



NIGERIA

NAVIGATING SECRECY IN THE
VETTING AND SELECTION OF
PEACEKEEPERS

NIGERIA: NAVIGATING SECRECY IN THE VETTING AND SELECTION OF PEACEKEEPERS



Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre

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List of Abbreviations

ACHR	Asia Centre for Human Rights
AIG	Assistant Inspector General
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
APF	Armed Police Force
AMS	Assessment for Mission Service
AU	African Union
CDO	Chief District Officer
CoAS	Chief of Army Staff
CDS	Chief of Defense Staff
CoS	Chief of Staff
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
DIG	Deputy Inspector General
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSP	Deputy Superintendent of Police
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FPU	Formed Police Unit
IC	Interim Constitution of Nepal (2007)
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IGP	Inspector General of Police
INGO	International Non-governmental Organization
IPO	Individual Police Officers
JTF	Joint Task Force
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MoHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOPOL	Mobile Police
MS	Mission Services
MPV	Multipurpose Vehicles

NA	Nigerian Army
NDA	Nigerian Defense Academy
NDC	Nigerian Defense College
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NHRC	National Human Rights Commission
NPF	Nigeria Police Force
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PR	Permanent Representative
PSC	Public Service Commission
SC	Supreme Court
SAAT	Selection Assistant and Assessment Team
SSP	Senior Superintendent of Police
SPAT	Special Police Assessment Teams
SP	Superintendents of Police
SRS	Selection and Recruitment Section
UN	United Nations
UNPKOP	United Nations Peace Keeping Operations
UNPOL	United Nations Police

Preface

Nigeria has hitherto been identified as one of the United Nations' (UN) largest troop contributing countries. As the UN maintains no independent army of its own, soldiers and police are contributed by member states to facilitate various peacekeeping operations.

Notably, Nigerian peacekeeping troops have involved in series of human right violations and abuses, which have undermined country's image in the international community. For instance, the conduct of Nigerian forces in Liberia where they were implicated in the sexual abuse of many women resulting in many unwanted pregnancies and the recent case in 2011 when a unit of a Nigerian police peacekeeping contingent was withdrawn from Congo for sexual misconduct have damaged Nigeria's international reputation.

Consequently, these have forced the UN to develop and agree on uniform standards for the vetting of peacekeeping personnel. However, their implementation largely lies in the hand of individual countries.

This publication highlights three essential processes to be observed to achieve effective implementation of the promulgated standards. These include the domestication of the standards within the policies and practices of the individual countries contributing forces for peacekeeping operations; the need to adhere to the application of these standards in the vetting and selection of prospective peacekeepers; and the opportunity for the public to observe and access information about these vetting processes so as to ensure the transparent and accountable selection of peacekeeping personnel who are not known to have been involved in criminal and unsuitable conduct and to give the citizens confidence that people who abuse rights of citizens at home are not enlisted for peacekeeping assignments abroad.

In order to ensure strict compliance in Nigeria to the standards, his publication book recommends publicly accessible vetting systems and mechanisms via workable reform of national level selection and vetting systems.

This publication provides a detailed and well-dated history of the Nigerian Armed Forces with cognizance reference to its long historical engagement with the UN peacekeeping operations date back in 1960 both within and outside the African continent.

More importantly, the publication has revealed that Nigerian Army has not codified a policy on sexual exploitation and abuse by its members. Thus giving its personnel opportunity to unlawfully engage in acts that could under normal circumstances be serious crimes. This was why in Liberia, the soldiers took advantage of the women and demanded sexual gratification resulting in large numbers of pregnancies by women that were attributed to members of the Nigerian Peacekeeping troops.

This publication provides workable recommendations that if implemented will help to sanitise Nigerian Armed Forces and Police Force and enhance effectively both national and international policy development, implementation and good practice in the training, selection and deployment process in peacekeeping operation. These and similar concerns has informed our decision to undertake a research to help address the problems.

Our gratitude goes to Open Society Institute, New York for supporting this project; the Asia Centre for Human Rights, India for the overall coordination of the project; Social Science Research Council, New York for providing meeting logistics.

More importantly, CISLAC appreciates the effort of Engr. Yunusa Zakari Ya'u, who conducted this research; and Ingrid Massage for taking time to edit the document.

We are grateful to CISLAC's staff such as Uche Hillary Ogbona, Abubakar Jimoh, and other staff who contributed to this research.

We hope the relevant stakeholders will find this publication useful and that this will further strengthen the implementation of the various peacekeeping standards promulgated by United Nations (UN).

Auwal Ibrahim Musa (Rafsanjani)
Executive Director, CISLAC

April, 2014

Approach and Methodology

This study was conducted mainly through desk review of very relevant materials addressing themes of the Nigerian security and peacekeeping operations. Reports, researches and writings from studies conducted by media, public institutions, national and international non-governmental organizations, were widely consulted and provided relevant information to establish the degree of human right violation cases accredited to Nigerian peacekeeping operations as regards the subject of this study.

Series of meetings were also held with individuals who have in-depth knowledge about the elements of this study. Mostly with the relevant security agencies, civil society organizations, the academia and media, the meetings further supported or validated information obtained through desk review. The one-on-one interviews brought life instances and application to the existing selection and recruitment policies in the context of Nigeria Army and Police Force. The knowledge and work experience of the researcher in security service and peacekeeping operation was also useful in the process of this study.

Both Nigerian Army and Police Force were given this report for their input, review and comment. However, CISLAC received a reply from Nigerian Army and non from Nigerian Policy Force.

Introduction

Since 1960, Nigeria has been one of the United Nations' (UN) largest troop contributing countries. Throughout these years, Nigerian forces have been regularly accused of corruption and human rights abuses.¹ For example in 2005, 11 Nigerian policemen serving on a UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) were withdrawn over sexual harassment allegations. They were suspended from duty after a special investigation panel found corroborating evidence, including against the commander.²

Due to issues and misconduct by Nigerian and other forces during peacekeeping missions, the UN developed uniform standards of conduct for all personnel.³ However, the implementation and enforcement of these standards lies with each troop and police contributing country. As a result in Nigeria, reform at the national level is necessary to truly effect change.

Nigeria must adhere to an open and transparent vetting system that is applicable to all members of the Army and Nigeria Police Force. Additionally the corruption and patronage system that plays a part in every level of the Army and Police must be addressed and punished. To accomplish a comprehensive overhaul of the vetting system in Nigeria, detailed understanding of the existing vetting mechanisms is required.

This report provides an initial assessment of the selection processes and vetting systems for Nigerian army and police as part of an effort to encourage such a transparent vetting system. The paper sets out the current recruitment and selection system, identifies gaps and proposes possible solutions that would bridge these gaps between what exist and what ought be to ensure the UN guidelines for vetting and selection of peacekeepers are upheld.

- 1 For example see the leaked confidential memorandum by former General Vijay Jetley concerning the Nigerian forces in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). EwenMacAskill, *UN gets warning shot on peacekeeping – Huge corruption in Sierra Leone shows the need for rapid reform*, The Guardian, 9 September 2000, available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/sep/09/sierraleone2>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also The Washington Post, *UN Says Scores of Peacekeepers Ousted for Abuse*, 1 December 2006, available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/30/AR2006113001388.html>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.
- 2 See Agence France-Presse, *11 Nigerian police peacekeepers sanctioned over sex scandal in DR Congo*, Reliefweb, 26 September 2005, available at <http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/11-nigerian-police-peacekeepers-sanctioned-over-sex-scandal-dr>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also See BBC, *Nigeria acts on police sex abuse*, 27 September 2005, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4285650.stm>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, *Statement attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on the recall of a Nigerian unit from MONUC*, available at <http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=1677>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also Wikileaks, *Cable 05KINSHASA1501_a*, 16 September 2005, available at http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05KINSHASA1501_a.html, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also Wikileaks, *Cable 05KINSHASA1484_a*, 14 September 2005, available at http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05KINSHASA1484_a.html, last accessed on 14 February 2014.
- 3 These standards are elaborated in the Capstone Doctrine. See United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, *Principles and Guidelines*, available at http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf, last accessed on 14 February 2014. Additionally please see United Nations Peacekeeping, *We are United Nations Peacekeepers*, available at: https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/un_in.pdf, last accessed on 14 February 2014; United Nations Peacekeeping, *Ten Rules – Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets*, available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/ten_in.pdf, last accessed on 14 February 2014; DPKO/DFS UNMEM Manual, *Selection, Deployment, Rotation, Extension, Transfer and Repatriation of United Nations Military Experts on Mission in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, available at <https://cc.unlb.org/UNSAAS%20Training%20Documents/UNMEM%20Documents/2010.30%20UNMEM%20Manual.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014; United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, *Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and Military Observers*, DPKO/CPD/DDCPO/2003/001, DPKO/MD/03/00994, available at http://www.un.org/en/pseataksforce/docs/disciplinary_directives_civpol_and_military_observers.doc, last accessed on 14 February 2014; and United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Police Division, *Guidelines for United Nations Police Officers on Assignment with Peacekeeping Operations* (DPKO/PD/2006/00135), available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/policy/documents/pkpo_unpol_guidelines_062010.pdf, last accessed on 14 February 2014. For details see <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/policy.shtml>. In addition, there is the Policy on Human Rights Screening of United Nations Personnel, issued by the UN on 11 December 2012.

Chapter 1: Overview of The Nigerian Army and United Nation's Peacekeeping

History of the Nigerian Armed Forces

Following independence in 1960, the Nigerian Army (NA) was officially formed.⁴ As of 2013⁵, the Nigerian Armed Forces has approximately 130,000 personnel, with approximately 67,000 personnel serving in the NA as soldiers/other ranks or officers.⁶ The NA began recruiting women in 1986.⁷

The NA has directly influenced civilian governance and politics through over 30 years of military rule as a result of six coups and counter-coups.⁸ The military's dominance in the political sphere was noted in former United States' Ambassador John Campbell observations about former President Obasanjo:

[He] is always introduced as the President of the Federal Republic and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and seems to take the latter designation very seriously.

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- 4 In 1863, 18 men from the northern territories of Nigeria were recruited by Lt. John Glover of the British Royal Navy as part of the "Glover Hausas," which helped protect British trade routes around Lagos. This was later expanded and formed part of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF). The WAFF was the forerunner of the Nigerian Army. See Nigerian Army, *About the Army – Nigerian Army History*, available at <http://army.mil.ng/NA%20History.html>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also The Library of Congress, *Nigeria: A Country Study*, available at <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ngtoc.html>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.
 - 5 In 1967, a civil war erupted between Biafran forces and the NA after the Eastern Region of Biafra unilaterally declared its independence as the Republic of Biafra. Colonel Emeka Ojukwu, the head/Governor-General of the Eastern Region, led the Biafran forces. During 1967-1970, the Civil War prompted a massive mobilization and enlistment of people into a federal (NA) faction, loyal to the Head of State, and a Biafran faction, led by the former Governor-General of Eastern Region. As a result at the end of the Nigerian Civil War (1970), the strength of the NA rose to 250,000, which is its highest recorded number to date. Biafra was reabsorbed into Nigeria in January 1970. See Barnaby Philips, *Biafra: Thirty years on*, 13 January 2000, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/596712.stm>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also BBC News, *Nigeria: A history of coups*, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/83449.stm>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.
 - 6 The exact number of the armed forces in unknown as Nigeria maintains that the figures are a part of national security. Soldiers/Other Ranks include Recruit, Private, Lance Corporal, Corporal, Sergeant, Staff Sergeant, Warrant Officer (Class I and II) and Army Warrant Officer. Officers include the ranks of Second Lieutenant, Lieutenant, Captain, Major, Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel, Brigadier, Major General, Lieutenant General, General and Field Marshal. See Tajudeen Sulaiman, *The World of Female Soldiers*, TELL Magazine, available at <http://telling.com/nation/world-female-soldiers>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also Armed Forces Act, 2004, available at [http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/0/049ea0330082bc31c12576ea005be4a3/\\$FILE/ARMED%20FORCES%20ACT.pdf](http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/0/049ea0330082bc31c12576ea005be4a3/$FILE/ARMED%20FORCES%20ACT.pdf), last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also Global Security, *Nigeria*, available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/nigeria/army.htm>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.
 - 7 Approximately 39 women were recruited in 1986, and nearly 1,000 women have been recruited each year since. However the Nigerian Army does not release exact figures of the number of female members of the Armed Forces. See Tajudeen Sulaiman, *The World of Female Soldiers*, TELL Magazine, available at <http://telling.com/nation/world-female-soldiers>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.
 - 8 For example in 1966 the then-Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, was killed in a coup and replaced by Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi. Ironsi was then killed six months later in a counter-coup and replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon. Gowon was overthrown and replaced by Brigadier Murtala Ramat Mohammed in 1975. Mohammed was assassinated in a failed coup attempt and replaced by his deputy, Lieutenant-General Olusegun Obasanjo in 1976. After elections are held in 1979, Major-General Muhammad Buhari seized power in a bloodless coup in 1983. Ibrahim Babangida seized power in a bloodless coup in 1985, and in 1993 power was transferred to an Interim National Government after the military annuls the elections. Two months later General Sani Abacha seized power. When Abacha died in 1998, Major-General Abdulsalami succeeded him. Parliamentary and presidential elections were held in 1999 and Obasanjo is elected as president. The first civilian-run presidential elections were held on 19 April 2003 and Obasanjo is re-elected as president. See BBC, *Nigeria Profile*, 27 November 2013, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13951696>, last accessed 14 February 2014. See also Washington Post, *Nigeria's History of Turmoil*, available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/nigeria/timeline.htm>, last accessed 14 February 2014.

He even appears at some military events in camouflage uniform (without rank). His past military service has left him very comfortable dealing with the military, and most members of the government seem to accept the prerogative of the President freely to manage the affairs of the uniformed services. The President selects service chiefs without confirmation by the legislature and the Presidency seems to control the military budget, which is anything but transparent.⁹

Given the levels of mistrust that grew within the military due to the practice of coup and counter-coup, command positions came to be seen and regarded as rewards for political support within the military rather than an award for excellent military conduct.¹⁰ The sustained military rule has resulted in corruption¹¹ and patronage.¹²

9 See Wikileaks, *Cable: 05ABUJA970_a*, 3 June 2005, available at http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05ABUJA970_a.html, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

10 For example General Abacha, who apparently followed the example set by General Babangida but on a much greater scale, “repeatedly resorted to detention, dismissals and transfers on questionable grounds; or to forced retirements and filing trumped up charges against those members of the armed forces whom he perceives as a threat.” According to a Human Rights Watch report approximately 200 senior officers were “sacked for various reasons between 1995 and 1996,” including Major General Chris Ali, the Chief of Army Staff and Rear Admiral Alison Maduek, the Chief of the Naval Staff. Additionally a source who has dealt with the Nigerian military for more than 30 years... and has known the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) for many years (Ogomudia) said that Obasanjo promoted Ogomudia “to the position of CDS as a political reward for ‘taking care’ of the situation in Zaki-Biam in 2001, at the direction of the President, while Ogomudia was the Chief of Army Staff.” See Human Rights Watch, *Nigeria Transition or Travesty? Nigeria’s Endless Process of Return to Civilian Rule*, October 1997, available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1997/nigeria/Nigeria-06.htm#P482_118236, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also Wikileaks, *Cable: 05ABUJA970_a*, 3 June 2005, available at http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05ABUJA970_a.html, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

11 “Nigeria also remains one of the two or three most corrupt countries in the world: A few years ago, Obasanjo’s aides used sacks of cash to secure votes for leadership positions in the legislature. (Though that’s an improvement over his predecessor, the military dictator SaniAbacha, who embezzled \$4 billion from the state during his half-decade in power.) Just as important, Nigeria’s culture of corruption ‘seems to affect every transaction in life’ in Nigeria, says Princeton professor Jeffrey Herbst. ‘It’s not just the big guys ripping off the state.’ The proliferation of e-mailed Nigerian “419 scams” is the latest manifestation of the country’s many cons. See Brendan Koerner, *The Nigerian Nightmare. Who’s sending you all those scam e-mails?*, 22 October 2002, available at http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/tangled_web/2002/10/the_nigerian_nightmare.html, last accessed on 14 March 2014. Nigeria’s reputation in such matters wasn’t helped by its last peacekeeping outing in Liberia, during which some Nigerian officers acted in the manner of warlords by trading diamonds and looting. The peacekeeping monitoring group, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group, earned itself the nickname ECOMOG: Every Car or Moving Object Gone. (These acronym jokes seem to be popular: Nigeria’s electric utility, the National Power Authority, is dubbed “Never Expect Power Anytime.”) See Chris Suellentrop, *Nigeria’s Peacekeeping Problem*, Slate available at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/assessment/2003/08/nigeria.html, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

“Military corruption is heavily ingrained... The military reflects society at large, so a reduction in military-specific corruption can only reasonably be expected within the framework of larger governmental and societal changes.” See Wikileaks, *Cable: 04ABUJA2106_a*, 21 December 2004, available at http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04ABUJA2106_a.html, last accessed on 14 February 2014. “‘Not corrupt’ may better understood as ‘not as corrupt’ as the others, given the endemic nature of corruption among Nigerian leaders,” according to a contact from the Nigerian Defence Intelligence Agency. See Wikileaks, *Cable: 05ABUJA970_a*, 3 June 2005, available at http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05ABUJA970_a.html, last accessed on 14 February 2014. “Much of the nation’s wealth is concentrated in the hands of tiny military, political, and commercial elites through corruption and non-transparent government contracting practices.” See Wikileaks, *Cable: 07ABUJA2108_a*, available at http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07ABUJA2108_a.html, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

12 The late Supreme Court Justice, UdoUdoma, was quoted as saying, “Now they [the military] have lost the [will] and skill of fighting as soldiers in the field. They are now being trained as politicians. That is a very dangerous situation; ...and, we must retrace our steps [and] get rid of the military. Let the military do its own assignment – protect the country [and] maintain their skills as [Nigerian] warriors ... They must respect the government of the day and be loyal to it. That is very important[.]”

See Emmanuel Ike Udogu, *Nigeria in the Twenty-first Century: Strategies for Political Stability and Peaceful Coexistence*, Chapter 2 – Taming of the Shrew: Civil-Military Politics in the Fourth Republic, 1 June 2005.

Moreover frequent purges and executions of coup plotters as a result of the methods the military adopted to remain in power have left many gaping holes in the military leadership.¹³ Dr. Pita OgabaAgbese noted that:

[The] imperative for instituting measures to permanently bar the military from political intervention stems from the recognition that military rule poses a serious threat to the armed forces as an institution. The naked quest for political power among the military officers has decimated the ranks of the military. Coups, coup attempts and even “rumors” of coups have led to many military officers being executed. In addition, coups have destroyed the hierarchical chain of command in the Nigerian armed forces. Junior officers who succeeded in staging coups automatically promoted themselves over and above their erstwhile superior officers. This practice not only damaged the chain of command, [but also] created a climate of mutual suspicion and crimination detrimental to professionalism and military discipline.¹⁴

As a result, the NA has devolved into what Brigadier General David Mark has described as a “group of disorganized cowboys,” in which “military officers are more or less organized into a variety of factions around the power and authority of retired and serving generals” such as SaniAbacha, OladipoDiya, Yar’ Adua, Babangida, Akinrinade, Obasanjo, Ukiwe, Bali, Idiagbon, Gowon, Buhari, Danjuma, Dogon-yaro.¹⁵ This has further allowed the culture of violence and corruption to permeate within the NA,¹⁶ resulting in the destruction of discipline and professionalism.¹⁷

History of the Nigerian Army and United Nation’s Peacekeeping

Approximately 250,000 NA personnel have been deployed to UN peacekeeping missions since Nigeria joined peacekeeping operations in 1960 when it contributed troops for a UN peacekeeping

13 For example the coup by Colonel BukaDimka was foiled in 1976, Dimka and 38 of his co-conspirators were executed. Additionally, General MammanVatsa and nine other officers were executed in 1986 as a result of an alleged coup attempt. In 1990, Major Gideon Orkar and 67 soldiers were executed after an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow General Ibrahim Babangida. *See also Ibid.*

14 *See* Pita OgabaAgbese, *The politics of stable civil-military relations*, available at <http://www.india-seminar.com/2000/490/490%20agbese.htm>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. *See also* Emmanuel Ike Udogu, *Nigeria in the Twenty-first Century: Strategies for Political Stability and Peaceful Coexistence*, Chapter 2 – Taming of the Shrew: Civil-Military Politics in the Fourth Republic, 1 June 2005.

15 Whether currently active or retired, these general continue to have their “boys” within the NA who protect their interests and take directions from them, including by reporting back to them concerning the actions or intentions of other officers. *See* Pita OgabaAgbese, *The politics of stable civil-military relations*, available at <http://www.india-seminar.com/2000/490/490%20agbese.htm>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

16 For example the allegations of General Abacha stealing billions of dollars during his five year rule, in addition to the allegations of military personnel engaging in illicit activities, such as selling their guns, committing armed robbery and setting up illegal toll-booths to extort money from motorists. *See* Pita OgabaAgbese, *The politics of stable civil-military relations*, available at <http://www.india-seminar.com/2000/490/490%20agbese.htm>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

17 For example soldiers arrived in Akure on 30 June 2008 to receive the pay for peacekeeping duties, but after waiting five days without shelter or food being provided, an official finally arrived on 4 July 2008 to inform them that they would receive only half of their salary. No reasons were given to the soldiers for the withholding of their wages. As a result, hundreds of soldiers staged a violent riot to protest the withholding of their peacekeeping salaries after their return to Nigeria. Soldiers reported that the violent reaction was in response to fear “that their situation would mirror that of past missions, which were often denied a significant portion of their salaries with no explanation.” An Aukure-based lawyer, Idowu Salami, stated that corruption was at fault and that soldiers “are regularly shortchanged in salary and benefits.” *See* Wikileaks, *Cable 08LAGOS291_a*, available at: http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08LAGOS291_a.html, 25 July 2008, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

operation in the DRC (ONUC) from 1960 to 1964.¹⁸ Since then, it has participated in over 50 peacekeeping operations, including more recently contributing peacekeeping troops for the Darfur Mission in Sudan and the mission in Mali.¹⁹ Nigeria has consistently contributed high numbers of troops to UN PKOs. One hundred and forty Nigerian personnel have died while on peacekeeping operations.²⁰

Although Nigeria has been contributing peacekeeping troops from all the three branches of its Armed Forces (Army, Navy and Air Force), the majority of troops are from the NA.²¹

In recent months, Nigeria has recalled some of its peacekeepers from missions in Mali and Darfur to fight the militant Islamic group, Boko Haram, active in central and northern Nigeria.²² According to a letter from President Jonathan to Côte d'Ivoire president and ECOWAS chairman Alassane Ouattara, the withdrawal of the troops was "in response to the need for infantry to cope with the domestic situation in Nigeria."²³ Moreover a report by the Nigerian Senate on the April 2013 violence in Baga, Boko State stated "Nigeria's military had become dangerously overstretched between its campaign against Boko Haram and its international commitments."²⁴

Nigerian Army's Selection, Recruitment and Promotion Policies and Procedures

The formal recruitment process for the NA is discussed in this section. However any discussion of NA recruitment should take place within the context of the high levels of corruption within Nigeria.²⁵ There is little debate that recruitment for all government jobs, civilian and military, is subject to some levels of corruption and a system of patronage.²⁶

18 See Mohammed J. Kuna, *The Role of Nigeria in Peace Building, Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960*. See also South African Foreign Policy Initiative Open Society Foundation for South Africa, *How policy, funding issues clog Nigeria's UN peace-keeping operations*, available at <http://www.safpi.org/news/article/2013/how-policy-funding-issues-clog-nigerias-un-peace-keeping-operations>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

19 See Appendix 1, Nigerian Participation in Peacekeeping Operations, 1960 to Present. See also Nasri El-Rufai, *Failing State, Fading Peacekeepers*, This Day, 16 March 2012, available at <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/failing-state-fading-peacekeepers/111562/>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

20 Out of 3,199 peacekeepers killed during missions, Nigeria has lost 140, while India has lost 156, followed by Pakistan with 134, Ghana with 132, Canada with 121, and Bangladesh with 116. See U.N. Peacekeeping, *Fatalities, Nationality and Mission up to 30 September 2013*, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/fatalities/documents/stats_2.pdf, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

21 The recruitment processes for all three forces generally follow the same procedure, requiring the same minimum qualifications and many of the ranks attend the same institutions for training. See Training for Peace Operations Conducted in Nigeria – African Capabilities for Training for Peace Operations, *Appendix E*, available at <http://www.issafrika.org/Pubs/Other/AfricaCapab/AppendE.html>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

22 See Jamestown Foundation, *Nigerian Army Abandons Peacekeeping Missions in Mali and Darfur to Combat Boko Haram*, 9 August 2013, available at <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5204fb024.html>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

23 See Jamestown Foundation, *Nigerian Army Abandons Peacekeeping Missions in Mali and Darfur to Combat Boko Haram*, 9 August 2013, available at <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5204fb024.html>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

24 See Jamestown Foundation, *Nigerian Army Abandons Peacekeeping Missions in Mali and Darfur to Combat Boko Haram*, 9 August 2013, available at <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5204fb024.html>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

25 See Pita Ogaba Agbese, *The politics of stable civil-military relations*, available at <http://www.india-seminar.com/2000/490/490%20agbese.htm>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also Emmanuel Ike Udogu, *Nigeria in the Twenty-first Century: Strategies for Political Stability and Peaceful Coexistence*, Chapter 2 – Taming of the Shrew: Civil-Military Politics in the Fourth Republic, 1 June 2005.

26 See Pita Ogaba Agbese, *The politics of stable civil-military relations*, available at <http://www.india-seminar.com/2000/490/490%20agbese.htm>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also Emmanuel Ike Udogu, *Nigeria in the Twenty-first Century: Strategies for Political Stability and Peaceful Coexistence*, Chapter 2 – Taming of the Shrew: Civil-Military Politics in the Fourth Republic, 1 June 2005. See also Wikileaks, *Cable: 05ABUJA970_a*, 3 June 2005, available at http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05ABUJA970_a.html, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

The NA sets forth clear policies concerning recruitment and selection.²⁷ However these policies are often abused.²⁸ Persons are able to enter the NA four ways. First, recruits may apply through an open application process, which is usually advertised in the newspapers and more recently also on the recruitment portal of the NA.²⁹ The key requirement is completion of secondary school in addition to meeting basic physical requirements.³⁰

The second route is through the various military schools of the army. These are the equivalent of secondary schools and children admitted undergo both basic military training and secondary school education. At the end of their six-year period, they have the option to join the army or opt out for a civilian route to a career. The basic requirements for recruitment into the schools are physical fitness.

The third is through the Nigerian Defense Academy (NDA), based in Kaduna. This has the status of a university. In addition to basic military training requirements, candidates must meet basic entry qualification criteria for university education. Admitted students will study for a 5-year course, comprising 4 years of academic program and one year of military training culminating in the award of a Bachelor Degree and a commission to the rank of second lieutenant, or equivalent in the Navy and Air Force.

The fourth route is through the Short Service Commission (SSC). Direct Short Service Commission (DSSC) will be granted for 10 years, for an initial probation period of 3 years, renewable yearly for another period of 7 years. Direct Regular Commission may be granted on conversion after 3 years as commissioned officer.³¹

Officer cadets who successfully complete the military training shall be granted the rank of lieutenant with no advantage of seniority except for fully registered medical doctors, architects, lawyers and holders of a doctorate degree in fields relevant to individual service who will be commissioned in the same rank but with 3 months' seniority. The DSSC is a 9-month intensive military training for professionals drawn from various disciplines to serve as officers in the non-combat services of the Army, Navy and the Air Force.

27 To join the NA, one must be of Nigerian origin by birth; attend a zonal screening exercise at the designated zonal centres for his/her respective states; must be between the ages of 18-22 at the time of application; must be medically, physically and psychologically fit and must not be less than 1.65 meters tall for men and 1.56 meters for women; must be free of any criminal conviction; and must submit all duly completed forms at the exam venue on the date of the exam. The educational requirements for entry as non-tradesmen/tradeswomen into the NA, are SSCE/NECO/GCE with at least 3 credits including for English language in no more than two sittings. See The Nigerian Army E-Application Portal, available at <http://www.narecruitment.org/>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also Armed Forces Act, available at [http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/0/049ea0330082bc31c12576ea005be4a3/\\$FILE/ARMED%20FORCES%20ACT.pdf](http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/0/049ea0330082bc31c12576ea005be4a3/$FILE/ARMED%20FORCES%20ACT.pdf), last accessed on 14 February 2014.

28 For example, each potential recruit must obtain a series of signatures on the form, and each signature requires a bribe. The total amount of money necessary for all of the signatures can be significant and many recruits do not have that type of money so they are forced to find other methods of obtaining the bribery amounts. One account given by a British Defence Advisory and Training Team (DAT) was that a "potential recruit will find a serving soldier and 'rent' his weapon. The recruit will then use the weapon to commit enough armed robberies to collect the funds necessary to pay all of the necessary bribes and the rental fee for the weapon. Once the soldier is in the Army, he will then rent his weapon out to future recruits, and the system lives on." See Wikileaks, *Cable: 05ABUJA970_a*, 3 June 2005, available at http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05ABUJA970_a.html, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

29 See The Nigerian Army E-Application Portal, available at <http://www.narecruitment.org/>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

30 See The Nigerian Army E-Application Portal, available at <http://www.narecruitment.org/>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

31 See The Nigerian Army E-Application Portal, available at <http://www.narecruitment.org/>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

Since the 1980s, emphasis has shifted to the recruitment of more educated cadres in the military through the Short Service Combatant Commission (SSCC) cadet programme of the NDA. The NDA itself was subsequently upgraded to a university status so that graduates of its five-year training programme came out with university degrees in addition to their cadetship commission.³²

All recruitments and selections are subject to the federal character requirement³³ and application of quotas, meaning that each state of the federation gets more or less equal number of people admitted or recruited. Given that applications are usually much higher than eventual admission, space is created for gatekeepers such as politicians and for corrupt practices in the admission and recruitment processes. “[P]ersonal relationships and political positioning still drive the promotion and assignment processes in the Army.”³⁴

The Nigeria Armed Forces have a training policy for its members. It is expected that promotion to higher ranks would be earned through both on the job training as well as attending specialized training programmes. For the officer positions the different branches of the country’s armed forces have their specialized training institutions. The NDA is for cadet training while the Armed Forces Command and Staff College (AFCSC), Jaji is for middle-level staff training positions. In addition there is a National Defence College (NDC) in Abuja, which takes in officers from all branches of the armed forces as well as from other security agencies for training. The NDC is the apex military training institution in Nigeria, and a Centre of Excellence for peace support operations training at the strategic level in West Africa. The NDC was established in 1992 as the highest military institution for the training of senior military officers in Nigeria.³⁵

Selection Criteria and Deployment for United Nation’s Peacekeeping

The Nigerian army has a long history of engagement with UN peacekeeping operations both within and outside the African continent and has repeatedly been commended for its contributions.³⁶ According to the UN, as of 31 January 2014, Nigeria was the fifth largest contributor of military and police personnel for UN PKOs with 4,862 military and police personnel.³⁷ Among them were 668

32 The SSCC is a scheme in which graduates after military training would serve for a maximum period of ten years after which they disengage from the military. See Nigerian Army Short Service Combatant Commission website, available at <http://ngcareers.com/job/2013-03/nigerian-army-recruitment-for-short-service-combatant-ssc-commission-2013>, last accessed on 21 March 2014.

33 “The composition of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few States or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that Government or any of its agencies.” Section 14(3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, available at <http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

34 “Promotions are political at Colonel-level and above, and are completely within the purview of the COAS. Officers need to start worrying about politics as Majors and Lieutenant Colonels to position themselves for future promotions and assignments. Command of the Ikeja Cantonment (Lagos) and of the 3rd Armored Division (Jos) are key positions given to loyal officers, because of the significance of these commands in the event of a national emergency, particularly regime instability (Ikeja can control Lagos, and the Armored Division has tanks that are reasonably close to Abjua). See Wikileaks, *Cable: 05ABUJA970_a*, 3 June 2005, available at http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05ABUJA970_a.html, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

35 See website of the NDC, at <http://www.ndc.gov.ng>, last accessed on 14 March 2014.

36 See UN, *Statement attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on the recall of a Nigerian unit from MONUC*, 15 September 2005, available at <http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=1677>. See also UN, *Secretary-General’s message to event marking the Centenary of the Amalgamation of Nigeria*, 27 February 2014, available at <http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=7490>.

37 See UN Peacekeeping, *Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations*, 31 January 2014, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2014/jan14_2.pdf, last accessed on 13 February 2014.

police officers, 58 Experts on Mission and 4,138 troops serving in PKOs.³⁸ Included in these numbers are 4,525 men and 337 women.³⁹ As of January 2014, members of the armed forces and police are serving in 10 PKOs out of 16 operations.⁴⁰ While the largest peacekeeping contributions come from the NA and NPF, the Nigerian Navy and Air Force also regularly contribute.⁴¹

As discussed in the previous section, it can be inferred from the Army's process for recruitment and selections that the process for recruitment and selection for UN peacekeepers⁴² is also subject to high levels of corruption within Nigeria.⁴³ As El-Rufai observed:

The process of selecting troops to peace missions is also flawed. Some battalions are loaded with clerks, cooks, batmen and orderlies who can barely handle a weapon, but are well connected! It is not unusual for legislators, retired military officers and traditional rulers to influence the selection process, so competence and capacity get compromised. Some of these ill trained soldiers simpl[y] take to their heels when under attack.⁴⁴

The Army does not have any formal, published guidelines concerning the contributions, recruitment or selection of UN PKOs. When questioned concerning the rules and regulations regarding UN PKOs, Colonel for Chief of Army Staff RJ Alexander replied that the NA:

[H]as codified rules and regulations, Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Rules of Engagement for its peacekeepers. These documents are elaborate in nature and have continued to ensure the maintenance of high standards by NA peacekeepers, including human rights. This is attested to by the [worldwide] acclaim of NA's participation and achievements in global peacekeeping.⁴⁵

The Department of Army Training and Operations is in charge of the selection of peacekeepers in the NA.⁴⁶ Together with the Directorate of Peacekeeping Operations of the Defence Headquarters, they coordinate and administer Nigeria's contribution/participation in peace support operations at

38 See UN Peacekeeping, *Monthly Summary of Contributions (Police, UN Military Experts on Mission and Troops)*, 31 January 2014, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2014/jan14_1.pdf, last accessed on 13 February 2014.

39 See UN Peacekeeping, *Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations*, 31 January 2014, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2014/jan14_2.pdf, last accessed on 13 February 2014.

40 In addition to peacekeeping operations, DPKO directs one political mission, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). See UN Peacekeeping, *UN Mission's Summary detailed by Country*, 31 January 2014, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2014/jan14_3.pdf, last accessed on 13 February 2014.

41 See Ahmed Musa Sule, *Nigeria's Participation in Peacekeeping Operations*, 25 April 2013, available at <http://cdn.peaceopstraining.org/theses/sule.pdf>, last accessed on 21 March 2014.

42 At the U.N. standard rate, NA personnel earn upwards of U.S. \$2,200 a month for an officer and U.S. \$1,100 for a soldier, in addition to other allowances and perks. See Omair Ahmad, *Indian Army: U.N. Report, Rotting Olives*, Outlook India.com, 2 June 2008, available at: <http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?237577>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

43 "[P]ersonal relationships and political positioning still drive the promotion and assignment processes in the Army." See Wikileaks, *Cable: 05ABUJA970_a*, 3 June 2005, available at http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05ABUJA970_a.html, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

44 See Nasri El-Rufai, *Failing State, Fading Peacekeepers*, This Day Live, 16 March 2012, available at <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/failing-state-fading-peacekeepers/111562/>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

45 Letter from Colonel for Chief of Army Staff RJ Alexander, *Re: Enhancing Human Rights Standards for Military and Police in Nigeria on Peacekeeping*, 13 November 2013, See Appendix 2.

46 See History Roles and Organisation of the Nigerian Army (Restricted), available at <http://www.nigerianafsc.org/DOCS/NA%20HISTORY,%20ROLES%20AND%20%20ORGANISATION%20.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

the sub-regional and global level.⁴⁷ This department does not choose individual peacekeepers, but selects units for deployment on peacekeeping operation. The Department of Army Logistics supplements the selection process by providing specialized troops such as armed personnel carrier drivers, medical troops, and engineers.⁴⁸

When the selection of the units has been completed, unit commanders are supposed to work in conjunction with the Department of Army Administration since it is tasked with “the administration, welfare, discipline, employment and development of all human resources in the NA”⁴⁹ to ensure that all of those to be selected are of “good conduct.” However according to internal NA sources, it is the unit commanders who select the individuals to be shortlisted. At the pre-selection stage, shortlisted personnel fill out the necessary forms and are subjected to medical examinations. The medical examination focuses on tests for significant illnesses, such as hepatitis and HIV. Those who pass the medical examination then participate in physical tests, which if successful, they are enlisted for pre-deployment training.⁵⁰

Currently, there is no published or transparent vetting system within the NA. Moreover, there is little cross-referencing between the units and the Department of Army Administration during selection and the cross-referencing and selection processes are influenced by socio-economic (poverty, unemployment, poor education) and political (influence of political and military leadership and quota system) factors.⁵¹ As a result, it is possible for those with disciplinary cases to still be shortlisted and indeed later on to be enlisted for peacekeeping operations.

Pre-deployment Training

NA personnel selected for peacekeeping operations generally undergo a four-week pre-deployment training at the Nigerian Army Peacekeeping Centre, which was established in 2005.⁵² Each pre-deployment training and included curriculum is tailored to the specific peacekeeping operation.⁵³ The training can be shortened in emergency deployment situations.⁵⁴

47 Information obtained during validation meeting with media personnel regularly reporting on peacekeeping, Abuja, 11 February 2014.

48 CISLAC interview with confidential source.

49 Interview with NA officer (name withheld), Abuja, 22 July 2013.

50 Telephone interview with a former member of the army contingent to Darfur, Sudan (name withheld), June 2013.

51 CISLAC interview with confidential source and information shared by participants in validation meeting with media personnel, Abuja, 11 February 2014.

52 The centre also holds a course on the “Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations” (intermediate/advanced level) for military and police officers being deployed on peacekeeping operations. See Nigerian Army Peacekeeping Centre, *Pre-Deployment Training (PDT)*, available at <http://www.napkc.org/course-pdt.php>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

53 The topics that are covered during training are as follows: Rules of engagement; Human rights; Movement formations and techniques; Area security/Base camp operations; Convoy protection/Escort duties; Dispatch and safety procedures; Combat life-saving exercises; Defence against attack; Care under tactical situation and care under fire; First aid for burns, bleeding, fracture management, and vector illnesses; Community awareness strategies and media relations; Coordination with other international organizations; and Training normally ends with advanced rifle marksmanship and other field training exercises. During the training, prospective peacekeepers undergo three types of drills. There is training on weapons and general military alertness; on rules of engagement and on the specific cultural contexts of the place they are to be deployed. The rules of engagement module introduces the participants to the general principles of the UN peacekeeping operations, and general conduct of peacekeepers. See Nigerian Army Peacekeeping Centre, *Pre-Deployment Training (PDT)*, available at <http://www.napkc.org/course-pdt.php>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

54 Although the duration of the training may not allow for in-depth treatment of most of the topics, a former peacekeeper stated that the points are well made to the participants. See Interview with a former peacekeeping police officer, Kano, 6 June 2013.

For middle-ranking personnel, training is

[c]onducted at the Armed Forces Command and Staff College (AFCSC), Infantry Corps Center and School (ICCS) and the Nigerian Army College of Logistics (NACOL). The AFCSC peace support training package is an intensive 2-weeks package dealing with the theory and practice of peace support operations (PSOs) in the field at the operational level, including an introduction to the UN system, conduct of humanitarian operations, principles for the conduct of PSOs, lessons learnt from past and ongoing missions, dynamics and future of contemporary UN peacekeeping and the institutional, military and legal background to peacekeeping.⁵⁵

Although the NA does provide pre-deployment training to its officers, military authorities, such as Major General Suraj, have admitted that there is a need for re-evaluation of the training in light of UN modules.⁵⁶

Recognizing that there may be some deficiencies in the training, the Commandant of the NA Peacekeeping Centre issued a statement on the website of the Peace Operations Training Institute, which reads:

I am pleased to recommend to all students of the Nigerian Army Peacekeeping Centre that you enroll in the e-learning programme offered by the Peace Operations Training Institute. These e-learning courses are offered free to all African military personnel, police, and gendarmerie, inclusive. The curriculum includes Civil-Military Coordination, Humanitarian Relief, International Humanitarian Law, courses on gender issues, and other important topics relevant to peacekeepers.⁵⁷

In many instances, the emphasis on conduct, discipline and integrity is only made during the graduation ceremony. For instance during the 21 Battalion pre-deployment graduation at the NAPKC in Jaji, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) 1st Division, Major General GarbaWahab issued the following warning to the graduating peacekeepers:

You must not involve yourselves in the trafficking of illicit substances of any kind, such as alcohol and drugs as these are very offensive to the cultural values of the Darfur people and negates UN ethics. I must also remind you of the UN zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse.⁵⁸

55 See Major General Suraj Abdurrahman, Nigerian Armed Forces, Director of Policy, Defense HQ, Lagos, *Peace Support Operations in Africa A Perspective from Nigeria*, available at http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/19_pkf_160_abdur.pdf, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

56 “In the face of major regional and global challenges, our training directives have been reviewed to cater adequately for training in PSOs, drawing largely from the UN Standardized Generic Training Modules (SGTM 1) provided by the Military Division, Training and Evaluation Service (MD/TES) of the UN DPKO for unit and pre-deployment training,” said Major General Suraj. See Major General Suraj Abdurrahman, Nigerian Armed Forces, Director of Policy, Defense HQ, Lagos, *Peace Support Operations in Africa A Perspective from Nigeria*, available at http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/19_pkf_160_abdur.pdf, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

57 Message by the Commandant of the Nigerian Army Peacekeeping Centre posted on the website of the Peace Operation Training Institute of the UN, <http://www.peaceopstraining.org/napkc/>

58 Speech by General GarbaWahab, General Officer Commanding (GOC) 1 Division Nigerian Army, during the 21 Battalion pre-deployment graduation at the Nigerian Army Peacekeeping Centre in Jaji.

Foreign Assistance in Nigerian Army Training

Due to the scale of documented human rights abuses by the NA,⁵⁹ the U.S. cannot provide overall military training, to the NA. Under current U.S. law, when credible information is uncovered that demonstrates that an individual or unit has committed gross human rights violations U.S. assistance must be withheld.⁶⁰ A February 2013 State Department inspector general report found that of “1,377 Nigerian soldiers vetted last year to receive American training, 211 were rejected or suspended because of human rights concerns. Indeed, a Nigerian Army battalion now operating in Mali as part of an African force to help combat Al Qaeda’s affiliate there is restricted from receiving nonlethal American equipment like helmets and communications equipment. But the Nigerian battalion that is scheduled to replace that unit in the coming weeks has received American training and is under no such restrictions.”⁶¹

Policies on Human Rights Violations and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

Beginning in mid-2004, allegations concerning sexual exploitation and abuse perpetrated by UN peacekeepers and other UN personnel began to surface.⁶² In response to the mounting allegations, the UN conducted investigations, which resulted in changes to existing UN policies concerning personnel.⁶³ A “zero-tolerance” towards any sexual exploitation and abuse was adopted and was to be implemented in “the most transparent manner” according to Secretary-General Kofi Annan.⁶⁴

Nigeria expressed its commitment to the principle of accountability concerning sexual abuse and other criminal acts by its peacekeepers, but has yet to make any documented effort to address the

59 In previously confidential diplomatic cables, Former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria Howard E. Jeter warned Nigerian Foreign Minister Lamido about joining the International Criminal Court (ICC) due to past allegations against some Nigerian peacekeeping forces as there could be likely prosecutions from the ICC. See Wikileaks, *Cable: 02ABUJA1449_a*, 9 May 2002, available at http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/02ABUJA1449_a.html, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

60 The U.S. under the Leahy Amendment is barred from providing training and equipment to troops and units (and individuals, in the cases of specific training) if credible information is received concerning human rights violations. However, units may be allowed to be sent for training if there is no credible information received concerning gross human rights violations. See Human Rights.Gov, *An Overview of the Leahy Vetting Process*, 9 July 2013, available at: <http://www.humanrights.gov/2013/07/09/an-overview-of-the-leahy-vetting-process/>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

61 Additionally see the 1998 U.S. Senate bill titled, Nigerian Democracy and Civil Society Empowerment Act, which prohibited military assistance to Nigeria, including military education and training, due to violations of human rights. *Nigerian Democracy and Civil Society Empowerment Act*, 105th Congress, 1997-1998, 20 May 1998, s.2102 (105th), available at <https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/105/s2102/text>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See Eric Schmitt, *Military Says Law Barring U.S. Aid to Rights Violators Hurts Training Mission*, 20 June 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/21/us/politics/military-says-law-barring-us-aid-to-rights-violators-hurts-training-mission.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

62 Allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation of girls and women, including trading sex for money, food or jobs; rape; in addition to victims of abuse being left to care for children without any family to help them care for the children. See United Nations Press Release, Secretary-General Kofi Annan, *Secretary-General Absolutely Outraged by Gross Misconduct by Peacekeeping Personnel in Democratic Republic of Congo*, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/9605 (19 November 2004), available at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sgsm9605.doc.htm>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also Elizabeth F. Defeis, *UN Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: An End to Impunity*, Washington University Global Studies Law Review, 2008, available at http://law.wustl.edu/WUGSLR/Issues/Volume7_2/Defeis.pdf, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

63 See Elizabeth F. Defeis, *UN Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: An End to Impunity*, Washington University Global Studies Law Review, 2008, available at http://law.wustl.edu/WUGSLR/Issues/Volume7_2/Defeis.pdf, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

64 See Elizabeth F. Defeis, *UN Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: An End to Impunity*, Washington University Global Studies Law Review, 2008, available at http://law.wustl.edu/WUGSLR/Issues/Volume7_2/Defeis.pdf, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

issue.⁶⁵ Furthermore, the NA does not have a published policy either on sexual exploitation and abuse or human rights violations.

As illustrated by the cases discussed below, there is clear evidence as to the need for a clear policy concerning sexual exploitation and abuse and human rights violations by members of the NA, in addition to a comprehensive and transparent vetting system to prevent those who have committed these types of abuses from serving as UN peacekeepers.

Accountability for Human Rights Violations and Selection of Peacekeepers

The history of the NA and peacekeeping has been plagued by allegations of corruption and violations of human rights. For example during their peacekeeping mission in Liberia, “some Nigerian officers acted in the manner of warlords by trading diamonds and looting. The peacekeeping group, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group, earned itself the nickname ECOMOG: Every Car or Moving Object Gone.”⁶⁶

Even domestically, the NA maintains a reputation for human rights violations and corruption. In addition to the many abuses during past military rule, many of the abuses now stem from the NA’s involvement in its effort to combat Boko Haram.⁶⁷ The NA has been accused of extrajudicial killings, torture, arson, arbitrary arrests and detention, and extortion.⁶⁸ Furthermore the NA has been accused of massive destruction of civilian property during raids carried out in search of Boko Haram members. For example on 16 and 17 April 2013, according to satellite images obtained by Human Rights Watch 2,275 buildings were burned down and another 125 were severely damaged by the NA in a raid in Baga.⁶⁹ Additionally Nigeria’s National Human Rights Commission released a report in 2013 stating that it had received credible allegations that the Joint Task Force (JTF), which is part of the NA, has carried out “summary executions, torture, arbitrary detention amounting to internment.”⁷⁰ According to the report, “[i]n particular, [the National Human Rights Commission has] received persistent and credibly attested allegations of indiscriminate disposal of dead remains” by Joint Task Force personnel.⁷¹

65 See UNGA, *Summary record of the 9th meeting*, A/C.6/67/SR.9, 20 December 2012, as cited by Carla Ferstman, *Criminalizing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers*, United States Institute of Peace Special Report, available at <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR335-Criminalizing%20Sexual%20Exploitation%20and%20Abuse%20by%20Peacekeepers.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

66 See Chris Suellentrop, *Nigeria’s Peacekeeping Problem*, Slate available at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/assessment/2003/08/nigeria.html, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

67 Since 2009, the NA has been increasingly involved in the fight against Boko Haram. The group’s aim is to “rid the country of its corrupt and abusive government and institute what it describes as religious purity.” It has carried out numerous attacks against police, government targets, Christians, schools, and other groups who it accuses of having cooperated with the government. See Human Rights Watch, *Spiraling Violence, Boko Haram Attacks and Security Force Abuses in Nigeria*, 11 October 2012, available at <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/10/11/spiraling-violence-0>, last accessed 14 February 2014.

68 See Human Rights Watch, *Spiraling Violence, Boko Haram Attacks and Security Force Abuses in Nigeria*, 11 October 2012, available at <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/10/11/spiraling-violence-0>, last accessed 14 February 2014.

69 See Human Rights Watch, *Nigeria: Massive Destruction, Deaths from Military Raid*, 1 May 2013, available at <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/01/nigeria-massive-destruction-deaths-military-raid>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

70 See Nigerian National Human Rights Commission, *NHRC Baga-NE Emergency Interim RPT*, available at <http://www.nigeriarights.gov.ng/resources>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

71 See Nigerian National Human Rights Commission, *NHRC Baga-NE Emergency Interim RPT*, available at <http://www.nigeriarights.gov.ng/resources>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

Case No 1:

During the peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone, General Vijay Kumar Jetley complained about the corruption of the Nigerian peacekeeping forces in a confidential report sent to the UN headquarters.⁷² According to Jetley's report, the NA "has obstructed peace moves in Sierra Leone because its officers and men are getting rich through illegally trading diamonds."⁷³

The document is supported by complaints from a wide range of sources who claim that the NA "was heavily involved in diamonds, false passports, drug smuggling and other illegal activities...A by-product of this was that the Nigerian Army supplied drugs to the Revolutionary United Front rebels, whose ill-disciplined troops have heavy drug habits."⁷⁴

Some of the claims could not be substantiated since they came from the RUF, but other reports came from sources such as a pilot working out of Freetown's Lungi airport "who claimed to have knowledge of heavy drug trafficking."⁷⁵

Some of the key allegations made by Major-General Jetley in his report are as follows:

1. "The Nigerian Army was interested in staying in Sierra Leone due to the massive benefits they were getting from illegal diamond mining."⁷⁶
2. "Brigadier-General Maxwell Khobe was commonly known as the "Ten Million man": it is alleged that he received up to \$10m to permit the activities of RUF. The [West African intervention] force commander Major-General Kpamber was also involved."
3. "It is understood that a tacit understanding was reached between the RUF and [the Nigerians] of non-interference in each other's activities. Protecting Nigerian interests was paramount even if it meant scuttling the peace process.
4. "To this end the special representative [of the UN in Sierra Leone, OluyemiAdeniji] and the deputy force commander cultivated the RUF leadership, especially FodaySankoh, behind my back."

72 See EwenMacAskill, *UN gets warning shot peacekeeping, Huge corruption in Sierra Leone shows the need for rapid reform*, available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/sep/09/sierraleone2>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also The Sierra Web, *Report on the Crisis in Sierra Leone*, available at <http://www.sierra-leone.org/Other-Conflict/jetley-0500.html>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

73 See EwenMacAskill, *UN gets warning shot peacekeeping, Huge corruption in Sierra Leone shows the need for rapid reform*, available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/sep/09/sierraleone2>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also The Sierra Web, *Report on the Crisis in Sierra Leone*, available at <http://www.sierra-leone.org/Other-Conflict/jetley-0500.html>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

74 See EwenMacAskill, *UN gets warning shot peacekeeping, Huge corruption in Sierra Leone shows the need for rapid reform*, available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/sep/09/sierraleone2>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also The Sierra Web, *Report on the Crisis in Sierra Leone*, available at <http://www.sierra-leone.org/Other-Conflict/jetley-0500.html>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

75 See EwenMacAskill, *UN gets warning shot peacekeeping, Huge corruption in Sierra Leone shows the need for rapid reform*, available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/sep/09/sierraleone2>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also The Sierra Web, *Report on the Crisis in Sierra Leone*, available at <http://www.sierra-leone.org/Other-Conflict/jetley-0500.html>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

76 According to General Victor Malu, "No Nigerian officer or soldier was ever caught in illegal mining activities or found with diamonds." See BBC, *Nigeria: Sack UN force commander*, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/917962.stm>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

5. “The Mission Directive given to me... directly conflicted with the interests of not only the warring factions but also of the major players in the diamond racket like Liberia and Nigeria. As an Indian, and having no hidden agenda to promote, I became a victim of the machinations of these countries.”⁷⁷

In response to Major-General Jetley’s allegations, the Nigerian chief of army staff, General Victor Malu, stated that the NA would not continue to serve under Jetley and demanded his dismissal.⁷⁸ The disagreements between Nigeria and the other countries deployed for peacekeeping date back to the early days of the mission when Nigeria had requested command of the mission, but was turned down due to its “patchy record in previous attempts to restore peace.”⁷⁹

Existing Practices and Problems with Implementation

1. Vetting is never public: The processes for vetting of peacekeepers nor the names of those selected for peacekeeping assignment have never been made public. The military consider both selection and deployment of troops as military secrets and in that context extends the same to the selection process of peacekeeping troops. There is also no known mechanism for individual soldiers to account for past conduct during selection processes. The Nigerian Army should put in place a screening policy in line with the UN human rights screening policy of December 2012, make its policy public, as well as provide opportunity for national institutions such as the Human Rights Commission as well as the general public to feed information about officers and other personnel with known records of human rights abuse into the vetting process.
2. Corruption in the administration of the payment of peacekeepers: General corruption in the military has found itself into the management of allowances of soldiers on peacekeeping operations. There have been longstanding grumblings, but on 4 July 2008, soldiers who served in peacekeeping operations converged from all over Nigeria and held a public protest in Akure, Ondo to demand the payment of their withheld peacekeeping allowance. Their claim was that instead of the \$1,228 (the global amount approved for them on a monthly basis), authorities of the NA were shortchanging them as they were paid only \$3,000 per six-month period. Following the protest, 27 of the soldiers were singled out and court-martialed using Section 52 (2) of the Armed Forces Act Cap. 20 LFN (2004) and were sentenced to life imprisonment for mutiny.⁸⁰
3. Corruption in both recruitment and selection: Although there are clear criteria for the recruitment into the NA, the processes have been politicized. The application of the federal

⁷⁷ See The Sierra Web, *Report on the Crisis in Sierra Leone*, available at <http://www.sierra-leone.org/Other-Conflict/jetley-0500.html>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also EwenMacAskill, *UN gets warning shot peacekeeping, Huge corruption in Sierra Leone shows the need for rapid reform*, available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/sep/09/sierraleone2>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

⁷⁸ See BBC, *Nigeria: Sack UN force commander*, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/917962.stm>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

⁷⁹ Major-General Jetley was replaced, although varying reasons were given for his replacement, such as the expansion of the mission and the need for a three star general (he was only a two star general). See BBC, *Nigeria: Sack UN force commander*, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/917962.stm>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also BBC, *UN announces Sierra Leone shake-up*, 23 September 2000, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/938281.stm>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

⁸⁰ Telephone interview with Mr. Femi Falana (SAN), Counsel to the NA Soldiers, 25 September 2013.

character principle and quotas has placed the process in the hands of politicians who are given specific slots to bring in their candidates. In this situation, qualification and merit become the chief casualties as patronage distribution takes precedent.

4. Lack of attention to human rights: Nigerian soldiers, both at home and abroad do not give premium to respect for human rights. They have systematically abused the rights of civilians (whom they describe as “bloody civilians”). They are known to beat citizens (including beating police officers) and the military establishment takes hardly any action against them. Only on rare occasions do military authorities respond to public outcry over human rights violations by members of the armed forces. Part of the reason is that many of those recruited into the army do not have proper training and orientation to ensure they respect human rights.
5. No policy on sexual exploitation and abuse: There is no publicly known policy on sexual abuse and harassment in the army.⁸¹ There have been many cases of sexual abuse and harassment by members of the Nigerian armed forces during internal military operations. Recent cases include sexual harassment by soldiers during the campaign against Boko Haram in Kano, Borno and Yobe. There have also been similar reports during the JTF campaign in both the Niger Delta and in Jos, Plateau. Those responsible have not been punished.⁸² It is possible that some of those involved in these incidents find their way into peacekeeping operations. Given that those who have participated in internal operations are considered as having some previous experience, in spite of the fact they might have awful records, they have advantage in being considered for international peacekeeping operations. The cases of Liberia and DRC where many of the soldiers impregnated many women while serving there demonstrated most convincingly the lack of policy and action on sexual exploitation and abuse.
6. Inadequate content of pre-deployment training: Although all selected peacekeeping operation members are required to undergo pre-deployment training, the training does not appear adequate both in its scope and depth. Ill-preparation during the training has resulted in poor performance. While there is the perception that Nigerian soldiers have been performing exceptionally, there have equally been many instances in which the performance of Nigerian contingent was disastrous. The evidence almost always is about ECOMOG in Liberia⁸³ but this was also so in Sudan for example. During the 2013 celebration of Peacekeepers’ Day in the UN, it transpired that Nigeria had the highest number of casualties among the 117 peacekeepers killed in the previous year. A lack of in-depth knowledge of the rules of engagement has undermined the reputation of Nigerian peacekeepers. For example, in August 2012, a Nigerian battalion serving in UNAMID was returned home for performing

81 The draft of this report was submitted to the Army Headquarters in October 2013. The response is attached hereto as Appendix 2.

82 There have been no public investigations by the army of the various allegations. The Human Rights Commission has undertaken an investigation on the allege massacre of civilian in Bama, Borno State by the JTF and has issued an interim report on this. See “The Baga Incident and the Situation in North-East Nigeria: An Interim Assessment and Report”, <http://nigeriarights.gov.ng/resources>

83 ECOMOG in Nigeria after the army had returned become a local slang for procuring free women, an indication of the rather sexual escapades of members of the Nigeria contingent during the period, signifying that they had indulged in many cases of sexual exploitation.

below par.⁸⁴ It has also been argued that the withdrawal of troops by Nigeria from Mali in July 2013, which government sources attributed to the need to have more soldiers to fight internal insurgents, has to do with the country's disappointment with the change in command of the AFISMA made by UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon. Nigerian Major-General ShehuAbdulkadir was replaced with Major General Jean BoscoKazura of Rwanda, a change that is attributed to poor performance of the Nigerians.⁸⁵

7. Insufficient mechanisms for public input to oversight bodies: The army does not have a civilian oversight body. The National Assembly since 1999 provides a general oversight role, which is still to be fully developed. In the absence of a body that is composed of civilians, members of the public have no access to an oversight mechanism in the armed forces that is responsible and accountable. This means that complaints about the behavior and conduct of members of the armed forces are not channeled through accessible and accountable organs, and often no response come from the military authorities when such complaints are made.
8. Gender discrimination: There has been discrimination against women in the selection of those to be sent on peacekeeping operations. The Ministry of Women's Affairs acknowledged this discrimination and has set up an "inter-ministerial task force on gender and peacekeeping to allow women participate in peacekeeping processes as peace-makers, peace-builders, peacekeepers and negotiators in conflict-torn countries."⁸⁶There are both institutional and legal discrimination against women in the armed forces. For instance, women are not allowed to apply for specific postings. Also until recently women were not admitted into the NDA for cadetship training. The discrimination against women has two negative consequences. One is that it reinforces the attitude that women cannot be in the mainstream of military service as they are considered as the weaker sex which serves to further exclude women not just from military decision making processes but also in the wider society. The second is that because there are few women, in instances during peacekeeping operations where deploying women peacekeepers may be more appropriate, men are sent with the temptation for sexual abuse. The military officials have argued that the discrimination against women is due to the fact that they have a gender stereotype of roles. As the Chief of Staff of the Nigerian Army, Brigadier General Abdul Malik Jubril stated "the need to increase their number depends on the role they are expected to play in such operations."⁸⁷

84 See MaduOnuorah, *How policy, funding issues clog Nigeria's UN peace-keeping operations*, Guardian, 6 June 2013, available at <http://www.safpi.org/news/article/2013/how-policy-funding-issues-clog-nigerias-un-peace-keeping-operations>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

85 See Andrew McGregor, *Nigerian Army Abandons Peacekeeping Missions in Mali and Darfur to Combat Boko Haram*, Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, 26 July 2013, available at http://www.ocnus.net/artman2/publish/Africa_8/NIGERIAN-ARMY-ABANDONS-PEACEKEEPING-MISSIONS-IN-MALI-AND-DARFUR-TO-COMBAT-BOKO-HARAM.shtml, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

86 See Daily Trust, *Ministry Wants Women in Peace-Keeping*, 1 October 2007.

87See Daily Trust, *Ministry Wants Women in Peace-Keeping*, 1 October 2007.

Chapter 2: Overview of The Nigeria Police Force and Un Peacekeeping

History of the Nigeria Police Force

The protracted military rule,⁸⁸ widespread insecurity, corruption, ethnic and religious conflicts, annulment of a presidential election in 1993 and the military dictatorship of General Abacha that followed have all impacted on the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) and its policing tasks.⁸⁹

According to a CLEEN Foundation Report:

With pressures from the despotic rulers to curb and crush opposition and curtail rising crimes coupled with institutional neglect (suffered by the police) which is manifested in lack of resources, embargo on recruitment and promotion for several years, victimization and nepotism, the Nigerian police embraced a culture of impunity. As a result, extra-judicial killing, detention without trial and corruption became widespread and were condoned by the successive governments. The inefficiency of the police regarding maintenance of law and order became glaring as cases of armed robbery involving the use of sophisticated weapon and high casualties as well as incidences of ethno-religious conflicts persisted.⁹⁰

In 1861, the British colonial government established the Lagos Consular Guard, the forerunner to the NPE.⁹¹ As with other regions of the world, the Nigerian constabulary was created explicitly as a punitive security measure and given wide reaching, and often, unaccountable powers.⁹² Since

88 According to Parry B. O. Osayande, "The military visited fundamental and severe collateral damage upon the Police. They deliberately under-funded the Nigeria Police to monopolize power. Secondly, they deliberately weakened and reduced the Police as an organization, only fit as a military Gestapo in furtherance of their political empire. Thirdly, a weak Police Force is in the interest of the military portraying them as the political messiahs of Nigeria." See Parry B. O. Osayande : "Factors inhibiting police performance in Nigeria" a paper presented at the occasion of the Retreat of the Police Service Commission with the theme: "understanding the mandate and Operations of the Police Service Commission in context of the rule of law", August 2008.

89 "In their bid to gain or maintain political power, the politicians employed the police to unleash violence on their opponents...Mass recruitment into local authority forces of thugs and party stalwarts against whom the police should give protection to the ordinary people. These people it was alleged carried out their paid duty of thuggery in local government police uniforms, under the full weight of government support." See CLEEN Foundation, *Police Violence*, available at <http://www.cleen.org/police-violence.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

90 See CLEEN Foundation Justice Sector Reform, *Analysis of Police and Policing in Nigeria*, available at <http://www.cleen.org/policing.%20driver%20of%20change.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

91 In 1930, the NPF was formally established when the two regional police forces (the Southern Nigeria Police Force and the Northern Nigeria Police Force) merged. See CSO Panel Final Report, September 2012, available at <http://www.noprin.org/CSO%20Panel%20Final%20Report.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also Human Rights Watch, *Rest in Pieces*, 27 July 2005, available at <http://www.hrw.org/node/11630/section/5>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

92 In the colonialism of countries, including Nigeria, scholars have noted that "violence and fraud were employed in the conquest of the nationalities and police forces under various names were established and employed as instrument of violence and oppression against the indigenous population...given the character of colonial rule, police forces were the instrument used to sustain the alien domination." See Tamuno, T.N. (1970) *The Police in Modern Nigeria: 1861-1965*. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press. See also CLEEN Foundation Justice Sector Reform, *Analysis of Police and Policing in Nigeria*, available at <http://www.cleen.org/policing.%20driver%20of%20change.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. "Police forces in colonial Nigeria employed violence in the maintenance of colonial exploitation and oppression: 'colonial police forces [in Nigeria] were organized and oriented to behave as occupation forces – ruthless, brutal, corrupt, dishonest and prone to brutalizing the colonized peoples and vandalising their properties...The history of police in Nigeria shows the various forces...were structured to regulate and regiment the indigenous people and facilitate their exploitation. The earlier police forces were organized as mercenary units and employed in several punitive expeditions to maim and kill 'belligerent natives' and to burn and loot obstructionist villages." See CLEEN Foundation, *Police Violence*, available at <http://www.cleen.org/police-violence.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

independence in 1960, there has been little reform of the laws governing the police.⁹³ The few attempts at reform have been unsuccessful resulting in high levels of human rights abuses⁹⁴ and increasing levels of corruption. According to a CLEEN Foundation report:

Many people thought that from being the enemies of the people the police would become friends of the people as well as the custodians of law and order in society. Regrettably, this has not turned out to be so. Almost four decades after independence, the police are yet to change its orientation to a people oriented police force... The police have continued to be accountable to the rules (as they did under colonial rule) who often are neither legitimate representatives of the citizens nor accountable to the people.⁹⁵

One contributor to the 2012 CSO report summed up the perspectives of the Nigerian people as follows:

The paradox of Nigeria Police Force can be located in the fact that the police is unable to protect citizens and no organ or authority of state has been able to protect the people from police excesses.⁹⁶

The NPF has developed a reputation for being inefficient, unprofessional and corrupt.⁹⁷ This negative perception of the NPF is “perhaps due more to the widespread incidence of corruption and extortion by a significant proportion of the members of the Nigeria Police Force.”⁹⁸ In response, both the Government of Nigeria and the NPF have attempted various police reform initiatives.⁹⁹ In fact,

93 Furthermore, the revision of the Police Act in 1967 only centralized the operational control of the police in the hands of the head of State, which has allowed the use of the police for partisan purposes, including electoral fraud and political violence. See Open Society Justice Initiative, *Criminal Force: Torture, Abuse, and Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigeria Police Force*, 19 May 2010, available at <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/criminal-force-20100519.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also CLEEN Foundation Justice Sector Reform, *Improving Police Community Relations*, available at <http://www.cleen.org/Improving%20Police-Community%20Relations.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

94 The NPF has been known to engage in brutality, unlawful arrests and detention, incivility to members of the public, and other violations, including but not limited to extra-judicial killings, summary executions of suspects, revenge killings, torture, and the arresting of family members of a suspect as substitutes or hostages. See CLEEN Foundation Justice Sector Reform, *Improving Police Community Relations*, available at <http://www.cleen.org/Improving%20Police-Community%20Relations.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

95 See CLEEN Foundation Justice Sector Reform, *Improving Police Community Relations*, available at <http://www.cleen.org/Improving%20Police-Community%20Relations.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

96 See CSO Panel Final Report, September 2012, available at <http://www.noprin.org/CSO%20Panel%20Final%20Report.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

97 See CLEEN Foundation Justice Sector Reform, *Improving Police Community Relations*, available at <http://www.cleen.org/Improving%20Police-Community%20Relations.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

98 The NPF has been accused of the following forms of corrupt behavior: 1) soliciting and receiving bribes from members of the public, especially crime suspects and victims; drivers, especially commercial vehicle operators at check-points, with the threat of arrest and prosecution; 2) frequent raid of places with a concentration of vulnerable groups such as unemployed youths, commercial sex workers, motor park officials – ostensibly as crime control measures but also as a means of extortion of bribes; 3) establishment of road blocks on highways, ostensibly to fight crime but in many situations as a means of extorting bribes from motorists; 4) receiving bribe to alter evidence; 5) receiving gratuities for returning stolen property recovered by Police; 6) stealing from suspects or accident victims; 7) receiving bribes in order not to effect arrest of crime suspects; 8) receiving bribes in order to arrest an innocent citizen as a form of intimidation and harassment; 9) supply of police arms and uniform to armed robber for a fee; 10) divulging information about complainants to criminals for a fee; 11) stealing from crime scene; 12) receiving bribes and failing to enforce the law against motorists who contravene the law or failing to search vehicles that may be carrying prohibited items; and 13) demanding money from suspects as a condition for granting bail, which is supposed to be free. See CLEEN Foundation Justice Sector Reform, *Improving Police Community Relations*, available at <http://www.cleen.org/Improving%20Police-Community%20Relations.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

99 See CLEEN Foundation Justice Sector Reform, *Improving Police Community Relations*, available at <http://www.cleen.org/Improving%20Police-Community%20Relations.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

between the years of 1999 and 2008, there were no less than nine such reform efforts by both the Government of Nigeria and the NPF.¹⁰⁰ Despite these attempts, reputation of the NPF has remained virtually unchanged, leading observers to refer to it as “Motions Without Movement”.¹⁰¹

History of the Nigerian Police’s Involvement in United Nation’s Peacekeeping

The first NPF officers were deployed to the UN peacekeeping mission to the Congo in 1960.¹⁰² Since then, the NPF has consistently sent police officers to various countries throughout the world on peacekeeping missions. In 2004 the NPF deployed its first Formed Police Unit (FPU) to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and “became the first country from Africa to deploy FPU on a United Nations peacekeeping mission.”¹⁰³

Despite its long history and considerable involvement with peacekeeping, it was only in 2005 that the NPF established a Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Training Centre at Police Headquarters to assist with the organization, coordination, training and deployment of peacekeepers.¹⁰⁴ Its mission is “[t]o equip personnel with requisite skills and competencies required to meet complex peace support operations environment through the delivery of quality internationally recognized and professional training.”¹⁰⁵

Nigerian Police’s Selection and Recruitment Policy

Recruitment into the NPF is conducted for three ranks: constable, cadet inspectors and cadet assistant superintendent of police. For each of these positions, the NPF sets forth specific qualifications for the position, including education, age, and height requirements.¹⁰⁶

100 For discussions of these efforts see Isima, J and KemiOkenyodo (2009): *Another Routine or Fundamental Change? Police Reform in Nigeria, 1999 till date*, CLEEN Foundation, Lagos.

101 See CLEEN Foundation Justice Sector Reform, *Improving Police Community Relations*, available at <http://www.cleen.org/Improving%20Police-Community%20Relations.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

102 See Nigeria Police Force, *Peacekeeping office*, available at <http://www.npf.gov.ng/information/peace-keeping-operations/>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

103 See Appendix 3 for a complete listing of the NPF’s involvement in peacekeeping operations. See also Harry Ford, *Evaluating the Operational Effectiveness of West African Female Police Officers’ Participation in Peace Support Operations: The Case of Ghana and Nigeria*, KAIPTC Occasional Paper No. 23, September 2008, available at http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5313~v~Evaluating_the_Operational_Effectiveness_of_West_African_Female_Police_Officers_Participation_in_Peace_Support_Operations_The_Case_of_Ghana_and_Ni.pdf, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

104 See Harry Ford, *Evaluating the Operational Effectiveness of West African Female Police Officers’ Participation in Peace Support Operations: The Case of Ghana and Nigeria*, KAIPTC Occasional Paper No. 23, September 2008, available at http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5313~v~Evaluating_the_Operational_Effectiveness_of_West_African_Female_Police_Officers_Participation_in_Peace_Support_Operations_The_Case_of_Ghana_and_Ni.pdf, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

105 Its achievements are said to include: 1) Recruitment/selection of police officers and men fit for UN/AU/ECOWAS peace support operations; 2) Training of officers to be deployed as United Nations Police officers (UNPOLs) comprising of Formed Police Units (FPUs) and Individual Police Officers (IPOs); 3) Deployment/Rotation of Police officers to various mission areas across the globe; 4) Serve as liaison between United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO)/African Union Peace Support Operations Department (AUPSOD)/ ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) and the Nigeria Police; 5) Give appropriate advice to the Inspector-General of Police on matters related to UN/AU/ECOWAS Peace support operations; 6) Monitoring of activities of Nigeria Police officers in Mission areas through daily situation reports from contingents; and 7) Liaise with Nigerian immigration, UNDP office and DHL on travel issues and air freighting of contingents belongings. Nigeria Police Force, *Peacekeeping Office*, available at <http://npf.gov.ng/information/peace-keeping-operations/>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

106 For example, for the rank of cadet an application must: Present two verifiable references from any of the following: community leaders/local government chairpersons/heads of educational institutions attended/present or past employers; Be between 18 and 25 years of age at the time of recruitment; Have an ‘O Level’ certificate or its equivalent with at least five papers passed at credit level including English Language in not more than two sittings; and Be certified mentally and physically fit by a Police Medical Doctor/Government medical practitioner; and Must not have any previous criminal record. For the rank of cadet inspectors the minimum requires are: Be a citizen of Nigeria; Be between 18 and 28 years of

In all cases, candidates will undergo a series of screening and interviews from the local area recruitment committee to national level before an offer is made. Promotion from the lower to higher ranks is earned due to a combination of service, course attendance, additional academic qualifications and job performance, among other things.¹⁰⁷The Police Service Commission, which has responsibility for the recruitment into the police, has published Guidelines for Recruitment into the Nigerian Police, which prescribe the minimum requirement for each of the position in the police.¹⁰⁸The Guidelines are an attempt at consistency and due process in the recruitment of police, but in practice, these principles have been largely ignored.

There are 13 Police Trainings Schools, four police colleges, and one police academy, in addition to a variety of other specialized training facilities.¹⁰⁹Typically new recruits go through six to twelve months of training.¹¹⁰ The training consists of theoretical and practical training in areas such as weapons, driving, policing skills and report writing.¹¹¹ It has been documented that NPF officers are often “poorly trained, ill-equipped and poorly remunerated.”¹¹²

age at the time appointment; Have a minimum educational requirement of Ordinary National Diploma (OND), National Certificate of Education (NCE) or their equivalent; Candidates must show capacity and willingness for further academic and professional training; Be certified mentally and physically fit by Police Medical Doctor/Government medical practitioner; Must not have any previous criminal record; and Present two verifiable references from any of the following: community leaders/local government chairpersons/heads of educational institutions attended/present or past employers. For the rank of cadet assistant superintendents of police, the academic qualification is either a first degree or Higher National Diploma (HND). See CLEEN Organization, *Police Service Commission, Guidelines: For Appointment in the Nigeria Police Force, Police Service Commission*, 2006, available at <http://www.cleen.org/guidelines%20for%20appointment.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

107 See CLEEN Organization, *Police Service Commission, Guidelines: For Appointment in the Nigeria Police Force, Police Service Commission*, 2006, available at <http://www.cleen.org/guidelines%20for%20appointment.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

108 Among the key principles in the Guidelines are: Advertisement of all recruitments into the Nigeria Police in the national and regional print and electronic media; No job applicant will be treated less favorably than another on the grounds of sex, marital status, race, colour, ethnic origin, religion, politics, age, social position, or is disadvantaged by conditions or requirements which cannot be shown to be justified; In the search for the best applicants the police shall endeavour to reach all sections of a community. This includes people from minority ethnic communities and women, all of whom will be given the opportunity to compete equally based on their abilities; Ensuring that complaints in respect of the procedure are heard and acted upon, and to ensure that people who feel aggrieved have enough confidence in the system to make a complaint; and The Police Service Commission shall be the sole issuing authority of recruitment forms and other recruitment materials. It shall also supervise the issue of service numerals (police numbers) for all serving police personnel in Nigeria. In the implementation of these guidelines Merit shall be 85% and shall be based on Federal Character Principles as established by the Federal Character Commission; Special quota for women shall be 10 percent. Discretion shall constitute 5 percent. See CLEEN Organization, *Police Service Commission, Guidelines: For Appointment in the Nigeria Police Force, Police Service Commission*, 2006, available at <http://www.cleen.org/guidelines%20for%20appointment.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

109 For a detailed description of each training facility see Nigeria Police Force, *Department of Training*, available at <http://www.npf.gov.ng/departments/c-department/>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

110 Constables go through six to nine months of training at either Police Training Centres, located in many state capitals or at the police colleges located in Ikeja-Lagos, Kaduna, Enugu and Maiduguri. Cadet Inspectors go through 12 months of training at the police colleges located in Ikeja-Lagos, Kaduna, Enugu and Maiduguri. Cadet assistant superintendents attended training for 12 months as the Police Academy in Wudil Kano. See CLEEN Foundation, *Police Violence*, available at <http://www.w.cleen.org/police-violence.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

111 See Nigeria Police Force, *Peacekeeping office*, available at <http://www.npf.gov.ng/information/peace-keeping-operations/>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

After the completion of Police College, officers have the opportunity to continue their education by applying for another position, and if selected, they would then undergo additional training to prepare them for operations such as counter-insurgency and riots. See Harry Ford, *Evaluating the Operational Effectiveness of West African Female Police Officers' Participation in Peace Support Operations: The Case of Ghana and Nigeria*, KAIPTC Occasional Paper No. 23, September 2008, available at http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5313~v~Evaluating_the_Operational_Effectiveness_of_West_African_Female_Police_Officers_Participation_in_Peace_Support_Operations__The_Case_of_Ghana_and_Ni.pdf, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

112 For example in 2005, the average, take home salary for a constable was approximately US \$61 per month. As discussed throughout this report, corruption is rampant in Nigeria, and in the NPF the low salary, in addition to the poor conditions,

In addition to recruitment, persons may enlist in the NPF through the Police Academy for the positions of cadet inspectors and cadet assistant superintendent of police.¹¹³ For each of these positions, the NPF sets forth specific entry requirements for the Academy, including education, age, and height requirements.¹¹⁴ The training for the positions of cadet inspectors and cadet assistant superintendent of police last for 18 months.¹¹⁵

Neither the training at the Police Academy in Kano nor the Police Trainings Schools provide new recruits with human rights training. However the NPF has received some human rights training through the National Human Rights Commission and other civil society organizations. Additionally the NPF has created the position of human rights desk police officers, who receive training on fundamental human rights laws on approximately three topics such as indiscriminate arrest, use of force, brutality, corruption and extortion.¹¹⁶ However a statement by NOPRIN “claimed the human rights desks had ‘at best been docile while human rights violations in the force continue unchecked.’”¹¹⁷ Their functionality differs from one Divisional Police Office to another.¹¹⁸

As previously discussed above concerning the military, despite having formal recruitment guidelines, the opportunity for corruption and patronage exists in the NPF as well.¹¹⁹ As noted in the 2012 CSO report concerning the NPF:

contribute in part to this. However, the systematic corruption and greed also play a part as evidenced by cases such as the former Inspector General of Police who in January 2005 resigned and was accused of stealing US \$98 million of public funds. See Human Rights Watch, *Rest in Pieces*, 27 July 2005, available at http://www.hrw.org/node/11630/section/5#_ftnref12, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

- 113 See Nigeria Police Force, *Police Academy Kano*, available at <http://www.npf.gov.ng/formation-list/police-academy/>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.
- 114 The basic qualifications required are as follows: a university degree (second class lower) or HND (upper credit) from a recognized University or Polytechnic for cadet ASPs and a school leaving certificate (WAEC or NECO) with at least five credits including English language and mathematics for the cadet inspectors; the applicant must not be above 28 years of age for cadet ASPs and 24 years for cadet inspectors; applicant must be physically fit; must not be less than 1.56 meters (5 ft 4 inches) for female; expanded chest measurement of 40 cm (36 inches) for men; the applicant must not be an ex-convict; must be a Nigerian; he or she must be medically fit. See Nigeria Police Force, *Police Academy Kano*, available at <http://www.npf.gov.ng/formation-list/police-academy/>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.
- 115 The training is segmented into three stages: basic training for six months, intermediate training for six months and advanced training for six months. Basic training includes: documentation/screening, attestation and oath taking; drill courses; police duties; laws, criminal of evidence and criminal procedure; four weeks first aid lay lectures; and one month attachment. Intermediate training includes drill courses; police duties; laws, criminal law of evidence and criminal procedure; four weeks first aid lay lecture courses; four weeks detective courses; and four weeks citizenship and leadership training course. Advance training includes: drill courses; police duties; laws, criminal of evidence and criminal procedure; four weeks police mobile force training; one week police educational visit; four weeks interview; and four weeks passing out parade practice. Police Force, *Police Academy Kano*, available at <http://www.npf.gov.ng/formation-list/police-academy/>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.
- 116 See All Africa, *Nigeria: Human Rights Abuse – Lawyer Urges Police to Study the Constitution*, 26 September 2013, available at <http://allafrica.com/stories/201309270125.html>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also National Human Rights Commission, *Training of Police Officers on Human Rights Standards and Practice*, 9 December 2013, available at <http://www.nigeriarights.gov.ng/blog/2013/12/nhrc-training-of-police-officers-on-human-rights-standards-and-practice>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.
- 117 See United States Department of State, *2012 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Nigeria*, 19 April 2013, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/517e6df818.html>, last accessed 14 February 2014.
- 118 Information provided by participants at report validation meeting, Lagos, 13 February 2014.
- 119 In 2008, the NPF “grossly compromised [their] standards, [which] resulted in widespread abuse of established procedure,” and left them with “a very large number of unqualified, under-trained and ill-equipped officers – in sum an undesirable workforce.” See Open Society Justice Initiative, *Criminal Force: Torture, Abuse, and Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigeria Police Force*, 19 May 2010, available at <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/criminal-force-20100519.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

Appointments into the Nigeria Police Force are determined largely by seniority and representation, and influenced by nepotism, political patronage and regime interests and preferences. As a result, organizational management and leadership development have been lacking, leading to organizational ineffectiveness.¹²⁰

A prime example of the ability for corruption and patronage to influence promotions is Section 215(1) of the Constitution, which allows for the Inspector General of Police¹²¹ to “be appointed by the President on the advice of the Police Council from amongst serving members of the Nigeria Police Force.” As discussed in the 2012 CSO report concerning the NPF:

The Constitutional provision does not provide for competence and other requirements for the appointment of an IGP...except that they should be appointed from the serving officers. Significantly, it did not even provide that the officer must be of any particular rank. For the sake of argument, it will be constitutional to appoint a constable as an Inspector General of Police.¹²²

While the size of the police force has continued to expand,¹²³ the professionalism and effectiveness of the NPF have declined over the years, resulting in poor policing in the country. Some of this decline in the quality of policing can be attributed to this massive growth.¹²⁴ Similarly it is argued that “one, this heavy intake of fresh recruits greatly over-burdened already strained training facilities, and two, the educational capacity and ethics of these recruits were of extremely doubtful integrity”.¹²⁵ As

120 See E.E.O. Alemika (2001), “Leadership Qualification and Appointment Procedure in the Nigeria Police Force: A Critical Analysis,” Paper presented at the 5th Policing Executive Forum, organized by the CLEEN Foundation in Abuja, as cited by See CSO Panel Final Report, September 2012, available at <http://www.noprin.org/CSO%20Panel%20Final%20Report.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

121 The Inspector General of Police (IGP) is in charge of the entire NPF, which includes 37 Commands and the Force Headquarters. The IGP’s office is located at the Force Headquarters. The IGP is assisted by a Deputy Inspector General and six Assistant Inspectors-General of Police, who are in charge of the departments at the Force Headquarters (which include Administration and Finance, Operations, Works and Logistics, General Investigation and Intelligence, Training, and Research and Planning). See CLEEN Foundation, *Police Violence*, available at <http://www.cleen.org/police-violence.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

122 Additionally Section 215(3) states: “The President or such other Minister of the Government of the Federation as he may authorize in that behalf may give to the Inspector General of Police such lawful directions with respect to the maintenance and securing of public safety and public order as he may consider necessary, and the Inspector General of Police shall comply with those directions or cause them to be complied with.” The Police Act further codifies this by stating, “The President shall be charged with operational control of the force,” and that “the Inspector General shall be charged with the command of the force subject to the directive of the President.” Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, section 215(3) and Police Act, 1990, Section 9(4) and (5), as cited by Human Rights Watch, *Rest in Pieces*, 27 July 2005, available at http://www.hrw.org/node/11630/section/5#_ftnref12, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also E.E.O. Alemika (2001), “Leadership Qualification and Appointment Procedure in the Nigeria Police Force: A Critical Analysis,” Paper presented at the 5th Policing Executive Forum, organized by the CLEEN Foundation in Abuja, as cited by See CSO Panel Final Report, September 2012, available at <http://www.noprin.org/CSO%20Panel%20Final%20Report.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

123 Since independence the NPF grew and saw massive recruitment during the civil war. When General Gowon was overthrown in a bloodless coup in 1975, General Murtala Mohammed took over and implemented anti-corruption purges in the civil service and the police. During these anti-corruption purges, there was a mass retirement in 1975. During the year leading up to the hand-over to civilian rule in 1979, General Obasanjo’s government ordered the NPF to double in strength from 40,000 to 80,000 in order to provide security for the polling stations. A similar massive recruitment occurred in 2000 and 2004 when more than 200,000 NPF were recruited.

124 For example, Parry B. O. Osayande, a former high-ranking police officer and former Chairman of the Police Service Commission, reported that training for the mass recruitment of 1976 was reduced to a period of merely three months. See Parry B. O. Osayande: “Creating Awareness on the Concept and Principles of Civilian Oversight of Police” in Alemika, E. E. O. and I. C. Chukwuma, eds, (2003): *Civilian Oversight and Accountability of Police in Nigeria*, CLEEN, Lagos

125 See also Civil Society Panel on Police Reform in Nigeria Final Report, September 2012, available at <http://www.noprin.org/CSO%20Panel%20Final%20Report.pdf>, last accessed 14 February 2014.

discussed above, the years of subordination to military rule not only facilitated the erosion of professionalism and the neglect of core duties of the NPF (as they were made part of the military ruling councils, and given executive positions at both state and federal level), but also contributed to this decline in quality of policing.¹²⁶

In response to this issue, the Police Service Commission has attempted to screen all recruitments at the junior level in an effort to weed out any officers who are unfit for duty. At the end of one screening in 2007, several officers were found to be medically unfit, over the required age or to have questionable or forged certificates, and were dismissed.¹²⁷

United Nation's Police Officers and Peacekeeper Selection Policy

Although there has been little research or documentation of the corruption, bribery and patronage concerning peacekeeping selection procedures in Nigeria, it would appear highly unlikely that the practices discussed above concerning recruitment into the NPF would not influence the selection processes for peacekeeping duties, especially in light of the significant financial rewards of peacekeeping duties.

The UN has two categories of police recruited for peacekeeping operations. These are the Formed Police Unit (FPU) and individual police officers (IPO).

Formed Police Units

A Formed Police Unit (FPU) is a team of police officers deployed as a “cohesive mobile unit,” who protect UN staff and property/facilities, ensure public order and support police operations that involve a higher risk.¹²⁸ They are deployed on UN missions under a Memorandum of Understanding between the UN and the Police Contributing Country, and the typical deployment ranges from six months to one year.¹²⁹

All FPUs to be deployed to a UN peacekeeping operation must be assessed by Special Police Assessment Teams (SPATs)¹³⁰ on operational capacity and readiness, the professional background of

126 See CLEEN Foundation Justice Sector Reform, *Analysis of Police and Policing in Nigeria*, available at <http://www.cleen.org/policing.%20driver%20of%20change.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

127 Sir Mike M. Okiro, IGP (Rtd), CFR, NPM, mni, Chairman, Police Service Commission, *Public Announcement re Rationalized Policemen*, 18 July 2013, available at <http://www.nairaland.com/1047573/invitation-written-exams-police-ict/108#17023893>, last accessed on 21 March 2014.

128 See U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, Department of Field Support, Ref. 2009. 32, 1 March 2013, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/policy/documents/formed_police_unit_policy_032010.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

129 Their deployment can be extended up to 24 months. See U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, Department of Field Support, Ref. 2009. 32, 1 March 2013, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/policy/documents/formed_police_unit_policy_032010.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

130 The Special Police Assessment Teams (SPAT) evaluate FPU personnel. The SPAT assessment, which is a compulsory step prior to deployment, comprises language, firearms, crowd control and other special police function assessments. It also focuses on the verification of the professional background of FPU personnel and specific pre-deployment preparations, including training, received by the unit. According to the UN guidelines, the following is subject to SPAT review: 1) All commissioned ranks (command staff, including deputies) must have a minimum of five years of police service in their home countries prior to deployment. Non-commissioned ranks must have a minimum of two years of police service in their home countries prior to deployment; 2) Personnel must be between the ages of 25-62 years (preference given to those under 55 years); 3) Personnel must demonstrate a clear understanding and practical application of the graduated use of force principles; 4) Personnel will be tested on their public order management capacity in accordance with the current testing regime; 5) All drivers within the FPU will be tested on their driving skills; 6) All personnel will be tested and assessed on their individual weapons handling skills; and 7) Personnel will be tested on their language skills. See UN Police Magazine, July 2012 9th Edition, DPKO, available at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/unpolmag/

the unit and specific training received. The examination involves “reading comprehension, listening comprehension (audio tape) and report writing. It also includes driving test and knowledge of computer.”¹³¹ The names of candidates who pass the exam are forwarded to UN Headquarters in New York. After filling the necessary form (P11) at the Nigerian Police Peacekeeping Coordination Office, the office sends the form to the UN. Following this, they are interviewed over the phone. Those who pass then undergo the pre-deployment training. It is important to note that the pre-deployment training provided by Nigeria does not include modules on human rights and gender issues.

The composition and organization of FPUs vary depending on the mission-specific requirements.¹³² However, each FPU has at minimum 120 police officers, and typically has operational, logistic and command strength of 140 personnel.¹³³

Individual Police Officers

The majority of individual police officers (IPOs) are seconded or loaned to the DPKO for a term of six months to a year.¹³⁴ Another, more limited way is for the UNPOL Division to seek candidates for professional posts via the UN Careers portal, where police officers can apply directly.¹³⁵

IPOs are deployed to meet the specific nature of the mandates of the UN only after they pass the UN Selection Assistance and Assessment Team (UN SAAT).¹³⁶ All IPOs must also meet minimum requirements relating to age, medical fitness, professional experience, professional integrity, language skills, mission-specific skills, computer skills, driving skills, firearms handling and shooting skills (for armed missions).¹³⁷ Medical fitness is certified before the deployment phase.¹³⁸

unpolmag_09.pdf, last accessed on 22 May 2013. See also UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, Department of Field Support, Ref. 2009. 32, 1 March 2013, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/documents/formed_police_unit_policy_032010.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013. See also U.N. Police Division Minimum Recruitment Requirements, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/requirements.shtml>, last accessed on 4 October 2013. Public order managements “includes preventive activities, such as high-visibility patrolling and popular confidence-building, as well as crowd and riot control. In accordance with mandated tasks, this may include protection of public and private property”. See UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, Department of Field Support, Ref. 2009. 32, 1 March 2013, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/documents/formed_police_unit_policy_032010.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

131 Email interview with a serving peacekeeper currently in Sudan, June 2012

132 See UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, Department of Field Support, Ref. 2009. 32, 1 March 2013, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/documents/formed_police_unit_policy_032010.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

133 See UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, Department of Field Support, Ref. 2009. 32, 1 March 2013, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/documents/formed_police_unit_policy_032010.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

134 Member States have been asked to extend the term from six months to a year at minimum in order for more stability within the deployed units. See U.N. Police Magazine, July 2012 9th Edition, DPKO, available at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/unpolmag/unpolmag_09.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

135 See UNPOL Recruitment, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/recruitment.shtml>, last accessed on 21 May 2013.

136 The UN SAAT is the name of the U.N. team that conducts the assessments in Member States. The UN SAAT uses the Standard Operating Procedure called the Assessment of IPO for Service in UN Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions (AMS). See U.N. Police Magazine, July 2012 9th Edition, DPKO, available at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/unpolmag/unpolmag_09.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013. See also U.N. Police, *U.N. Police Division Minimum Recruitment Requirements*, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/requirements.shtml>, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

137 See U.N. Police Magazine, July 2012 9th Edition, DPKO, available at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/unpolmag/unpolmag_09.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

138 Assessment of Individual Police Officers for Service in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions. Standard Operating Procedure. available at: http://www.apf.gov.np/downloads/un/SAAT_SOP_2012.pdf, last accessed on 11 May 2013.

Professional and higher level police posts for UN missions and UN Headquarters are also filled through the UN global vacancies system from police/troop contributing countries. The recruitment of these officers is done through semi-annual recruitment campaigns. Member States are approached to nominate qualified and skilled police officers who meet the requirements outlined in the circulated job openings. Today there are 81 contributing countries and a limited number of posts making the process highly competitive.¹³⁹

To apply for a UN position through its GlobalVacancy system, candidates should have completed at least one UN mission duty and should not face any departmental action over the preceding year. The selection of IPOs for the UNPOL is carried out on the basis of examinations conducted as per the UN SAAT Guidelines.¹⁴⁰ **The typical length of deployment for an IPO is one year; however the selection policy allows for a 45-day technical extension by the UN and a six-month to a year extension for officers in seniors posts.**

Selection Criteria for Peacekeepers

Although there are no published guidelines or standards setting out the selection policies for NPF officers according to reports and interviews, the NPF requires that NPF officers have a minimum of five years of police service to participate in either UN or AU operations.¹⁴¹ Additionally, officers must pass UN CIVPOL¹⁴² testing standards, which the NPF has incorporated as a part of a “pre-selection process prior to the SAAT evaluations.”¹⁴³ The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Training

139 See U.N. Peacekeeping, *Monthly Summary of Contributions*, 31 August 2013, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2013/aug13_1.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013. See also U.N. Department of Peacekeeping, U.N. Mission's Summary detailed by Country, available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2013/aug13_3.pdf, last accessed 4 October 2013.

140 All individual police officers from Mission Services must meet minimum requirements relating to age, medical fitness, professional experience, professional integrity, language skills, mission-specific skills, computer skills, driving skills, and firearms handling and shooting skills (for armed missions) to be selected for service into peace keeping operations. Whether a candidate meets the necessary requirements is determined through an Assessment for Mission Service (AMS) – either on the basis of Selection Assistance and Assessment Team (SAAT) deployed to a MS or on the basis of an in-mission AMS. Upon the request of a MS, a SAAT is deployed by the Selection and Recruitment Section (SRS) of the Police Division of DPKO to conduct an AMS of the candidates in the member states. The language, driving, firearms, computer and professional experience requirements are assessed by the SAAT. The MS provides additional documentary evidence on the age, professional experience and professional integrity requirements. The medical fitness is certified before the deployment phase. See U.N. Police Magazine, July 2012 9th Edition, DPKO, available at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/unpolmag/unpolmag_09.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013. See also U.N. Police, *U.N. Police Division Minimum Recruitment Requirements*, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/requirements.shtml>, last accessed on 4 October 2013.

141 See also Harry Ford, *Evaluating the Operational Effectiveness of West African Female Police Officers' Participation in Peace Support Operations: The Case of Ghana and Nigeria*, KAIPTC Occasional Paper No. 23, September 2008, available at http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5313~v~Evaluating_the_Operational_Effectiveness_of_West_African_Female_Police_Officers_Participation_in_Peace_Support_Operations_The_Case_of_Ghana_and_Ni.pdf, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

142 CIVPOL is an acronym for Civilian Police. See United Nations Civilian Police Handbook, available at http://www.saint-claire.org/resources/civpol_hand_en.pdf, last accessed 14 February 2014.

143 The UN SAAT is the name of the U.N. team that conducts the assessments in Member States. The UN SAAT uses the Standard Operating Procedure called the Assessment of IPO for Service in UN Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions (AMS). See U.N. Police Magazine, July 2012 9th Edition, DPKO, available at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/unpolmag/unpolmag_09.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013. See also U.N. Police, *U.N. Police Division Minimum Recruitment Requirements*, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/requirements.shtml>, last accessed on 4 October 2013. See also Harry Ford, *Evaluating the Operational Effectiveness of West African Female Police Officers' Participation in Peace Support Operations: The Case of Ghana and Nigeria*, KAIPTC Occasional Paper No. 23, September 2008, available at http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5313~v~Evaluating_the_Operational_Effectiveness_of_West_African_Female_Police_Officers_Participation_in_Peace_Support_Operations_The_Case_of_Ghana_and_Ni.pdf, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

conducts screening interviews and Pre-SAAT evaluations officers.¹⁴⁴ Individual officers receive a formal request to return to Police Headquarters for their pre-SAAT evaluations.¹⁴⁵ Individuals who pass the Pre-SAAT examination are invited back to Police Headquarters for the SAAT examinations.¹⁴⁶ Lastly, officers are not permitted to participate in peacekeeping operations if there is any pending disciplinary inquiry against them.¹⁴⁷

Pre-deployment Training for Police

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Training conducts all pre-deployment training.¹⁴⁸ Successful applicants typically attend, at minimum, a weeklong pre-deployment training, which includes courses that are specifically designed for each peacekeeping mission.¹⁴⁹ These courses are

- 144 Screening interviews are conducted to pre-screen any applicant to determine whether he or she meets the baseline criteria for deployment. After the interview, candidates are assigned to training groups A-Z depending on the results of their interviews. “For example if an officer is assigned to group A, he or she is immediately prepared and evaluated for a peacekeeping operation, whereas individuals placed in group M will have to wait a certain period of time before their group is selected for pre-SAAT evaluations and eventual deployment.” This is apparently done to allow for quicker recruitment and deployment of officers to peacekeeping missions. See Harry Ford, *Evaluating the Operational Effectiveness of West African Female Police Officers’ Participation in Peace Support Operations: The Case of Ghana and Nigeria*, KAIPTC Occasional Paper No. 23, September 2008, available at http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5313~v~Evaluating_the_Operational_Effectiveness_of_West_African_Female_Police_Officers_Participation_in_Peace_Support_Operations_The_Case_of_Ghana_and_Ni.pdf, last accessed on 14 February 2014. The UN Pre-SAAT stands for the Preliminary Selection Assistance and Assessment Team. The Pre-SAAT exam assists in determining an applicant’s professional experience, integrity, language skills, mission-specific skills, computer skills, driving skills and firearms handling and shooting skills (for armed missions) to be selected for service into peacekeeping operations. See U.N. Police Magazine, July 2012 9th Edition, DPKO, available at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/unpolmag/unpolmag_09.pdf, last accessed on 4 October 2013. See also U.N. Police, *U.N. Police Division Minimum Recruitment Requirements*, available at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/requirements.shtml>, last accessed on 4 October 2013.
- 145 “The examination consists of an oral interview, report writing test, an audio listening test, a driving test and a shooting test (if required). Candidates must receive a minimum of 70 percent on each test before proceeding to the driving and weaponry evaluations.” See Harry Ford, *Evaluating the Operational Effectiveness of West African Female Police Officers’ Participation in Peace Support Operations: The Case of Ghana and Nigeria*, KAIPTC Occasional Paper No. 23, September 2008, available at http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5313~v~Evaluating_the_Operational_Effectiveness_of_West_African_Female_Police_Officers_Participation_in_Peace_Support_Operations_The_Case_of_Ghana_and_Ni.pdf, last accessed on 14 February 2014.
- 146 The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Training forwards the P-11 forms and examination results of successful candidates to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations for the selection of personnel for the specific missions and final approval. See Harry Ford, *Evaluating the Operational Effectiveness of West African Female Police Officers’ Participation in Peace Support Operations: The Case of Ghana and Nigeria*, KAIPTC Occasional Paper No. 23, September 2008, available at http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5313~v~Evaluating_the_Operational_Effectiveness_of_West_African_Female_Police_Officers_Participation_in_Peace_Support_Operations_The_Case_of_Ghana_and_Ni.pdf, last accessed on 14 February 2014.
- 147 See Harry Ford, *Evaluating the Operational Effectiveness of West African Female Police Officers’ Participation in Peace Support Operations: The Case of Ghana and Nigeria*, KAIPTC Occasional Paper No. 23, September 2008, available at http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5313~v~Evaluating_the_Operational_Effectiveness_of_West_African_Female_Police_Officers_Participation_in_Peace_Support_Operations_The_Case_of_Ghana_and_Ni.pdf, last accessed on 14 February 2014.
- 148 “Activities of the Directorate of Peacekeeping. (2) Training of officers to be deployed as United Nations Police officers (UNPOLs) comprising of Formed Police Units (FPU) and Individuals Police Officers (IPOs)” See also Harry Ford, *Evaluating the Operational Effectiveness of West African Female Police Officers’ Participation in Peace Support Operations: The Case of Ghana and Nigeria*, KAIPTC Occasional Paper No. 23, September 2008, available at http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5313~v~Evaluating_the_Operational_Effectiveness_of_West_African_Female_Police_Officers_Participation_in_Peace_Support_Operations_The_Case_of_Ghana_and_Ni.pdf, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also Nigeria Police Force, *Peacekeeping office*, available at <http://www.npf.gov.ng/information/peace-keeping-operations/>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.
- 149 See also Harry Ford, *Evaluating the Operational Effectiveness of West African Female Police Officers’ Participation in Peace Support Operations: The Case of Ghana and Nigeria*, KAIPTC Occasional Paper No. 23, September 2008, available at http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5313~v~Evaluating_the_Operational_Effectiveness_of_West_African_Female_Police_Officers_Participation_in_Peace_Support_Operations_The_Case_of_Ghana_and_Ni.pdf, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

usually designed to enhance their skills and knowledge in the areas of basic computer skills, human rights, code of conduct for peacekeepers and kitting/dress code.¹⁵⁰

Unlike the NA, the NPF does not currently have its own peacekeeping training institute. Instead training for IPOs is held at the conference hall of the Peacekeeping Department, while training for FPU is held at one of the Mobile Police Training schools.¹⁵¹ Additional specialized training sometimes occurs at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana.

Recently the Police Command has announced that it is establishing its own peacekeeping training institute. On 12 June 2013, the IGP announced that the NPF will create its own peacekeeping institute.¹⁵² The institute will be based in Abuja and will train and prepare NPF officers for regional, continental and global peacekeeping operations.¹⁵³ It will also train NPF officers on issues including, but not limited to, conflict resolution, disaster management, humanitarian support operations and global best practices in policing.¹⁵⁴

In addition to the creation of its own peacekeeping training institute, the NPF needs to address the issue of the poor quality of trainers it uses in its current pre-deployment training for peacekeeping operations.¹⁵⁵ The 2006 Presidential Committee on the Reform of the Nigeria Police Force Report stated:

Officers and men now consider their postings to training Institutions as punishment. This is because the criteria that were used in selection of the right calibre of officers and men for posting to the training Institutions are no longer being applied. Rather, officers with pending disciplinary matters or those who fall out of favour are posted to training Institutions. Furthermore, incentives that were normally enjoyed by staff of training Institutions are no longer provided.¹⁵⁶

Since the postings of trainers are often seen as punishments, trainers are often apathetic about their positions, resulting in improper training of the officers. Furthermore, the facilities themselves are in generally poor condition.¹⁵⁷ In June 2013, the Minister of Police Affairs

150 See also Harry Ford, *Evaluating the Operational Effectiveness of West African Female Police Officers' Participation in Peace Support Operations: The Case of Ghana and Nigeria*, KAIPTC Occasional Paper No. 23, September 2008, available at http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5313~v~Evaluating_the_Operational_Effectiveness_of_West_African_Female_Police_Officers_Participation_in_Peace_Support_Operations_The_Case_of_Ghana_and_Ni.pdf, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

151 Interview with a former FPU member, Kano, July 2013.

152 See Nigeria Police Force, *Nigeria Police to Establish Peacekeeping Institute*, 12 June 2013, available at <http://www.npf.gov.ng/news/view-news?id=104#.Uxg4WaWAXt4>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

153 See Nigeria Police Force, *Nigeria Police to Establish Peacekeeping Institute*, 12 June 2013, available at <http://www.npf.gov.ng/news/view-news?id=104#.Uxg4WaWAXt4>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

154 See Nigeria Police Force, *Nigeria Police to Establish Peacekeeping Institute*, 12 June 2013, available at <http://www.npf.gov.ng/news/view-news?id=104#.Uxg4WaWAXt4>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

155 IPO trainers are personnel from the Peacekeeping office of the NPF. However FPU trainers are staff from the mobile police training schools. See Nigeria Police Force Headquarters, Directorate of Peacekeeping, available at <http://www.slideshare.net/intelligentcop/npf-peacekeeping-department>, last accessed on 21 March 2014.

156 See Report of Presidential Committees on Police Reform in Nigeria, *Motions Without Movement*, 2006, CLEEN, <http://www.cleen.org/Report%20of%20Presidential%20Committee%20on%20Police%20Reform.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also Civil Society Panel on Police Reform in Nigeria Final Report, September 2012, available at <http://www.noprin.org/CSO%20Panel%20Final%20Report.pdf>, last accessed 14 February 2014.

157 See Report of Presidential Committees on Police Reform in Nigeria, *Motions Without Movement*, 2006, CLEEN, <http://www.cleen.org/Report%20of%20Presidential%20Committee%20on%20Police%20Reform.pdf>, last accessed on 14

confirmed the current state of affairs using the Police Staff College in Jos as an example stating:

With the growth of the manpower strength of the Nigeria Police Force, the utilization of facilities at colleges (Jos) became overstretched. While the installed student capacity of college is 900 at full capacity, there are currently about 1,300 students on regular basis.¹⁵⁸

Accountability for Human Rights Violations and Selection of Peacekeepers

Nigeria Police Force and Human Rights Abuses

There is documented evidence that widespread and systematic abuse by police, including torture,¹⁵⁹ occurs regardless of the government in power.¹⁶⁰ A presidential commission on the NPF headed by former Inspector-General of Police Mohammed Dikko Yusuf concluded that “[policing in Nigeria was characterized by a pattern of] unlawful arrest and detention, extortion, torture, rape, extrajudicial killings and other forms of brutality. The negative image of the police in the eyes and minds of the public arose from the high levels of crimes in the force and its failure to carry out genuine police functions successfully.”¹⁶¹ The commission further stated, “instead of becoming a public asset therefore, the police have become a public burden.”

Although the Constitution of Nigeria guarantees the “right to life, human dignity (freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment, torture) personal liberty, and privacy,”¹⁶² previous military regimes have suspended these provisions, enacted retroactive legislations, in addition to frequent and overt abuses such as instances of NPF officers shooting “those who refuse to pay bribes of as twenty naira (US \$.015).”¹⁶³

February 2014. See also Civil Society Panel on Police Reform in Nigeria Final Report, September 2012, available at <http://www.noprin.org/CSO%20Panel%20Final%20Report.pdf>, last accessed 14 February 2014.

158 Minister Platform 2013 by Navy Capt (Rtd) Caleb Olubolade, Hon Minister of Police Affairs, 13 June 2013, Abuja.

159 “The most common types of abuses committed by the police in Nigeria...includes repeated and severe beatings with metal rods and wooden sticks or planks, as well as other implements...Other violations reported include the tying of arms and legs tight behind the body; suspension by hands and legs from the ceiling or a pole; resting concrete blocks on the arms and back while suspended; spraying of tear gas in the face and eyes; electric shocks; death threats, including holding a gun to the victim’s head; shooting in the foot or leg; stoning; burning with clothes irons or cigarettes; slapping and kicking with hands and boots; abusive language or threats; and denial of food and water. There were also numerous cases of the molestation and rape of female detainees; use of pliers or electric shocks on the penis; insertion of broom bristles into the penis; beating the penis with cable wire; and spraying of tear gas on genitals.” See Human Rights Watch, *Rest in Pieces*, 27 July 2005, available at <http://www.hrw.org/node/11630/section/7>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

160 “Based on 882 respondents drawn from suspects in custody across the country: [n]early half of the accused persons interviewed (48.7%) stated that their arrest involved insult or abuse by the police. Roughly half (51.1%) of the accused persons interviewed indicated that their arrest did not involve use of physical force by police, however, 35.9% were rough handled or slapped, 7.4% were beaten with a baton; and 3% were threatened with a gun. As to why force was used on them, 24.2% said they did nothing to warrant the use of force, 3% resisted arrest, while 1.6% returned verbal abuse, 5.2% were assaulted because they questioned police behaviour; and 22.5% were assaulted because they either refused to admit the offence or make a statement.” Police violence in the form of summary executions occurs frequently among Special Task Forces assigned to the patrol of highways and cities to curb armed robbery. Police torture in the form of physical assault frequently occurs at all levels of police work – crowd control, arrest, investigation, and detention.” See CLEEN Foundation, *Police Violence*, available at <http://www.w.cleen.org/police-violence.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

161 Former Inspector-General of Police, Ibrahim Coomasie accused the NPF of “barbaric treatment of Nigerians.” See CLEEN, *Civilian Oversight and Accountability of Police in Nigeria*, 2003, available at <http://www.w.cleen.org/POLICE%20ACCOUNTABILITY%20BOOK1.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

162 See Chapter 4 of the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions of the Federation of Nigeria.

163 See “Shot to death,” in The Educator, official newsletter of the Civil Liberties Organization, July-September 2004, and “Nigerian Police slay driver, triggering riot in south-west,” Associated Press, January 14, 2005, “Police Kill 9, Arrest 2,” This Day, October 21, 2004, “Nigerian police kill 3 over 15-cent bribe,” PANA, August 18, 2004, as cited by Human Rights

In 2005, a Human Rights Watch report confirmed the deaths of 23 men in police custody, although they received information concerning many other cases “suggesting a widespread pattern of deaths in custody across the country.”¹⁶⁴

A NPF officer who worked at the Kano Police Headquarters until 2003, who had routinely observed suspects being shot in the leg or beaten with wooden sticks and metal rods, stated that:

There are many cases at State Criminal Investigation Department (CID) at the police headquarters in Kano] where the police intentionally shoot people. They are shooting roughly one person per week.¹⁶⁵

Moreover the 2010 report by the Open Society Justice Initiative documented the following widespread abuses and issues concerning the NPF and its governing legislation:

- From January 2000 to March 2004, 7,198 persons were killed, meaning on average 4.6 people were killed per day, according to statistics provided to Human Rights Watch researchers in April 2004 by TafaBalogun, then Inspector-General of Police.¹⁶⁶
- According to acting Inspector-General of Police Mike Okiro, during his first 100 days of office, the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) killed 785 people. One week later the late President UmaruYar’Adua promoted him.¹⁶⁷
- In 2006 police reported killing 329 robbers and injuring none, suggesting a kill-to-punish policy. Records show that in the same year, 111 police were killed and 53 injured.¹⁶⁸
- While responding to violence in Borno State in northeastern Nigeria, the NPF killed hundreds of suspected Boko Haram members, including its leader in July 2009.¹⁶⁹

Watch, *Rest In Pieces*, 27 July 2005, available at http://www.hrw.org/node/11630/section/5#_ftnref13, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See CLEEN Foundation, *Police Violence*, available at <http://www.w.cleen.org/police-violence.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

164 Twelve of the men died while in custody at the Kano State Police Headquarters between 2003 and 2005; three died in Lagos in February 2005; and eight died between March 2002 and May 2005 in Enugu. The report also included an account of two detainees who were beaten to death while in custody November 2003. See Human Rights Watch, *Rest in Pieces*, 27 July 2005, available at <http://www.hrw.org/node/11630/section/6>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

165 See Human Rights Watch, *Rest in Pieces*, 27 July 2005, available at <http://www.hrw.org/node/11630/section/6>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

166 See Open Society Justice Initiative, *Criminal Force: Torture, Abuse, and Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigeria Police Force*, 19 May 2010, available at <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/criminal-force-20100519.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also IRIN Africa, *Nigeria: Police kill, rape torture and extort says rights group*, 21 May 2010, available at <http://www.irinnews.org/report/89220/nigeria-police-kill-rape-torture-and-extort-says-rights-group>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

167 See Open Society Justice Initiative, *Criminal Force: Torture, Abuse, and Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigeria Police Force*, 19 May 2010, available at <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/criminal-force-20100519.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also IRIN Africa, *Nigeria: Police kill, rape torture and extort says rights group*, 21 May 2010, available at <http://www.irinnews.org/report/89220/nigeria-police-kill-rape-torture-and-extort-says-rights-group>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

168 See Open Society Justice Initiative, *Criminal Force: Torture, Abuse, and Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigeria Police Force*, 19 May 2010, available at <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/criminal-force-20100519.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also IRIN Africa, *Nigeria: Police kill, rape torture and extort says rights group*, 21 May 2010, available at <http://www.irinnews.org/report/89220/nigeria-police-kill-rape-torture-and-extort-says-rights-group>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

169 See Open Society Justice Initiative, *Criminal Force: Torture, Abuse, and Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigeria Police Force*, 19 May 2010, available at <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/criminal-force-20100519.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also IRIN Africa, *Nigeria: Police kill, rape torture and extort says rights group*, 21 May 2010, available at <http://www.irinnews.org/report/89220/nigeria-police-kill-rape-torture-and-extort-says-rights-group>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

- The Nigeria Legal Defence and Assistance Project found 2,987 extrajudicial executions by police in 2004, but no force member was convicted.¹⁷⁰
- The UN Special Rapporteur said that [the vague language in Police Force Order 237 concerning extrajudicial killings by police] “practically provide police carte blanche to shoot and kill at will.”¹⁷¹
- Every major police station has an “Officer in charge of Torture”, according to a researcher at the Network of Police Reform in Nigeria (NOPRIN), a civil society organization.¹⁷²
- Victims reported the following slang terms being used for torture: “V.I.P. treatment” - shooting a detainee in both legs; “J5” - prolonged sleep deprivation in a standing position; “suicide” - being suspended upside down by a rope tied around the ankles and being kicked, or beaten with machetes, gun butts or electrical wires.¹⁷³
- Other forms of torture include beating; forced stress positions; tear gas applied to eyes or genitals; clubbing the soles of the feet; burning with cigarettes, hot irons or a flame; sexual torture by rape or violation; psychological manipulation; sleep deprivation; water or food deprivation.¹⁷⁴
- The crime of torture has not been codified in Nigerian domestic law.¹⁷⁵
- Male officers in the Lagos Police Command often demand sex from female detainees as the price of bail - one NPF member said sex with sex workers was “one of the fringe benefits attached to night patrol”.¹⁷⁶

170 See Open Society Justice Initiative, *Criminal Force: Torture, Abuse, and Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigeria Police Force*, 19 May 2010, available at <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/criminal-force-20100519.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also IRIN Africa, *Nigeria: Police kill, rape torture and extort says rights group*, 21 May 2010, available at <http://www.irinnews.org/report/89220/nigeria-police-kill-rape-torture-and-extort-says-rights-group>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

171 See Open Society Justice Initiative, *Criminal Force: Torture, Abuse, and Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigeria Police Force*, 19 May 2010, available at <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/criminal-force-20100519.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also IRIN Africa, *Nigeria: Police kill, rape torture and extort says rights group*, 21 May 2010, available at <http://www.irinnews.org/report/89220/nigeria-police-kill-rape-torture-and-extort-says-rights-group>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

172 See Open Society Justice Initiative, *Criminal Force: Torture, Abuse, and Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigeria Police Force*, 19 May 2010, available at <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/criminal-force-20100519.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also IRIN Africa, *Nigeria: Police kill, rape torture and extort says rights group*, 21 May 2010, available at <http://www.irinnews.org/report/89220/nigeria-police-kill-rape-torture-and-extort-says-rights-group>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

173 See Open Society Justice Initiative, *Criminal Force: Torture, Abuse, and Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigeria Police Force*, 19 May 2010, available at <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/criminal-force-20100519.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also IRIN Africa, *Nigeria: Police kill, rape torture and extort says rights group*, 21 May 2010, available at <http://www.irinnews.org/report/89220/nigeria-police-kill-rape-torture-and-extort-says-rights-group>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

174 See Open Society Justice Initiative, *Criminal Force: Torture, Abuse, and Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigeria Police Force*, 19 May 2010, available at <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/criminal-force-20100519.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also IRIN Africa, *Nigeria: Police kill, rape torture and extort says rights group*, 21 May 2010, available at <http://www.irinnews.org/report/89220/nigeria-police-kill-rape-torture-and-extort-says-rights-group>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

175 See Open Society Justice Initiative, *Criminal Force: Torture, Abuse, and Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigeria Police Force*, 19 May 2010, available at <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/criminal-force-20100519.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also IRIN Africa, *Nigeria: Police kill, rape torture and extort says rights group*, 21 May 2010, available at <http://www.irinnews.org/report/89220/nigeria-police-kill-rape-torture-and-extort-says-rights-group>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

176 See Open Society Justice Initiative, *Criminal Force: Torture, Abuse, and Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigeria Police Force*, 19 May 2010, available at <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/criminal-force-20100519.pdf>, last

In response to allegations of human rights abuses in 2010, NPF spokesperson Emmanuel Ojukwu stated:

In the past 10 years in Nigeria the police force has grown tremendously in its respect for human rights and values of decent conduct [but] there are bad eggs in the police force who are guilty of human rights violations, making the force not immune to these accusations.¹⁷⁷

Impunity for human rights abuses and corruption continues to be widespread in the NPF.¹⁷⁸

Currently neither the Government of Nigeria nor the NPF have taken any measurable steps to establish policies or procedures for the investigation and prosecution of police who are suspected of abusing human rights.¹⁷⁹ For example, the Police Service Commission is charged with investigating police abuses by the NPF, but they are constrained by the lack of resources and overall lack of political will.¹⁸⁰ **As the former chairman of the Police Service Commission stated,** “One of the problems that have inhibited policing is noncompliance with extant rules and regulations, procedures and established police practices.”¹⁸¹

Additionally as has been reported by the CLEEN Foundation, “[s]uccessive chiefs of police at federal and state level[s] in Nigeria have failed to recognize discipline and disciplinary mechanism[s] as tools that could be used in a fair and consistent manner to remove those police officials who are undermining” effective policing efforts within Nigeria.¹⁸²

accessed on 14 February 2014. See also IRIN Africa, *Nigeria: Police kill, rape torture and extort says rights group*, 21 May 2010, available at <http://www.irinnews.org/report/89220/nigeria-police-kill-rape-torture-and-extort-says-rights-group>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

177 See IRIN Africa, *Nigeria: Police kill, rape torture and extort says rights group*, 21 May 2010, available at <http://www.irinnews.org/report/89220/nigeria-police-kill-rape-torture-and-extort-says-rights-group>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

178 **Two NPF departments have become notorious for their violent methods, Department B, which has a Police Mobile Force that is commonly known by Nigerians as “kill and go” due to its harsh tactics, and Department D, which routinely uses torture and abuse to illicit confessions instead of evidence-based policing.** See IRIN News, *Nigeria: Urgent need for police reform*, 18 April 2012, available at <http://www.irinnews.org/report/95314/nigeria-urgent-need-for-police-reform>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

179 **In 2003, the IGP had as part of police reform proposed the** “training of officers and men to appreciate and respect the concepts of constitutionalism, rule of Law and due process in line with Federal Government policy” as well as the establishment of Human Rights Desks at both Commands and Divisional levels and inclusion of human rights topics in syllabi of Police training institutions. These have not been fully implemented and have no visible impact on the conduct of security forces. See CP Marvel Akpoyibo, “Strategies for Re-Organisation and Re-Oriented of the Nigeria Police” a paper presented on behalf of Sir (Dr.) Mike M. Okiroefi; *npm, mni*, Inspector-General of Police at the Police Service Commission Retreat held in Osogbo, Osun State, 18 - 20 August 2003. According to CISLAC sources, this directive has not been implemented. See also Report of the Presidential Committee on the Reform of the Nigeria Police Force: 2006 headed by Alhaji Muhammad Dan Mandami CFR, mni DIG (RTD). See also Civil Society Panel on Police Reform in Nigeria Final Report, September 2012, available at <http://www.noprin.org/CSO%20Panel%20Final%20Report.pdf>, last accessed 14 February 2014, as well as the annual report of the National Human Rights Commission of 2007 where it recommended for the establishment of human rights desk offices in the police and other security agencies (*The State of Human Rights in Nigeria, 2009*, available at <http://nigeriarights.gov.ng/resources>, last accessed on 14 February 2014).

180 The NPF Act has remained the principal law governing the operations of the police. The conduct of the men and officers of the police is regulated by the Police Regulations. The Regulations list many offences that could require taking disciplinary measures but do not list specific serious human rights violations, such as torture, enforced disappearance or extrajudicial execution. Neither do they mention sexual exploitation and abuse as offences. Additionally, any extrajudicial police killings the Police Service Commission receives are referred to the police for investigation. Moreover the Commission's quarterly reports to the President are not published. See Open Society Justice Initiative, *Criminal Force: Torture, Abuse, and Extrajudicial Killings by the Nigeria Police Force*, 19 May 2010, available at <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/criminal-force-20100519.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

181 *Factors Inhibiting Police Performance in Nigeria*, a paper presented at the occasion of a Retreat with the theme: "Understanding the Mandate and Operations of the Police Service Commission in Context of the Rule of Law" by Parry B. O. Osayande, DIG (RTD), CFR, OFR, NPM, mni, Chairman, Police Service Commission.

182 This can be ascertained through the lack of resource allocation to disciplinary mechanisms and the absence of periodic review of the disciplinary system. None of the disciplinary mechanisms in the NPF have an annual budget for their

Currently, there is no known or published documentation on human rights screening of peacekeepers.¹⁸³ The Police Code of Conduct bars members of the police from taking undue advantage of citizens by violating their human rights. Police officers contend that they strictly adhere with the UN Guidelines in this connection.¹⁸⁴ However in the context of Nigeria, many cases of human right violations by members of the police go untried and unpunished.

Due to the demonstrated evidence of human rights abuses within the NPE,¹⁸⁵ the Government of Nigeria and the NPF must make a clear commitment towards the investigation and prosecution of human rights abusers, in addition to the fulfillment of the expression of commitment Nigeria has made to a “zero-tolerance” policy towards **sexual abuse and other criminal acts. Absent such an agreement, it is feared that those who have engaged in violations could be selected for peacekeeping missions.**¹⁸⁶

Nigerian Police and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation

Case No. 1

As previously discussed, in mid-2004, widespread allegations surfaced concerning sexual exploitation and abuse by Nigerian forces on peacekeeping mission in the DRC.¹⁸⁷ Due to the numerous allegations, UN officials responded to the charges through thorough investigations and subsequent changes in UN policies. Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that a zero tolerance policy towards sexual exploitation and abuse would be implement in the most transparent manner and appointed Prince Zeid to investigate and report on possible abuse.¹⁸⁸ More than a year after his appointment in

operations. Moreover, mechanisms such as the police Public Complaints Bureaus “have no writing materials for recording complaints, working telephone lines, fax machine and computer sets for keeping tracks of the complaints.” See CLEEN Foundation, *Improving Police-Community Relations*, available at <http://www.cleen.org/Improving%20Police-Community%20Relations.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

183 As mentioned above, the selection and training procedures for peacekeepers is not transparent. According to Transparency International, Canada is the only major UN troop contributing country with transparent selection and training procedures. See *Corruption and peacekeeping: Strengthening peacekeeping and the United Nations*, Transparency International UK, 9 October 2013, available at <http://www.transparency-se.org/130925-PK-report.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

184 Interview with an officer, Kano, 26 June 2013.

185 The Police Reform Committee also noted that “unlawful arrest and detention are sometimes due to directives by the government and the manipulation of the Police by influential people in society.” It went on to recommend that “[t]o reduce the incidence of police brutality, unlawful arrest and detention, the government needs to demonstrate to the citizens that it does not tolerate these practices, by showing itself as an example of government under the rule of law. First, by respecting and protecting the rights of association, assembly and protest by citizens, especially those in opposition; restraining itself from directing the Police to arrest and detain those who do not agree with it and by ensuring that victims of police brutality are duly compensated.” See Report of Presidential Committees on Police Report in Nigeria, *Motions Without Movement*, 2006, CLEEN, <http://www.cleen.org/Report%20of%20Presidential%20Committee%20on%20Police%20Reform.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

186 Nigeria has previously expressed its committed to the principle of accountability with regard to sexual abuse and other criminal acts, although it has made no direct reference to the proposed UN convention. See UNGA, *Summary record of the 9th meeting*, A/C.6/67/SR.9, 20 December 2012, as cited by Carla Ferstman, *Criminalizing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers*, United States Institute of Peace Special Report, available at <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR335-Criminalizing%20Sexual%20Exploitation%20and%20Abuse%20by%20Peacekeepers.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

187 Allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation of girls and women, including trading sex for money, food or jobs; rape; in addition to victims of abuse being left to care for children without any family to help them care for the children. See United Nations Press Release, Secretary-General Kofi Annan, *Secretary-General ‘Absolutely Outrage’ by Gross Misconduct by Peacekeeping Personnel in Democratic Republic of Congo*, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/9605 (19 November 2004), available at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sgsm9605.doc.htm>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also Elizabeth F. Defeis, *UN Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: An End to Impunity*, Washington University Global Studies Law Review, 2008, available at http://law.wustl.edu/WUGSLR/Issues/Volume7_2/Defeis.pdf, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

188 See Elizabeth F. Defeis, *UN Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: An End to Impunity*, Washington University Global Studies Law Review, 2008, available at http://law.wustl.edu/WUGSLR/Issues/Volume7_2/Defeis.pdf, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

2004, Prince Zeid stated in a confidential report that “[t]he situation appears to be one of ‘zero-compliance with zero tolerance’ throughout the mission.”¹⁸⁹

As a result of the findings of the investigations concerning the UN’s peacekeeping mission in the DRC (MONUC), the Government of Nigeria repatriated an entire 120 FPU from peacekeeping duties in 2005 following sexual abuse allegations.¹⁹⁰ The investigation uncovered allegations of sexual misconduct, including prostitution and sex with minors.¹⁹¹

In a speech given to the entire unit, the Nigerian Police Chief, Sunday Ehindero, stated, “Investigations so far conducted have established corroborated cases against 11 officers, including your commander, who breached the UN Code of Conduct. You all have brought shame to this country.”¹⁹² HazIwendi, the NPF spokesman, further explained the reasoning behind the repatriation of the entire contingent: “When one is contaminated, the whole bunch is contaminated.”¹⁹³ According to the report, the 11 implicated members of the unit were suspended upon their return as a result of the accusations.¹⁹⁴ However it is unclear what, if any, further actions were taken.

Existing Practices and Problems with Implementation

1. Vetting is not transparent: While there is a set of criteria for recruitment into the police, there is no clear set of criteria for the vetting of those selected for peacekeeping assignments. Thus even if vetting is done, it is not done in such a way that national institutions such as the Human Rights Commission and the Public Complaints Commission as well as the public in general would know and therefore citizens who have information about conduct

189 See Elizabeth F. Defeis, *UN Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: An End to Impunity*, Washington University Global Studies Law Review, 2008, available at http://law.wustl.edu/WUGSLR/Issues/Volume7_2/Defeis.pdf, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

190 Upon substantiation of the preliminary allegations of sexual misconduct, the entire unit was confined to its barracks until they were repatriated. See BBC, *Nigeria acts on police sex abuse*, 27 September 2005, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4285650.stm>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, *Statement attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on the recall of a Nigerian unit from MONUC*, available at <http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=1677>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also Wikileaks, *Cable 05KINSHASA1501_a*, 16 September 2005, available at http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05KINSHASA1501_a.html, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also Wikileaks, *Cable 05KINSHASA1484_a*, 14 September 2005, available at http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05KINSHASA1484_a.html, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

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192 See BBC, *Nigeria acts on police sex abuse*, 27 September 2005, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4285650.stm>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

193 See BBC, *Nigeria acts on police sex abuse*, 27 September 2005, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4285650.stm>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

194 It is unclear what other measures were taken against these officers, including, but not limited to, length of suspension, further inquiry into the allegations or court proceedings. See BBC, *Nigeria acts on police sex abuse*, 27 September 2005, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4285650.stm>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, *Statement attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on the recall of a Nigerian unit from MONUC*, available at <http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=1677>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also Wikileaks, *Cable 05KINSHASA1501_a*, 16 September 2005, available at http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05KINSHASA1501_a.html, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also Wikileaks, *Cable 05KINSHASA1484_a*, 14 September 2005, available at http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05KINSHASA1484_a.html, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

of police personnel cannot feed into the process. This inaccessibility means that people of dubious conduct and records could be enlisted. Furthermore, in the context of corrupt practices during recruitment into the police, it is possible also for corrupted personnel to get selected.

2. Corruption in the administration of the payment of peacekeepers: Peacekeeping contingents are paid their allowance through their commands. In a number of cases there have been protests by Nigerian contingents over the non-payment or cut in the payment of their allowances. In May 2011, about 600 members of the Nigeria Police contingent to Liberia, Haiti and Sudan on Peace-Keeping Missions, protested in Abuja over non-payment of their foreign allowances running into billions of naira by the Nigeria Police High Command, Abuja. There was a similar protest in 2012. As part of the effort to reduce corruption in the payments, the police authorities in June 2012 changed the practice of the payment of allowance from paying at the end of tour to paying some part in advance. CSP Frank E. Mba, deputy force public relations officer, said contrary to the usual practice of paying allowances on return of the Unit after completion of its assignment, the IGP approved the payment of three months' allowances to the officers in advance of their deployment, thus reducing the potential for corruption.¹⁹⁵
3. Corruption in both recruitment and selection: In spite of the criteria for recruitment, corruption in the recruitment of police has been a major problem and has been officially acknowledged as such. For example, the Report of the Presidential Committee on the Reform of the Nigeria Police Force noted that, "For some years now, recruitment standards have fallen due to a number of factors which include government policies, corruption, favoritism and undue external interference in the recruitment process. This has led to the Force being infiltrated by people of doubtful qualifications, character and integrity."¹⁹⁶ The Communiqué of the Police Service Commission Retreat of 2008 also observed that, "Corruption has eaten deep into the fabric of the Nigerian society including the Police but the situation can be remedied with disciplined and forthright leadership and a citizenry that is united in its resentment of corruption."¹⁹⁷ Corruption has made it possible for unqualified people to be recruited into the police and since unqualified people could get recruited into the police, it is possible also for those unqualified people to be selected for peacekeeping operation assignments.
4. No human rights policy: The Nigeria Police Force has no internal policy on human rights and does not have a mechanism for addressing human rights violations by its members. Indeed, human rights violations are not mentioned in the Police Code of Conduct or even the Police Regulations.

195 Press statement by CSP Frank E. Mba, deputy force public relations officer issued in Abuja, June, 2013

196 For full text of Communiqué issued at the end of 2008 Police Service Commission Retreat on: Understanding The Mandate and Operations of the Police Service Commission in the Context of the Rule Of Law held from 18th-20th August, 2008 at Miccom Golf Hotels and Resort, Ibukun Road, Ada, Osun State, see Police Service Commission website, <http://www.psc.gov.ng/node/140>

197 For full text of Communiqué issued at the end of 2008 Police Service Commission Retreat on: Understanding The Mandate and Operations of the Police Service Commission in the Context of the Rule Of Law held from 18th-20th August, 2008 at Miccom Golf Hotels and Resort, Ibukun Road, Ada, Osun State, see Police Service Commission website, <http://www.psc.gov.ng/node/140>

5. No policy on sexual exploitation and abuse: We note the indirect reference to sexual exploitation and abuse in the rules of engagement for peacekeepers. However, the Nigeria Police Force has no policy on sexual exploitation and abuse. As these acts are rarely punished at home, some of the officers also engage in such acts while on peacekeeping operations. For example, in 2005, eleven Nigerian police officers were found responsible for sexual misconduct while serving in the UN peacekeeping force in the DRC leading to the withdrawal of the whole FPU. Among the culprits was the head of the contingent.¹⁹⁸
6. Inadequate content for pre-deployment training: The police's pre-deployment training does not appear to be adequate enough. The reasons for the poor training include poor training facilities, poor or no motivation for training and the fact that the curriculum is not sufficiently deep to provide adequate grounding in reorienting the police to place premium on respect for human rights and dignity of civilian populations.
7. Insufficient mechanisms for public input and oversight bodies: Although there is the Police Service Commission, the availability of the body is too limited to constitute sufficient avenue for the public to provide information that would assist in the oversight of the Nigerian Police. The Commission is still battling to find its feet given its initial position and lack of cooperation to it from the top police command.¹⁹⁹ The Police Affairs Committee of the National Assembly does not concern itself with the conduct of members of the Police Force. They have limited their oversight review to issues pertaining to implementation of projects appropriated in the police budget.
8. Gender Discrimination: Because of systemic gender discrimination women do not get to fully participate in all aspects of police life and have far fewer chances of getting selected for peacekeeping assignments. The Police Act has many discriminatory clauses against women. For instance, married policewomen are not supposed to have accommodation in barracks. Similarly, unmarried policewomen must seek permission to marry.

198 Media statement by former IGP, Sunday Ehindero, September 2005. See also <http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/nigerian-peacekeepers-pulled-drcongo-mission-misconduct>

199 For details of these problems see for example, S. N. Okeke: "Successes and Challenges of the Tenure of the Chief Simon Okeke-led Police Service Commission and the Way Forward" in CLEEN Foundation: *External Police Accountability and the Police Service Commission, Conference Proceedings*. CLEEN Foundation, Lao, 2013

Chapter 3: Conclusion and Recommendations

Drawing on the available documentation and observations on the current practices of both the Nigerian Police Force and the Armed Forces as they relate to the selection and training of prospective personnel for peacekeeping operations, there is clearly a need to develop a proper vetting mechanism for the selection of peacekeeping contingents that will be consistent with the guidelines of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. This vetting mechanism and processes should be transparent, rule-based and accessible to institutions such as the Police Service Commission, the Human Rights Commission and the Public Complaints Commission and to the public so that inputs by the public regarding the records or standing of people being considered for enlistment in peacekeeping operations can be taken onboard in the decision-making processes.

With respect to individuals, a vetting system would centre around two broad categories of indicators: capacity and integrity. Capacity indicators would include education, experience and aptitude. These are much easier to assess and to verify during selection than integrity indicators. The latter would assess a person's history of professional and personal conduct. In the specific cases of Nigeria, it would seem that capacity indicator is poor when judged against the entry route, training and the pre-deployment training that selected peacekeepers receive. With respect to integrity, both the police and the armed forces have no clear public vetting system that is database-driven. The fact is that in terms of both policy and practice, members of both the Nigeria Armed Forces and the Police Force do not have sufficient regard for human rights. This means that there is the possibility that they could be poorly prepared for peacekeeping operations. The observations below summarize the key gaps in the evolution of a robust, transparent and accountable vetting system that the country needs to be developed.

Key observations

1. Nigeria is currently one of the top contributor countries to peacekeeping personnel. To this extent therefore, the quality of personnel and their conduct are of utmost importance in the global peacekeeping operation system.
2. There is ground to suspect that training for peacekeepers is inadequate. In particular “the curriculum for the police is severely undeveloped and there are critical gaps in areas that are vital to effective policy, such as forensics and crime management, special victims, human rights and information technology.”²⁰⁰
3. Over the years, sexual exploitation and abuse and human rights violations by members of the Nigeria Armed Forces and the Nigeria Police Force have been rampant with no proactive responses by the concerned institutions to deal with the situation in a systematic manner that would win the confidence of the public.
4. The performance of Nigerian troops with respect to weapons' handling when dealing with people living in situations of conflict and war has not always been adequate. There are cases of sexual exploitation and abuse and other human rights violations in a number of peacekeeping posts, which have not been properly investigated because of the lack of a robust oversight mechanism for peacekeeping operations in the country.

200 CSO Panel(ed), 2012: *Police Reform in Nigeria: Civil Society Panel Final Report*, Malthouse and CLEEN, Lagos, pp 51-52

5. Corruption, especially in relation to the payment of allowances for peacekeepers has been responsible for undermining the morale of peacekeepers and has also been a cause for indiscipline among the contingents, including possibly sexual exploitation and abuse and other human rights violations. Whereas this has been somewhat addressed by the partial payment of allowances prior to deployment, corruption in the overall process remains a serious concern.
6. The public is not aware about vetting and selection of peacekeepers and have no means of providing information about prospective peacekeeping personnel who have been known to have been involved in human rights violations or sexual exploitation and abuse.
7. There is limited knowledge of human rights instruments and the commitment to uphold human rights in the course of duty among members of both the armed forces and police.
8. There are no policies with respect to sexual abuse and other human rights violations within both the Nigerian Armed Forces and the Nigerian Police Force.
9. Nigeria does not have a National Peacekeeping Operation Policy that guides its participation in peacekeeping operations.
10. There is no civilian body that is responsible for ensuring accountability from the armed forces of Nigeria. This is why complaints about army brutality and abuses of power from ordinary citizens are hardly investigated. This breeds impunity.
11. Neither the police nor the armed forces have an easy to use database that can be used to weed out personnel with cases of proven misconduct during selection and vetting of prospective peacekeepers, especially as related to human rights violations.
12. Civilian oversight of the Police is developing but is still weak and not in a position to provide an effective oversight on police participation in peacekeeping operations.
13. Parliamentary oversight that should provide accountability in all its dimensions for both the military and police is still evolving but nowhere near the point it could provide an oversight on peacekeeping operations.

Recommendations

As set out in this paper, major weaknesses in policy development, vetting policy and practice, training, role of oversight bodies and corruption more generally impact on the current processes used for the selection and deployment of peacekeepers, resulting in serious deficiencies. Below are a set of recommendations addressed to the government and other relevant institutions in respect of all these areas.

Policy Development

1. Nigeria should as a matter of urgency develop a national Policy on Peacekeeping Support Operations. Such a policy should detail among other things the principles, criteria, processes and mechanisms for the selection of peacekeeping personnel as well as create civilian oversight mechanisms that would assure the public that military and police personnel are transparently and accountably vetted for participation in peacekeeping operations.

2. There is the need for both the Nigeria Armed Force and the Nigeria Police to develop relevant policies on
 - a. Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
 - b. Human Rights Violations
3. There is the need to speed up the full integration of women into the pool of those to be selected for peacekeeping operations in both the military and the police both as a mean of ending discrimination against women and a mechanism to address sexual exploitation and abuse by pre-dominantly male peacekeeping troops.

Vetting policy development

4. Notwithstanding the existence of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the Defence Headquarters, Offices of Peacekeeping Operations should be established in all arms of the Nigerian Armed Forces to be charged with the responsibility of coordinating the participation of that arm in peacekeeping operations, and in particular to vet those to be selected for peacekeeping operations.
5. To enhance effectiveness, and ensure proper screening for human rights violations, a system to monitor the selection of all contributor components for peacekeeping personnel should be developed.
6. Both the Armed Forces and the Nigerian Police should develop a functional and easy-to-mine database on the conduct of their members to enhance personal performance monitoring and for use during vetting processes so that personnel who have been involved in sexual abuse or other human rights violations are not enlisted.
7. Vetting mechanisms should include interviews on human rights knowledge of the prospective personnel for peacekeeping.
8. A vetting mechanism for both the Nigerian Armed Forces and Police should include the National Human Rights Commission.
9. The submission of lists of selected peacekeeping troops from Nigeria to the UN should be accompanied by a detailed report on vetting for each candidate. Such vetting reports should also be made available to the relevant oversight committees of the National Assembly.

Training

10. There is need for the Police to speed up the implementation of its decisions to establish a Peacekeeping Training Institute for the Police and to properly equip the institution, including providing it with appropriate curriculum that will train police for peacekeeping operations within the context of respect for human rights and dignity.
11. There is the need for the review of the curricula of all military and police training institutions with a view to mainstream human rights and gender issues in the programmes.
12. The training institutions of both the Armed Forces of Nigeria and the Nigerian Police should be strengthened to enhance the quality of training they receive and all curricula should incorporate courses on human rights and gender awareness.

Strengthening of Oversight Mechanisms

13. There is the need for the National Assembly oversight committees to insist on developing policy and getting reports from vetting processes of those selected for participation in peacekeeping operations to ensure that those with dubious records are not enlisted. In particular, all relevant oversight committees of the National Assembly should ensure that no police or member of the armed forces is sent to peacekeeping operations without vetting him or her with respect to human rights and sexual exploitation and abuse.
14. The National Human Rights Commission should initiate a programme on profiling members of both the armed forces and the police who have been found involved in human rights violations and connect such profile data to the vetting mechanisms for the army and police for the use during vetting and selection of peacekeeping personnel.
15. The decision of the Police to establish a Human Rights Desk in all its units should be fully implemented without further delay.
16. There is a need for the Police Service Commission Disciplinary Processes to go beyond normal operational misconduct to develop capacity to deal with issues of human rights violations and sexual abuse and keep up to date records of all those found guilty of human rights or sexual exploitation or abuse or standing trial for such abuses so that they do not get enlisted for peacekeeping operations. The data on number of officers found guilty and the punishments imposed on them should be made public, in order to increase public trust in the NPF.
17. To strengthen the oversight function of the Police Service Commission, the appointment of the representatives of stakeholders on the Commission should be done through consultative processes in which these stakeholders will nominate their representatives, with the power to recall them if they lost confidence in the quality of representation they give or in their conduct and participation in the work of the Commission.
18. There is need for the establishment of external oversight agencies for the military and other security agencies as well as the promotion of synergy and collaboration among all security agencies to reduce impunity among the agencies.
19. The National Assembly should organize public hearing on the participation of Nigeria in peacekeeping operations with a view to establish how personnel were selected, how funds were used and how the personnel conducted themselves in peacekeeping missions.

To Address Corruption

20. Recent reforms of the payment of peacekeeper allowances should be consolidated with mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability in the payment of these allowances.
21. There is a need to institute a thorough investigation into various allegations of corruption in the management of peacekeeping operations in both the police and the army with a view to determining if there was corruption involved, how it was allowed to occur and develop steps to ensure they do not occur again as well as punish those persons found responsible.
22. Strategies suggested by various bodies on stemming corruption in the police should be vigorously pursued.

Appendix 1

HISTORY OF NIGERIA POLICE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS²⁰¹

The Nigeria Police first participated in peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the year 1960 with ACP. Louis Edet as the Contingent Commander. The first Nigerian Formed Police Unit was deployed to Liberia in the year 2004 with SP. Sikiru Akande as its contingent commander.

THE NIGERIA POLICE IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING SINCE 1960

S/ NO	COUNTRY	MISSION	DATE
1	Congo/Democratic Republic of the Congo	ONUC/MONUC/ MONUSCO	1960 – Present
2	Namibia	UNTAG	1989 – 1990
3	Angola	UNAVEM I, II, III	1991 – 1998
4	Western Sahara	MINURSO	1991
5	Cambodia	UNTAC	1992 – 1993
6	Mozambique	UNOMOZ	1993 – 1994
7	Somalia	UNOSOM/AMISOM	1993 – 1994
8	Rwanda	UNAMIR	1993 – 1996
9	Yugoslavia	UNPROFOR	1992 – 1996
10	Bosnia-Herzegovina	UNMIBH	1992 – 1994
11	Croatia	UNCRO	1995 – 1994
12	Macedonia	HNPREDREP	1995
13	East Timor	UNTAC/UNMIT	1999 – 2012
14	Kosovo	UNMIK	1999
15	Sierra Leone	UNAMISIL	2000
16	Liberia	UNMIL	2003 – 2014
17	Afghanistan	UNAMA	2004
18	Cote d'Ivoire	ONUCI	2004 – 2012 , Present
19	Burundi	UNOB	2004
20	Haiti	MINUSTAH	2004 – Present
21	Sudan	AMIS/UNMIS/UNAMID	1999 – Present
22	South Sudan	UNMISS	2011 – Present
23	Guinea Bissau	ECOMIB	2012
24	Mali	MINUSMA	2013 - Present

201 See United Nations, *Troop and police contributors*, available at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also United Nations, *Troop and police contributors archive (1990-2013)*, available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also History of Peace Opps, available at <https://docs.google.com/document/d/19cqYVqB4GooH56d7Gh-8OKkbNNFBaL-Lk32Qc0lAuW0/edit>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

INDIVIDUAL POLICE OFFICERS DEPLOYED TO UNITED NATIONS PEACE KEEPING MISSIONS FROM 2008 TO 2011

S/NO	MISSION	COUNTRY	IPO	DATE/YEAR
1	UNMIT	Timor-Leste	54 OFFICERS	12/02/2008
2	UNMIS	Sudan	13 OFFICERS	26/02/2008
3	UNAMID	Sudan	4 OFFICERS	13/03/2008
4	UNMIL	Liberia	7 OFFICERS	13/03/2008
5	MINUSTAH	Haiti	4 OFFICERS	30/05/2008
6	UNMIK	Kosovo	20 OFFICERS	17/06/2008
7	UNMIS	Sudan	18 OFFICERS	23/06/2008
8	UNAMID	Sudan	46 OFFICERS	3/10/2008
9	UNAMID	Sudan	28 OFFICERS	28/10/2008
10	UNAMID	Sudan	19 OFFICERS	31/10/2008
11	UNAMID	Sudan	7 OFFICERS	31/10/2008
12	UNMIL	Liberia	21 OFFICERS	30/12/2008
13	UNMIS	Sudan	11 OFFICERS	07/04/2009
14	UNAMID	Sudan	28 OFFICERS	17/04/2009
15	UNAMID	Sudan	40 OFFICERS	11/05/2009
16	UNAMID	Sudan	27 OFFICERS	16/05/2009
17	UNAMID	Sudan	27 OFFICERS	26/05/2009
18	UNAMID	Sudan	2 OFFICERS	28/05/2009
19	UNMIT	Timor-Leste	52 OFFICERS	02/06/2009
20	UNAMID	Sudan	35 OFFICERS	26/06/2009
21	UNAMID	Sudan	3 OFFICERS	24/07/2009
22	UNMIL	Liberia	10 OFFICERS	07/08/2009
23	UNAMID	Sudan	31 OFFICERS	12/08/2009
24	UNMIS	Sudan	23 OFFICERS	26/08/2009
25	UNMIL	Liberia	2 OFFICERS	15/09/2009
26	UNAMID	Sudan	4 OFFICERS	17/11/2009
27	AMISOM	Somalia	8 OFFICERS	14/02/2010
28	UNAMID	Sudan	26 OFFICERS	23/02/2010
29	UNMIS	Sudan	5 OFFICERS	28/04/2010
30	MINUSTAH	Haiti	1 OFFICER	21/05/2010
31	UNMIL	Liberia	14 OFFICERS	22/06/2010
32	MINUSTAH	Haiti	6 OFFICERS	22/06/2010
33	UNMIS	Sudan	6 OFFICERS	08/07/2010
34	UNAMID	Sudan	40 OFFICERS	19/07/2010
35	MONUSCO	DRC	2 OFFICERS	10/08/2010
36	UNMIL	Liberia	7 OFFICERS	20/08/2010
37	UNAMID	Sudan	79 OFFICERS	14/10/2010
38	UNAMID	Sudan	6 OFFICERS	15/10/2010
39	UNMIL	Liberia	7 OFFICERS	21/10/2010
40	UNMIT	Timor-Leste	37 OFFICERS	11/11/2010
41	UNMIS	Sudan	3 OFFICERS	17/12/2010

42	UNMIS	Sudan	32 OFFICERS	13/12/2011
43	UNMIS	Sudan	13 OFFICERS	11/02/2011
44	AMISOM	Somalia	8 OFFICERS	04/02/2011
45	UNMIS	Sudan	1 OFFICER	19/06/2011
46	MINUSTAH	Haiti	3 OFFICERS	14/07/2011
47	MINUSTAH	Haiti	4 OFFICERS	17/08/2011
48	MINUSTAH	Haiti	1 OFFICER	18/08/2011
49	MONUSCO	DRC	1 OFFICER	22/08/2011
50	UNMIL	Liberia	6 OFFICERS	11/09/2011
51	ONUCI	Cote d'Ivoire	9 OFFICERS	01/12/2011
52	ONUCI	Cote d'Ivoire	1 OFFICER	08/12/2011
TOTAL	8 COUNTRIES		862	

THE NIGERIA FORMED POLICE UNIT (NFPU) DEPLOYED TO UNITED NATIONS PEACE KEEPING MISSIONS FROM 2008 TO 2011

S/NO	MISSION	COUNTRY	NO. OF FPU DEPLOYED PER 6MONTH	NO. OF FPU DEPLOYED PER YEAR	PERIOD UNDER REVIEW (4 YEARS)
1	UNMIL	Liberia	120	240	2008-2011
2	UNAMID	Sudan 1	140	280	
3	UNAMID	Sudan 2	140	280	
4	MINUSTAH	Haiti	140	280	
TOTAL	3 Countries		1080 X 4	4320	

INDIVIDUAL POLICE OFFICERS DEPLOYED TO UN/AU/ECOWAS PEACE KEEPING MISSIONS 2012

S/NO	MISSION	COUNTRY	IPO	DATE/YEAR	C/COMMANDER
1	MINUSTAH	Haiti	8 OFFICERS	28/1/2012	SP. DAHIRU IBRAHIM
2	MONUSCO	DRC	5 OFFICERS	16/1/2012	SP. MOHAMMED AMABUA
3	UNAMID	Darfur	91 OFFICERS	5/3/2012	CSP. BABATOLA AFOLABI
4	UNMISS	South Sudan	25 OFFICERS	24/3/2012	SP. OKON M. EFFIONG
5.	AMISOM	Somalia	29 OFFICERS	16/5/2012	CSP. STEVE IKENWEIWE
6.	UNMIL	Liberia	5 OFFICERS	16/5/2012	CSP. NYATSE TANIMU
7.	UNMIT	East Timor	32 OFFICERS	5/7/2012	SP. OLUFEMI AKINWALE AKINOLA
8.	UNMIL	Liberia	5 OFFICERS	2/11/2012	CSP. OGUNLEYE TEMITAYO

FORMED POLICE UNIT (FPU) DEPLOYED TO UN/AU/ECOWAS PEACE KEEPING MISSIONS 2012

S/ NO	MISSION	COUNTRY	IPO	DATE/ YEAR	C/COMMANDER
1	SUDAN 1	Sudan/Elgeniena	140 OFFICERS	16/4/2012	SP. ABIODUN ALABI
2	SUDAN 2	Sudan/Zalinge	140 OFFICERS	16/4/2012	SP. SULE BALARABE
3.	LIBERIA	Liberia	120 OFFICERS	25/3/2012	CSP. GOTAN D. IBRAHIM
4.	GUNIEA BISSAU	Guinea Bissau	142 OFFICERS	29/5/2012	CSP. YAKUBU KWAZHI B. D
5	AMISOM	Somalia	140 OFFICERS	17/9/2012	CSP. ALAMUTU A. MUSTAPHA
6	UNMIL	Liberia		18/10/2012	CSP. MOHAMMED B. MARAFA

Appendix 2: Response to CISLAC From Chief of Army Staff, Nigerian Army

AHQ DOAA/G1/300/200



Headquarters
Nigerian Army
Ministry of Defence
Area 7 Garki
PMB 239
e-mail: ahq.doaa@army.mil.ng
Tel: 092917040

The Executive Director
Civil Society Legislative Advocacy
Centre (CISLAC)
7 Mahatma Gandhi Street
Off Shehu Shagari Way
By Bulet Garden
ASOKORO - ABUJA

13 November 2013

RE: ENHANCING HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS FOR MILITARY AND POLICE IN NIGERIA ON PEACEKEEPING

1. I am directed to acknowledge your letter dated 24 October 2013 which forwarded a draft report on enhancing human rights standards for military and police in Nigeria on peacekeeping. You requested for Nigerian Army (NA) input on the document.
2. Please be informed that the NA has codified rules and regulations, Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Rules of Engagement for its peacekeepers. These documents are elaborate in nature and have continued to ensure the maintenance of high standards by NA peacekeepers, including human rights. This is attested to by the worldwide acclaim of NA's participation and achievements in global peacekeeping.
3. While thanking you for considering the NA worthy of consideration in your project, please accept the assurances of Chief of Army Staff's esteemed regards.


RJ ALEXANDER
Colonel
for Chief of Army Staff

Copy to:

Office of the Chief of Army Staff
Army Headquarters Department of Training and Operations
Army Headquarters Department of Civil/Military Affairs
Directorate of Army Public Relations
Directorate of Legal Services (Army)

Appendix 3

NIGERIAN PARTICIPATION IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 1960 TO PRESENT²⁰²

Mission	Year	Type of Operation
Congo (ONUC)	1960 - 1964	Battalion operations
New Guinea (UNSF)	1962 - 1963	Military Observers
Tanzania (Bilateral agreement)	1964	Battalion operations
India-Pakistan (UNIPOM)	1965 - 1966	Military Observers
Lebanon (UNIFIL)	1978 - 1983	Battalion operations and Staff Officers
Chad (HARMONY I, bilateral agreement)	1981 - 1982	Battalion operations and Staff Officers
Chad (HARMONY II, OAU)	1982 - 1983	Brigade operations
Iran-Iraq (UNIIMOG)	1988 - 1991	Military Observers
Liberia (ECOMOG)	1990	Division (-) operations
Iraq-Kuwait (UNIKOM)	1991	Military Observers
Angola (UNAVEM II)	1991 - 1992	Military Observers
Sierra Leone (NATAG)	1991	Training Team
Angola (UNAVEM III)	1992 - 1995	Detachment
Namibia (UNTAG)	1989 - 1990	Military Observers
Western Sahara (MINURSO)	1991	Military Observers
Cambodia (UNTAC)	1992 - 1993	Military Observers
Somalia (UNOSOM)	1992 - 1994	Battalion operations and Staff Officers
Former Republic of Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR)	1992	Battalion operations and Staff Officers
Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	1992	Military Observers
Rwanda (UNAMIR)	1993	Battalion operations
Gambia (NATAG)	1993	Training Team
Aouzo Strip (UNASOG)	1994	Military Observers
Israel (UNTSO)	1995	Military Observers

202 See Training for Peace Operations Conducted in Nigeria – African Capabilities for Training for Peace Operations, *Appendix F* available at <http://www.issafrica.org/Pubs/Other/AfricaCapab/AppendF.html>, last accessed on 14 February 2014. See also United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, *Troop and Police Contributors 1990-2013*, available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

Appendix 4

HIERARCHICAL, COMMAND AND FIELD OPERATIONS STRUCTURE OF THE NPF²⁰³

NO.	Command Level	Commander
1.	Force Headquarters (National)	Inspector-General
2.	Zonal Command (group of state commands)	Assistant Inspector-General
3.	State Command	Commissioner
4.	Area Command (a group of Divisional Commands)	Assistant Commissioner
5.	Divisional Command	Assistant Superintendent of Police (or higher rank)
6.	District Command	Inspector (or higher rank)
7.	Police Station	Sub-Inspector (or higher rank)
8.	Police Post	Corporal (or higher rank)
9.	Village Post	Police Constable (with a minimum experience or higher rank)

203 See CLEEN Foundation, *Police Violence*, available at <http://www.w.cleen.org/police-violence.pdf>, last accessed on 14 February 2014.

Appendix 5: Establishment and Strength of The Police Force in 2009 ²⁰⁴

S/N	Rank	Number	Total
1.	IGP	1	1
2.	DIG	7	6
3.	AIG	18	18
4.	CP	85	77
5.	DCP	147	139
6.	ACP	417	378
7.	CSP	1,154	1,061
8.	SP	2,308	1,698
9.	DSP	4,616	3,314
10.	ASP 1&11	9,232	12,377
11.	INSPECTOR	26,356	29,257
12.	SERGEANT	52,711	53,008
13.	CORPORAL	105,424	76,591
14.	CONSTABLE	210,000	167,098
15.	TOTAL	412,476	345,023

²⁰⁴ Nigeria Police Force (2009): The Annual Report of the Nigeria Police Force.

Appendix 6: Police Formation in The Country as of 2009

States	No of area command	No of divisions	No of police stations	No of police posts	Total no of village post
Abuja	3	16	11	44	7
Abia	3	29	22	32	1
Adamawa	3	24	65	102	199
Anambra	3	32	41		
A/ibom	3	35	52	43	132
Bauchi	3	24	38	99	55
Benue	3	28	37	139	204
Bayelsa	3	10	19	30	61
Borno	3	37	42	100	179
C/river	3	23	55	23	103
Delta	3	33	67		100
Ebonyi	3	13	29	10	69
Edo	3	29	31	43	151
Enugu	3	23	6	54	
Ekiti	3	20	21	50	79
Gombe	3	29	34	74	129
Imo	3	30	63	38	134
Jigawa	3	27	27	120	179
Kaduna	3	36	59	105	202
Kano	3	67	17	104	45
Katsina	3		38	103	3
Kebbi	5	24	123	79	137
Kogi	3	32	91	79	4
Kwara	3	46	7	85	
Lagos	8		128	78	298
Niger	4	36	60	118	44
Nasarawa	3	17	39	115	171
Ogun	5	31	25	65	10
Ondo	3	31	36	26	93

Oyo	4	47	50	32	170
Osun	3	33	47	47	130
Plateau	2	25	101	174	256
Rivers	3	38	34	63	103
Sokoto	3	26	3	44	75
Taraba	3	17	71	123	33
Yobe	3	18	19	70	20
Zamfara	3	36	35	62	136
Railway	5	9	30		44
PAP	2	7	7	2	20
Airport	1	3		2	6
Total	127	1,130	1,579	2,165	

Source: Nigeria Police Force (2009): The Annual Report of the Nigeria Police Force



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