNTAC	1002	0	0	1002
	UNMLT	1	0	0	1
Congo	MONUC, MONUSCO	10989	256	2128	13373
East Slovenia	UNTAES	17	0	0	17
East Timor	UNAMET / UNTAET / UNMISSET	1308	3	71	1382
Ethiopia/ Eritrea	UNMEE	1093	6	9	1108
Georgia	UNOMIG	94	19	18	131
Haiti	UNMIH / MNF	2023	50	52	2125
Iraq	UNGC	90	18	13	121
Iran/Iraq	UNIIMOG	31	0	0	31
Iraq	UNMOVIC	0	2	1	3
Ivory Coast	MINUCI/ONUCI/ UNOCI	20639	334	317	21290
Kosovo	UNMIK	12	0	0	12
Kuwait	UNIKOM	7911	46	281	8238
Liberia	UNOMIL	129	19	0	148
	UNMIL	20050	153	49	20252
Macedonia	UNPREDEP	4	0	3	7
Mozambique	ONUMOZ	2468	15	39	2522
Namibia	UNTAG	25	0	0	25
Rwanda	UNAMIR	990	7	15	1012
Sierra Leone	UNAMSIL	11908	22	14	11944
Somalia	UNOSOM-I	5	0	2	7
	UNOSOM II	1967	0	0	1967
	AMISOM	1	0	0	1
Sudan	UNMIS	8621	683	78	9382
Tajikistan	UNMOT	34	3	3	40
Uganda/ Rwanda	UNOMUR	20	0	0	20
Western Sahara	MINURSO	123	19	4	146
Yugoslavia (Former)	UNPROFOR / UNMOP	1381	18	24	1423
Sierra Leone	UNIOSIL	3	0	0	3
CAR & Chad	MINURCAT	9	1	43	53
Darfur	UNAMID	1342	20	32	1394
Lebanon	UNIFIL	0	326	1	327
West Africa	UNOWA	1	0	0	1
Syria	UNSMIS	14	1	1	16
Total		94,768	2,309	3,207	100,014

226. See Armed Forces Division, *Bangladesh in UN Peacekeeping Mission*, available at: <http://www.afd.gov.bd/?q=node/25>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

Annex 3: Monthly Breakdown of Bangladeshi Troop Deployment for UN Peacekeeping Missions

Available as on 10th November 2013 at : <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml>

Year	JAN	FEB	MAR	APL	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
2013	6,927	6,917	6,916	6,921	6,918	6,047	6,050	7,931	7,944	7,941	-	-
2012	8,079	8,082	8,081	7,779	7,118	7,108	7,095	7,087	7,087	7,091	6,932	6,929
2011	8,446	8,449	8,455	8,453	8,457	8,485	8,465	8,479	8,434	8,343	8,338	8,233
2010	8,913	9,166	9,159	8,515	8,592	8,590	8,710	8,714	8,716	8,645	8,494	8,449
2009	8,356	8,355	8,158	8,161	8,533	8,530	7,888	8,082	7,989	8,681	8,722	8,715
2008	8,795	8,399	8,003	7,997	7,991	7,989	7,996	8,000	8,028	8,349	8,356	8,358
2007	8,786	8,781	8,798	8,811	8,796	8,818	8,798	8,823	8,824	8,814	8,805	8,804
2006	9,576	9,589	9,677	9,705	9,704	9,728	9,543	9,575	8,810	8,796	8,796	8,789
2005	7,757	7,871	7,787	7,753	7,758	8,026	8,275	8,629	8,682	9,155	9,198	8,959
2004	6,258	6,263	6,983	6,189	6,551	5,972	6,960	8,019	8,016	8,013	8,013	7,838
2003	4,051	4,053	2,475	2,489	2,471	2,482	2,983	3,771	3,771	3,866	4,110	4,565
2002	5,781	5,772	5,771	5,787	5,267	5,254	5,252	5,227	5,245	5,245	4,844	4,043
2001	3,087	-	-	5,739	5,738	5,789	5,789	5,874	5,789	5,788	5,786	5,782
2000	806	892	1,356	1,356	1,509	2,135	2,135	2,134	2,134	2,134	2,137	3,005
1999	808	810	808	810	810	810	810	816	802	802	802	802
1998	817	802	805	805	811	811	-	808	808	808	808	-
1997	1,015	1,013	1,014	1,003	1,014	1,012	900	894	891	891	855	890
1996	1,899	1,898	1,917	1,573	1,569	1,567	1,013	1,033	1,043	1,039	1,033	1,037
1995	2,933	2,040	2,908	3,096	3,095	3,116	3,093	3,095	2,921	3,144	1,910	1,904
1994	4,115	4,119	4,137	3,007	3,043	2,935	2,886	2,881	3,679	3,977	3,999	3,994
1993	911	934	1,000	1,184	2,293	2,337	2,359	2,437	2,436	2,480	2,583	3,217
1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	910	911	911	911	911
1991	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Annex 4: Bangladesh Army and Staff Officers/Military Observers Serving in UN Peacekeeping Missions and UN Headquarters²²⁷

County	Name of Mission	Army	Navy	Air Force	Total
Liberia	UNMIL	1393	4	1	1398
Cote d' Ivory	UNOCI	2038	28	117	2183
South Sudan	UNMISS	280	1	0	281
DR Congo	MONUSCO	2157	27	377	2561
Darfur	UNAMID	200	08	07	215
LEBANON	UNIFIL	1	324	2	327
Western Sahara	MINURSO	25	2	2	29
UNHQ	UNDPKO	6	2	0	8
TOTAL		6,100	396	506	7002

227. See Armed Forces Division, Ongoing Peacekeeping Missions Participated by Bangladesh, available at: <http://www.afd.gov.bd/?q=node/24>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

Annex 5: Human Rights Violations by the Military in the CHTs (2004-2011)²²⁸

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
Deaths	3	1	1	3	2	5	0	0	15
Injury	5	5	1	0	2	7	0	11	31
Rape	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
Attempted Rape	0	1	1	1	0	8	4	1	16
Looting	4	20	1	0	0	0	6	1	32
Homes Burnt	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	5
Temples Destroyed	1	0	0	2	1	1	1	1	7
Arrests	53	84	21	38	11	159	43	55	464
Torture	64	40	42	30	38	112	9	39	374
Beating	26	36	0	1	1	36	22	32	154
Desecration	1	0	1	1	2	4	5	3	17
Harassment	10	0	0	0	0	33	24	18	85
Eviction	0	1	275	0	9	0	0	0	285
Total	167	188	345	81	66	365	114	161	1,487

228. Source: Newspapers (Daily Star, Prothom Alo), reports from Regional Political Parties (PCJSS and UPDF) and human rights organizations (Kapaeng Foundation, chtnews.org, CHT Commission) as cited in IWGIA, *Militarization of the Chitragong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, The Slow Demise of the Region's Indigenous Peoples*, Report 14, May 2012, available at: http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_publications_files/0577_Igia_report_14_optimized.pdf, last accessed on 14 October 2013.

Annex 6: Major Attacks by Bengali Settlers Backed by Military Personnel (2001-2011)²²⁹

	2001-2006 BNP regime	2007-2008 Caretaker regime	2009-2011 Awami League regime	TOTAL
Torture	0	6	0	6
Temples burnt	4	1	4	9
Homes burnt	368	60	642	1,070
Homes destroyed	98	0	0	98
Looting	32	2	4	38
Rape	10	0	0	10
Injury	14	6	22	42
Deaths	2	0	5	7
Total	528	75	677	1,280

229. Source: Newspapers (Daily Star, Prothom Alo), reports from regional political parties (PCJSS and UPDF) and human rights organizations (Kapaeng Foundation, chnews.org, CHT Commission) as cited in IWGIA, *Militarization of the Chitragong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, The Slow Demise of the Region's Indigenous Peoples*, Report 14, May 2012, available at: http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_publications_files/0577_Igia_report_14_optimized.pdf, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

Annex 7: Land Illegally Acquired by the Government of Bangladesh in the Name of Military Purpose in Bandarban Hill District²³⁰

SL No.		Particulars Land (in acre)
1	Acquired for Sualok artillery & infantry training centre	11,445.45
2	Under process for acquisition for Sualok artillery & infantry training centre	19,000.00
3	Acquired for expansion of Ruma garrison	9,560.00
4	Under process for acquisition for expansion of Bandarban brigade headquarters	181.00
5	Under process for acquisition for Bandarban-Lama air forces training centre	26,000.00
6	Under process for acquisition for establishment of BDR battalion HQ in Ruma	25.000

230. See Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti, *Report on the Implementation of the CHT Accord*, CHT Commission, January 2013, available at: <http://www.chtcommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Report-on-Impln-of-CHT-Accord-January-2013-Final.pdf>, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

Annex 8: List of Rapid Action Battalion Commanding Officers who have served in UN Peacekeeping Missions²³¹

1. Director General Md. Abdul Aziz Sarkar, in Yugoslavia and Kosovo;
2. Additional Director General Md. Mahbubul Alam Mollah, UNIKOM;
3. Lt. Col. Mirza Ezazur Rahman (Operations Director), UNOMIG;
4. Lt. Col. Gulzar Uddin Ahmed (Intelligence Director), UNTAC, U5.NIOSIL;
5. Commander Fatema Begum (Investigation Director), UNIOSIL;
6. Commander Md. Moyeenul Haque (Communications Director), UNMIL;
7. Lt. Col. Asif Ahmed Ansari (RAB-1 CO), ONUMOZ;
8. Additional DIG Md. Akbar Ali (RAB-2 CO), UNTAC, IPTE;
9. Lt. Col. Farhad Ahmed (RAB-3 CO), UNIIMOG;
10. Lt. Col. Md. Badrul Ahsan (RAB-4 CO), UNIOSIL;
11. Lt. Col. Md. Hashinur Rahman (RAB-7 CO), UNIKOM, UNPROFOR;
12. Lt. Col. Md. Manikur Rahman (RAB-10 CO), UNPROFOR, MONUK; and,
13. Founder/Director General of the RAB Anwarul Iqbal, UNUMOZ.

231. See Asian Human Rights Commission, *BANGLADESH: UN should stop deploying Bangladeshi peacekeepers until government disbands Rapid Action Battalion*, 17 August 2006, available at: <http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-news/AHRC-OL-050-2006>, last accessed on 16 September 2013. See also Wikileaks, *Cable No. 07 Dhaka 87*, 17 January 2007, available at: http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07DHAKA87_a.html, last accessed on 21 October 2013.

Annex 9: Disappearances 2009-2013²³²

Years	Total Number of Disappeared Persons	Found Dead	Returned Alive	Still No Trace of Their Whereabouts
2013 (Jan-Jun)	14	0	8	6
2012	24	1	10	13
2011	31	5	1	25
2010	18	1	0	17
2009	3	1	0	2
Total	90	8	19	63

232. See Odhikar, *Disappearances 2009-2013*, available at: http://odhikar.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Statistics_Disappearance_2009-2013.pdf, last accessed on 16 September 2013.

Annex 10: Crossfire/Gunfight 2001-2013²³³

Year	RAB	Police	RAB-Police	Joint Force	Army	RAB Coast Guard	Coast Guard	Police Coast Guard	Total
2013 Jan- Jun	15	16	0	0	0	-	-	-	31
2012	40	7	2	-	-	4	-	-	53
2011	42	15	4	-	-	4	-	-	65
2010	65	21	9	-	-	3	-	-	98
2009	38	63	25	-	3	-	-	-	129
2008	65	50	15	1	-	-	4	-	135
2007	90	35	3	1	-	-	1	-	130
2006	181	96	1	-	-	-	7	-	285
2005	107	212	-	-	-	-	-	15	334
2004	63	91	-	7	1	-	-	-	162
2003	-	26	-	4	1	-	-	-	31
2002	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	706	637	59	13	5	11	12	15	1,458

233. See Odhikar, *Crossfire/Gunfights 2001-2013*, available at: http://odhikar.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Statistics_Crossfire_Gunfight_2001-2013.pdf, last accessed on 16 September 2013.

Annex 11: Torture to Death by Law Enforcement Agencies in 2001-2013²³⁴

Year	RAB	Police	RAB- Police	Joint Force	Army	BGB former BDR	Coast Guard	DB Police	Jail authorities / Police	Navy	Drugs Narcotics	Total
2013 Jan- Jun	1	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
2012	0	5	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	7
2011	1	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	17
2010	2	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22
2009	3	11	-	-	-	5	1	-	1	-	-	21
2008	3	8	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	12
2007	2	14	-	3	5	-	-	-	1	3	2	30
2006	4	23	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27
2005	4	20	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	26
2004	11	28	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	46
2003	-	16	-	1	1	-	-	2	4	1	-	25
2002	-	14	-	-	33	1	-	-	2	-	-	50
2001	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
Total	31	186	0	11	39	8	1	4	11	4	2	297

234. See Odhikar, Torture to death by LEA, available at: http://odhikar.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Statistics_Torture-to-Death_2001-2013.pdf, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

Annex 12: Total Extrajudicial Killings from 2001 to June 2013²³⁵

Year	RAB	Police	RAB-Police	Army	BGB Former BDR	Police BGB Former BDR	Total
2013 Jan- June	19	129	0	0	8	28	184
2012	40	18	2	-	2	-	62
2011	43	31	4	-	-	-	78
2010	68	43	9	-	1	-	121
2009	41	75	25	3	5	-	149
2008	68	59	15	-	2	-	144
2007	94	64	3	7	1	-	169
2006	192	144	1	-	6	-	343
2005	111	258	-	-	-	-	369
2004	77	133	-	1	6	3	220
2003	-	57	-	2	4	-	63
2002	-	33	-	39	4	-	76
2001	-	33	-	-	-	9	42
Total	753	1,077	59	52	39	40	2,020

235. See Odhikar, Total Extrajudicial killings from 2001-2013, available at: http://odhikar.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Statistics_EJK_2001-2013.pdf, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

Annex 13: Torture (Dead and Alive) from 2004 to June 2013²³⁶

Month/ Year	RAB		Police		Army		Total
	Persons Alive	Persons Dead	Persons Alive	Persons Dead	Persons Alive	Persons Dead	
2013 Jan- Jun	0	1	12	5	-	0	18
2012	5	0	5	53	0	0	63
2011	5	0	24	14	-	-	43
2010	9	2	36	20	-	-	67
2009	21	3	35	11	1	-	71
2008	4	3	27	8	-	-	42
2007	-	2	10	14	-	5	31
2006	-	4	-	23	-	-	27
2005	-	4	-	20	-	-	24
2004	-	11	-	28	-	-	39
Total	44	30	129	196	1	5	405

236. See Odhikar, Torture (Dead and Alive) from 2004-2013, available at: http://odhikar.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Statistics_Torture_2004-20131.pdf, last accessed on 1 September 2013.

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